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Abstract 
The Trident strategic nuclear missile system was developed by the United States in 
the 1970s and selected in 1980 by the Thatcher government to become Britain's main 
nuclear deterrent. It replaced a similar but smaller Polaris missile submarine system, 
which had entered service in 1968. The Royal Navy version comprised of four 
massive 'Vanguard' class nuclear submarines; these vessels were commissioned 
between 1993 and 1999. Each submarine could carry sixteen Trident D5 warheads; 
each missile could mount up to eight thermonuclear warheads. 
The submarines and warheads were produced in England and the missiles were 
produced and serviced in the United States. Nevertheless, the Trident decision meant 
that Scotland remained the main base of Britain's strategic nuclear forces. Complex 
and expensive new support facilities were constructed at the existing British Polaris 
base at Faslane on the Gareloch in the Clyde Estuary; nuclear storage facilities were 
constructed nearby at Coulport. Further activities were to be carried out at the existing 
naval dockyard at Rosyth in the east of Scotland. These were the three major Trident 
facilities in Scotland. At the time of writing (2004) Scotland's experience with 
Trident has not been adequately researched or subjected to the insight of historians. 
One of the three core arguments presented in this thesis suggests that many people 
accepted the view that Trident was a necessary contributor to national security. The 
promise of sustained employment in Scotland was a second reason to accept Trident. 
Finally, the Scottish people did not actively oppose Trident because they had become 
familiar with Polaris. 
Chapter One discusses the experiences of Strathclyde communities and those local 
governments near Faslane and Coulport. Chapter Two is concerned with the 
experiences of Fife communities and those local governments in proximity to Rosyth 
Royal Dockyard. The third chapter will discuss the Scottish political dimension of 
Trident and evaluates the pressures that the disarmament issue implied for the various 
parties. Chapter Four reveals the various reactions of seven components within 
Scottish civil society to Trident's procurement. Chapter Five investigates the 
disarmament movement's experience with Trident in Scotland. Chapter Six presents 
the conclusions of this study. 
Official printed sources employed in this thesis include Defence Committee reports, 
Notices of Proposed Development and case-studies from the National Audit Office. 
Other documents included Strathclyde Region Council's 1983 Couiport Inquiry, and 
literature from the SCND, the Nuclear Free Local Authorities and the Scottish Trades 
Union Congress. This research also uses council minutes, environmental impact 
assessments and several hundred clippings from local newspapers. Furthermore, oral 
and written testimony served to fill numerous historical gaps. Numerous interviews 
and correspondences involved government officials, British MPs and MSPs, members 
of the Scottish media and the STUC, Faslane shop stewards, along with members of 
Scotland's religious community, the disannament movement and everyday citizens . 
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Introduction 
Before one can begin a thorough examination of the Scottish historical experience 
with the Trident system it is first necessary to explain the specific path to be taken 
within this introduction. We begin with a discussion on the rationale for such a 
thesis, core arguments are presented, and then it is necessary to provide background 
information on both the Royal Navy's experience with the submersible and the 
decision to employ the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and 
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system. Due to the vast degree of 
complexity associated with this topic, and the quantitative limitations imposed upon 
this work, the account of the Royal Navy's experience is merely an overview of 
events. This will be followed by an explanation of the numerous sources utilised in 
this thesis, and the methodology employed by the researcher, so that one might 
better understand how an accurate depiction of Scotland's experience with Trident 
was finally established. Ultimately, the contents of this study systemically reveal 
the tension that Trident exacted upon civil society and Scotland's place in the 
Union. It also uncovers the changing nature of the relationship between Scotland 
and the most recent sea-borne deterrent over the course of two decades. 
Rationale 
This thesis is important because it interprets the first two decades of Scotland's 
interaction with the Royal Navy's Trident SSBN and SLBM. This research seeks to 
highlight the impact a project of this magnitude has had on Scottish communities, 
the physical environment and the numerous concerns the nuclear dimension of 
Trident has generated north of the Border. It also underlines the complexities the 
1 
system has placed upon Scotland's relationship with the remainder of the UK while 
providing an example for future decisions regarding a replacement for Trident. In 
addition, this study also examines the several strategies that central government has 
employed over the course of twenty years to assist in convincing both the Scottish 
and British electorate of Trident's utility. Moreover, Trident came with a £5,000 
million price tag and this work has revealed the economic repercussions of 
maintaining such a system, both to Scotland and the wider UK. Lastly, the country's 
interaction with the SSBN verifies Scotland's strategic importance to the British 
military establishment throughout the Cold War era but may provoke the reader to 
question the system's necessity in an age where the Soviet Union is no more. 
From 1961 a number of Scotland's residents became increasingly concerned with 
nuclear weaponry after the arrival of the American Polaris fleet in the Holy Loch. 
Yet the safe operation of US and UK systems from Strathclyde, along with their 
employment potential, subdued many of the various concerns associated with the 
deterrent. However, one might expect to hear the phrase 'ye cannae spend a dollar 
when ye're deid' from a Glasgow peace activist, someone who ultimately rejected 
central government's economic arguments for Trident. I Because Strathclyde served 
as Trident's operational centre, the explicit targeting of Scottish territory by Soviet 
military strategists during the Cold War era, the fears that accompanied the 
possibilities for accidental radiological contamination, and, more recently, the 
vulnerability of this system to acts of terrorism have fuelled this ongoing 
trepidation. Despite rigorous safety guidelines enforced over the course of its life 
I This is a line from the Polaris protest anthem Ding-Dong Do//ar. See Chapter five: Scotland and 
the disarmament movement. 
2 
expectancy, Trident, and future versions of the nuclear deterrent, will undoubtedly 
generate some level of concern in Scotland so long as a system remains in place. 
Though Malcolm Spaven sheds some light into Scotland's post-1945 experience 
with his publication Fortress Scotland: A Guide to the Military Presence, little is 
actually understood of the country's interaction with the UK's nuclear deterrent, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or even the Cold War.2 In 1977 
historian John Erickson wrote that: 
For all the noisesomeness of sentimentality and the verbosity of 
nostalgia, 'defence' in its technical context has been left largely and 
deliberately unnoticed. Even more important, it is intended that it should 
go unnoticed. In the several feverish discussions of Scotland and its 
possible future, 'defence and foreign policy' drift quite casually by, they 
trip off the tongue of many, but it is not meant to be heard.3 
While Erickson's interpretation of events was centred on the debate over 
constitutional status and its connotations to national security, Scotland's role in UK 
Defence planning has been overlooked and oflow academic priority. In this 
particular instance, Trident, like NATO, has been disregarded by Scottish 
academics as these topics are customarily associated with modem British military 
history. Furthermore, studies of specific weapon systems are typically associated 
with research, development and operation. They very rarely investigate the specific 
influences a particular weapon might hold for communities in proximity to these 
systems. However, in terms of its impact on Scotland the reason for Trident's low 
2 M. Spaven, Fortress Scotland: A Guide to the Military Presence (London: Pluto Press, 1983). 
3 J. Erickson, 'Scotland's Defence', in Robert Underwood (ed.), The Future o/Scotland (London: 
Croom Helm, 1977), p. 154. 
3 
priority may be much simpler. Scotland has a complex, rich history that has been 
left with an over-abundance of unexplored research materials. 
An explanation for the chosen period of study is also in order. The 1979-1999 time 
frame has been selected because the period runs from the beginning to the end of 
Trident's anti-Soviet deployment. The Carter administration's willingness to offer 
Britain the system was first seriously considered during the final months of the 
Callaghan government. The fourth and final Vanguard class SSBN arrived at 
Faslane in 1999. This marked the project's completion in that all the necessary 
components involving the British model for deterrence were in place. 
Taken from a publication that was simply the transcript of a conversation between 
publisher and author, when asked ifhe was converted to Scottish Home Rule by the 
placing of the American and British nuclear submarine bases on the Clyde, 
prestigious author Alasdair Gray stated: 
Most British Labour voters did not see why the USA, when she was the 
only nation to possess atomic weapons, refused to sign an international 
agreement banning their manufacture and use. Still less did we see why 
Britain (which now had no empire to defend) was joining an arms race 
with the two biggest empires which remained: especially when Japan 
and West Germany were becoming the world's foremost industrial 
nations because they were excluded from such weapon making. We 
could not understand it - there seemed no explanation but human 
blindness. Leading politicians in those days spoke as if nuclear war was 
a thing civilisation could survive, while at the same time building vastly 
expensive bunkers for themselves and their adherents all over the 
country. Bunkers for Scottish administrators were built under Edinburgh 
Zoo and the Glasgow Burrell Collection Gallery. 
4 
Furthermore, he states: 
We were told that without nuclear weapons Britain would become second 
rate like Japan, West Germany and Scandinavian nations where the 
ordinary standard of living had risen mysteriously higher than that of 
Britain. Despite this pUblicity our trade unions and local Labour parties 
were so convinced by eND arguments that the 1960 Labour Party 
conference voted that Britain give up her nuclear defences - whereupon the 
leader of the parliamentary Labour Party said he would ignore the 
conference's decision. In this matter he was on the side of the Tories, and 
the parliamentary Labour Party has been on the side of the Tories in that 
and other matters ever since. At that time I was naively astonished ... But 
our Labour leaders are supporting the fucking British nuclear so-called 
deterrent to the present day! 
For Gray the SSBN was only one of several reasons that supported the need for 
greater Scottish autonomy, but beneath his commentary on Labour's relationship 
with the deterrent thrives the justification for disarmament. To a limited extent this 
is a sentiment that still exists in Scotland to this day. Because it is an opinion 
important to the historiographical record, it, and Scotland's overall experience with 
Trident, must be addressed. 
Core arguments 
The public's anxieties over Trident have receded considerably since 1980, and 
though the introduction of a replacement system in Scotland would most likely 
rekindle yet another heated controversy, at time of writing (2004) public interest 
4 A. Gray, Why Scots should rule Scotland 1997: A camaptious history of Britain from Roman times 
until now (Edinburgh: Canongate books, 1997), pp. 99-100. 
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in the system is minimal.s Therefore, one of the three core arguments presented in 
this thesis suggests that many people in Scotland accepted the view that Trident was 
a necessary contributor to national security. The promise of sustained employment 
in Scotland was a second reason to accept the system. Finally, the Scottish people 
did not actively oppose Trident because they had already become well acquainted 
with the Polaris system, TridenCs predecessor. Yet before we proceed any further, 
at this point a background discussion over the UK's decision to procure a sea-based 
deterrent is necessary. 
The Trident system: Background 
While successive British governments sought to impede the inevitable 
disintegration of empire, from 1945-1963 the submarine did not fit into UK Defence 
planning or its scheme for deterrence. Paul Rodgers, political scientist, described 
British politics in the late 1940s and 1950s as being 'dictated by a yearning for 
global status', focused on the need 'to maintain a global military presence' and 
having the desire to develop 'an independent nuclear force'. 6 By this time the Cold 
War had engulfed East and West, and because the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli 
invasion of Suez shattered Britain's confidence in maintaining a sizeable military 
presence the decision to develop a nuclear deterrent was taken for two broad 
reasons. After 1945 the Attlee government assumed the Soviet Union would have a 
nuclear capability by the early 1950s and believed that a British bomb would 
5 But so is interest in politics in general. 
6 GCUA P. Rodgers, Trident - Bedrock of Britain 's Defence into the 21 sl Century? The Cost of 
Trident - One Day National Conference (Glasgow, 10 June 1982). p. 2. 
6 
solidify the UK's position as a world power.' It was also assumed that a nuclear 
capability represented the only effective deterrent against an opponent's nuclear, 
biological or chemical threat, while simultaneously defending British national 
interests.8 To overcome the American post-war ban on information on such 
weaponry, the UK began to test and deploy a number of bombs through the 
assistance of British contributors from the Manhattan Project in 1952.9 Several 
designs were considered before a suitable weapon became fully operational. 
The arrival of the jet bomber, with its ability to deliver devastating nuclear 
payloads, represented the first and only British model for airborne deterrence. By 
1962 the Royal Air Force (RAF) successfully fielded three distinct medium-range 
nuclear-capable jet bombers. lo These V-bombers, referred to as Vulcan, Victor and 
Valiant, involved one aircraft in each squadron being ready at fifteen minutes notice 
twenty-four hours a day; thirty per cent of available aircraft ready to deploy after 
four hours and that figure rising to 100 per cent after twenty hours. II Yet the 
bomber's role within the British nuclear defence strategy was all but extinguished in 
the mid-1950s as the stealthy American rocket-firing nuclear-powered submarine 
encouraged many in the UK government to reconsider. 
7 Rodgers, Trident, p. 46. 
8 I. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain 's deterrent and America 1957-
1962, (Oxford: OUP, 1994). See in its entirety. 
9 R.A. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons: British. French 
and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: National Resources Defence Council, 1994), p. 102. For 
more information about the McMahon Act and the British bomb see B. Cathcart, Test of Greatness: 
Britain 's Struggle for the Atomic Bomb (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd., 1995). 
10 The Vulcan medium bomber had a range of 2,500-3,000 miles 
1\ D. Miller, Cold War: A Military History (London: Pimlico, 2001), p. 139. Maintenance of these 
strategic bombers, fuel consumption required to keep these bombers on twenty-four hour stand-by 
and the safety practices of transporting nuclear weapons aboard aircraft were of great concern. For 
7 
The discovery of Gennan wartime attempts to place newly developed missiles 
within submarines, coinciding with American post-war development of 
thennonuclear weapons and the nuclear-powered submarine, led the US National 
Security Committee to approve the development of the world's first SSBN and 
SLBM system, known as Regulus, in 1955.12 Not only had the USSR successfully 
deployed Sputnik, which encouraged the joint London and Washington policy 
against Soviet encroachment, but there was also the Kennedy administration's 
embarrassing cancellation of Skybolt. Harold Macmillan and his Conservative 
government were therefore provided with the necessary leverage with which to 
obtain the recently deployed American Polaris deterrent. 13 Macmillan had earlier 
convinced Washington to sell the UK Skybolt in exchange for the US Navy's use of 
the Holy Loch in Scotland for their Polaris forward operating base, a development 
that inspired the now legendary marches of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (SCND).14 Despite considerable public disapproval the Polaris Sales 
Agreement was concluded by April 1963, with the British government acquiring 
Polaris at low cost and its missiles intended for the development of a multilateral 
NATO force. IS Scotland's populace became acquainted with both nuclear 
submarines and their powerful payloads soon after. 
more detailed information on the V-bomber see T. Laming, V-Bombers: Vulcan. Victor and Valiant; 
Britain 's Airborne Nuclear Deterrent (Haynes Publishing, 1997). 
12 Miller. The Cold War, p. 110. 
13 Skybolt was an attempt to use a bomber to launch a ballistic missile. The cancellation of the 
Skybolt programme meant that the RAF was fielding a nuclear deterrent force that was increasingly 
outmoded. The US also launched the Regulus and Regulus II programmes, which were inevitably 
replaced by the Polaris system. R. Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century 
(London: MacMillan Press, 1998), pp. 122-129; Miller, The Cold War, pp. 110-111. 
14 Due to its limitations in terms of range, a forward operating base allowed for the American Polaris 
missile to strike at the heart of the Soviet Union. Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations, p. 122. 
IS Ibid., p. 129. For further information on the UK Polaris deterrent's contribution to a NATO force 
see G.M. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special 
Nuclear Relationship /962-1982 (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1983), p. 35. 
8 
Due to the system's capabilities and consistent tensions between the US and USSR, 
the Royal Navy's decision to deploy the Resolution class Polaris system from 
Scotland was indeed controversial. Nevertheless, a working party considered 
several locations for the submarine's operating base, but both geographical and 
operational factors dictated that construction of the Clyde Submarine Base at 
Faslane Bay should commence.16 Faslane had played an important military role 
since the early 1940s, the area was somewhat remote though Scotland's largest 
population centre, Glasgow, was within reasonable distance from the facility, and 
the Gareloch was considered advantageous because it was sheltered and in 
proximity to deep water. 17 Furthermore, Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) 
Coulport, some thirteen miles by sea from Faslane, was constructed to perform 
missile servicing for the upcoming Polaris programme and Rosyth Dockyard in Fife 
was selected as the first British facility used for nuclear submarine refitting and 
refuelling operations.18 Work began at Faslane on 22 May 1963, the day after the 
government placed orders for Polaris boats, and by 1968 Polaris submarines began 
the first of nearly 250 patrols.19 
The successful operation of the UK's Polaris fleet enabled the Royal Navy to 
explore its options towards the end of the system's life expectancy. Yet the 
overwhelming confidence gained from this experience led to a failed attempt at 
16 For a detailed summary of reasons why Faslane was chosen to host the Polaris nuclear deterrent 
see M. Chalmers, and W. Walker, Uncharted Waters: The UK. Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish 
f?t!estion (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2001), pp. 17-25. 
I Ibid., p. 20. 
18 RNAD Coulport will be referred to as Coulport from this point. Clyde Submarine Base, later 
known as H.M. Naval Base Clyde, will be referred to as Faslane. Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted 
Waters, p. 24-26. Rosyth Dockyard was selected to perform refits in 1963. Spaven, Fortress 
Scotland, pp. 168-169. 
19 TS, 29 August 1996, p. 2; K. Hall, Images o/Scotland: The Clyde Submarine Base 
(Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing Ltd, 2002), p. 59. 
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establishing a uniquely British system. By late June 1969 the RAF formally handed 
over responsibility for the nuclear deterrent to the Royal Navy as the dramatic 
improvement of Soviet radar and anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) resulted in a 
protection of Moscow which Polaris warheads could not penetrate with absolute 
certainty.20 Though the US initially offered the Poseidon system as a replacement 
for the increasingly outdated Polaris, the indigenous but troubled Chevaline 
programme was the UK's response to Soviet technical advancements. The system 
was designed to increase the likelihood of warhead survival by disguising incoming 
Polaris warheads as dummies to confuse Soviet ABM defences, but the UK's 
decision to go it alone caused the Royal Navy to fall behind in technological terms. 
The £4 billion programme included the need for new rocket engines; problems later 
surfaced with Polaris submarine hulls, and it did not provide for a Multiple 
Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV).21 However, the UK's improved Polaris 
boats would not begin patrols with the convoluted system until 1982. While the 
system was the subject of several refurbishment programmes, the US Navy 
launched its first Poseidon boat in 1968, equipped with the highly desirable MIRV 
capability. 
The Ministry of Defence did not acquire Poseidon, but over time an order for 
another system would be placed. Poseidon was initially received with considerable 
interest, but by 1973 the American and British governments decided that it had no 
place in the Royal Navy as a deal could have threatened to undo the process of 
20 B. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRO: Nuclear strategies and Forces for Europe. /949-
2000 (London: MacMillan Press, 1999), p. 76; Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 59. 
21 MIRV was the ability to target each warhead independently on to separate targets. For a historical 
account on the Chevaline programme see Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence, p. 37; Miller, The 
Cold War, p. 141 and Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Chevaline Improvement 
to the Polaris Missile System, HC 269 of Session 1981-1982. 
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detente that was well underway between Moscow and Washington. 22 The improving 
relationship between superpowers did not last, and during the latter half of the 
1970s the Soviet Union unveiled new solid-fuel SS-20 missiles.23 This weapon 
appeared to represent a means of waging a limited nuclear war in Europe by taking 
out airfields, bases, and cities in a pre-emptive first strike.24 Because of the SS-20's 
capabilities it inspired the US to offer the UK the option of purchasing either 
ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) or the new Trident system in the late 
1970s as a replacement deterrent for the near obsolete PolariS.25 With the Chevaline 
improvement programme coming at considerable cost and lacking a true MIRV 
capability, the recently elected Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher, 
opted to renew its status as a 'client of the Pentagon,.26 
In the midst of the Cold War a replacement deterrent had to be able to pose a threat 
to the Soviet Union at least as credible as that initially posed by Polaris. The 
GLCM was seriously considered but it possessed several inadequacies. The UK 
would have had to purchase the hugely expensive system to ensure that the US 
could not fire these weapons without consent from the British government. 27 
Thatcher further believed the Soviet Union could be persuaded that Britain might 
not agree to their use at a critical moment, while the system was only available to 
22 For the Americans detente was seen as a way of managing the Russians and the Kremlin viewed it 
as an acknowledgement of their superpower status. A deal with the UK could have jeopardised the 
state of these relations. See Dillon, Dependence and Dete"ence, p. 147. 
23 Detente had stalled after the spring of 1976, when the two superpowers experienced complications 
over issues such as human rights, disarmament and arms control. See J. Isaacs, and Taylor Downing, 
The Cold War:for 45 Years the world held its breath (London: Bantam Press, 1998). 
24 Ibid., pp. 316-318. 
2$ For more information see M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years: 1979-1990 (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1993), pp. 239-268. 
26 Spaven, Fortress Scotland, p. 2. 
27 Considerable pressures against cruise in England did not contribute to the decision to deploy 
Trident in Scotland. The technical arrangement for cruise was known as a 'dual key' option. 
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West Germany if there was no 'German finger on the trigger' .28 The GLCM also 
lacked the desirable stealth of a sea-based deterrent and by late September 1979 
Britain discarded this option because the system was considered to be too 
vulnerable to attack.29 Finally, cruise missiles proved highly contentious throughout 
England as some 120,000 activists marched in opposition to the American GLCM 
presence at Greenham Common in April and December 1983.30 A combination of 
these factors detracted from its appeal and placed greater emphasis on Trident as the 
system essentially represented a Polaris force with greater capabilities and therefore 
improved security in terms of deterrence. Trident also possessed a MIRV capability 
that ultimately defeated an ABM system. General satisfaction obtained through 
Polaris since 1963 strengthened arguments for Trident, and the decision was to be 
finalised in the summer of 1980, with arrangements made to systematically phase 
out Polaris while simultaneously establishing Trident on the Clyde. 
After rejecting both the Poseidon and GLCM systems, the government was 
ultimately forced to choose between two different Trident systems. In 1980 the 
Trident I C4 was considered by the Thatcher government to be the most up-to-date 
and credible deterrent. By purchasing the system from the US, the UK could be 
spared the burden of maintaining an expensive improvement programme similar to 
that of Chevaline. Letters exchanged between Thatcher and President Jimmy Carter 
on 15 July 1980 led to the UK's purchase of Trident in the midst of a series of 
28 For more information on the complexities associated with the GLCM see Thatcher, The Downing 
Street Years, p. 268. 
29 Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence. p. 88. 
30 P. Webber, Graeme Wilkinson and Barry Rubin, Crisis over Cruise (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Publishing. 1983). See in its entirety. 
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negotiations.31 Yet by 1981 the Reagan administration opted to enter full 
development of the Trident II D5 for the US Navy.32 Defence Secretary John Nott 
was forced to study the implications. In 1981 the government believed that ifit 
were to implement Trident I, it would have entered service with the Royal Navy 
only shortly before it left service with the US Navy.33 Similar to the Chevaline 
programme, this implied that the UK alone would be responsible for keeping open 
special Trident support facilities in the US, forcing the UK to fund any research and 
development needed to counter further Soviet ABM defences.34 Accordingly, the 
UK entered into agreement with the US on 11 March 1982 to purchase Trident II as 
described in Command Paper 8517. 3S It was this system that was ultimately 
established at Faslane (Illustration 1). 
The Vanguard class Trident boat was an SSBN based on the British Trafalgar class 
nuclear-powered attack submarine design, incorporating a centrally-situated missile 
compartment based on a scaled down version of the missile compartment of the 
American Ohio class SSBN. While the US version possessed twenty-four missile 
tubes the British boat was to hold sixteen, as well as four torpedo tubes. 
Furthermore, each boat was to be powered by a Rolls Royce pressurised water 
PWR-2 nuclear reactor, giving the submarine a top speed of around 25 knots. Four 
31 For more on Trident negotiations with the Carter administration see Thatcher, The Downing Street 
Years, p. 244-248. 
32 Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 12 Col 410, 13 November 1981; Thatcher, The 
Downing Street Years, p. 157,247. 
33 This observation now appears to be incorrect as the C4 system will serve with the US Navy Pacific 
fleet until at least 2007, when the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will reduce the number of 
US Ohio class Trident boats from 18 to 14. Hutchinson, Submarines, War Beneath the Waves: from 
1776 to the present day (London: Harper Collins, 2001), p. 186. 
34 The Trident Missile Programme, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Vol 19 Col 981, 1 March 
1982. 
3S Trident II D5 will be referred to as simply Trident from this point. The British Strategic Nuclear 
Force, Cmd. 8517 (London: HMSO, 11 March 1982). 
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Illustration 1: Trident SSBN and SLBM 
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Trident submarines would replace the previous Polaris boats, and they were 
scheduled to remain in service until at least the year 2020 (Figure 1).36 
Figure 1: Trident SSBN SpeclOcations37 
Length 
Hull Diameter 
Height 
Displacement 
Speed 
Power Plant 
Navigation System 
Crew 
Armaments 
491 feet (149.6 meters) 
43.3 feet (13.2 meters) 
4 stories 
16,000 tonnes submerged 
25 knots submerged 
1 pressurised water PWR-2 nuclear reactor 
Geared steam turbines, 1 shaft 
132 
4 torpedo tubes - Spearfish torpedoes 
16 Trident II SLBMs carrying up to 128 
Mark IV 100 kiloton MIRVs. 
The Trident SLBM was a three stage, solid propellant, inertially guided fleet 
ballistic missile with greater range and improved accuracy over Polaris, capable of 
carrying a maximum of twelve warheads per missile.38 The missiles were fuelled by 
Nitrate Ester Plasticized Polyethylene Glycol, a solid fuel, and had a range greater 
than 7,400 kIn (4,000 nautical miles, 4,800 statute miles) at full payload, or 11,000 
kilometres at reduced payload. Furthermore, every boat potentially carried 192 
British MIRVed warheads similar to the American W76, each capable of a 
100-kiloton yield and estimated to be at least eight to twenty times more powerful 
than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.39 The missile was also expected to have an 
in-tube life of at least seven years, twice that of the Polaris system, greatly reducing 
36 Actual top speed was classified. Thatcher's government retained the option to construct an 
additional fifth submarine in due course, costing, at 1980 estimates, an additional £600 million 
including missiles. Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons, p. 102 
37 This information was complied from: B. Aldridge, Trident Submarines: American and British 
(Santa Clara California: Pacific Life Research Centre. 7 February 1999), p. 3; Norris, Burrows and 
Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons, p. 102 
38 Aldridge, Trident Submarines, p. 3. 
39 Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons, p. 102; J. Ainslie, Trident: Britain's Weapon of 
Mass Destruction (Glasgow: Scottish CND, 1999), p. 4. 
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maintenance that would have to be perfonned aboard the submarine.4o Finally, the 
Trident SLBM was fitted with NA VST AR satellite receivers resulting in a circular 
error probable (CEP) of ninety metres, making it a genuine hard target attack system 
with a range enabling it to hit any target in the world from any ocean (Figure 2).41 
CEP was a tenn used to describe the delivery precision of a system, and it is the 
radius of a circle, centred upon the mean point of impact, within which fifty per cent 
of the warheads aimed at the target will fall. Due to the operational success with 
Polaris, the Trident fleet was to be stationed in the west of Scotland at Faslane with 
warheads stored and serviced at Coulport. 
Figure 2: Trident SLBM Specifications41 
Description 
Specifications 
Length 
Diameter 
Missile Weigbt/minus warhead 
Stages 
Fuel 
Guidance 
Tbrowwefgbt 
Range 
N udear warheads 
Number of Warbeads 
Yield 
A three stage, solid propellant, inertially-
guided fleet ballistic missile with greater 
range/payload capability and improved 
accuracy over Polaris SLBMs. 
13.6 m (44.6 ft) 
2.18 m(83 in) 
57,700 kg (127,000 Ibs) 
Three 
Solid 
Mk-6 Stellar-aided inertial 
2800 kg (6160 lbs) 
7,400 km at full payload 
11,000 km with reduced payload 
British MIRVed warheads enclosed in 
US Mark IV re-entry body, possibly 
Deployed on US 'warhead bus'. 
Probably four, up to eight; theoretical 
maximum of 15-16 warheads. 
estimated 100 kilotons 
40 The Trident Missile Programme, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 19 Col 984, 1 March 
1982. 
41 NAVSTAR provided mid-course navigational updates to the inertial system. A hardened target 
such as a missile silo or command bunker protected against the effects of nuclear weapons. Miller, 
The Cold War, p. 113,445. 
42 Information complied from: Aldridge, Trident Submarines, p. 3; Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, 
Nuclear Weapons, p. 102 
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In 1985 construction under the Trident Works Programme began refurbishment at 
the Base to accommodate the Vanguard class, while responsibilities for Trident's 
missiles and torpedoes were handled at Coulport on Loch Long. Coulport was 
suited to meet the needs of the missile system; it was situated on the west coast of 
the Rosneath peninsula, and was originally designed to maintain and arm Polaris 
missiles. Upon the arrival of Trident boats at Coulport, stored warheads were to be 
mated to missiles while aboard the submarine, leaving the boat armed for its patrol 
at sea and prepared to launch lethal payloads within fifteen minutes of the given 
order (Photograph 1). Because of the SSBN's awesome capabilities, operational 
characteristics and the role it served in British and Soviet military planning, 'the 
world's most powerful submarine weapons platfonn' was received in the west of 
Scotland with noticeable apprehension (Photograph 2).43 
The system was to be refitted and refuelled in Fife. Rosyth Dockyard had 
successfully maintained the Resolution class since 1968 and most Scots naturally 
assumed the facility would continue these responsibilities with Trident. Though the 
fourth boat only became operational in 1999, the initial plan was that while two 
Vanguard class boats performed sixty day patrols, a third submarine would ideally 
be under refit at Rosyth while the fourth was to be at Faslane preparing for its next 
mission. In this context, after roughly eight years at sea a Trident boat would be 
ready for servicing.44 Rosyth was the major refitting centre for Polaris and was the 
only location in all of Britain capable of overhauling, updating and replacing the 
reactor cores of Trident submarines at that time (Map 1). 
43 Hutchinson, Submarines, war beneath the waves, p. 186. 
44 Refuelling involved a lengthy technical process. Accurate descriptions of the refit process is 
available in Chapter 2. Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons, p. 117. 
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Phot02raph 1: Trident on the Clyde 
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Map 1: Trident shore facilities in Scotland 
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Sources 
At this stage of the introduction an explanation of the sources utilised by this study 
is in order. Successful completion of this thesis inevitably required the marriage of 
two distinct subjects: Trident the system and the familiarity of the Scottish people 
with the deterrent. Official sources included several publications such as materials 
from Hansard, House of Commons Defence Committee reports, and Notices of 
Proposed Development from the Ministry of Defence, all of which provided one 
component of the foundation for this research. This base ofinformation was further 
bolstered through the accompaniment of studies from both the Central Unit for 
Procurement and the National Audit Office. Without the inclusion of these 
documents, little would be understood of the Trident Works Programme, the 
complications it experienced or the economic, environmental and human investment 
this project involved. Independent studies from a range of sources in Scotland, 
along with applicable pamphlets, council minutes, official statements and 
environmental impact assessments were also required to underline the Scottish 
experience. This material included Strathclyde Regional Council's 1983 Coulport 
Inquiry, literature from the SeND, assessments from the Nuclear Free Local 
Authorities (NFLA) and relevant information from the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress (STUC). The inclusion of these vital materials served to verify the 
positions of these organisations when investigating their perspective on Trident, 
with members often assisting in locating various documents despite the 
inconvenience this usually involved. Finally, it should be noted that in order to 
further reinforce this aspect of the study, time-consuming travel throughout both the 
20 
Strathc1yde and Fife territories was necessary to acquire several hundred clippings 
from local newspapers in proximity to Trident's shore facilities. 
Scotland's ongoing experience with nuclear weaponry represents an important 
chapter in its story, yet from an historical perspective surprisingly little has been 
written on this. While the subject of Scotland and the national deterrent appears to 
have been disregarded, there is research on Trident but not work that covers the 
Scottish dimension as fully as this thesis. a.M. Dillon's Dependence and 
Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special Nuclear 
Relationship 1962-1982 or Bob Aldridge's Trident Submarines: American and 
British are two examples, but these publications made no attempt whatsoever to 
explore the Scottish dimension of Trident. Malcolm Spaven's Fortress Scotland 
briefly mentions the national deterrent, but because this work was published 
previous to the construction phase at Faslane it is only able to provide limited 
background information on the system. Furthermore, authors of recent modem 
Scottish history books rarely incorporate Trident into their contents, and if the 
subject is mentioned it is, more often than not, a brief explanation of its controversy 
north of the Border. The one political study that specifically addressed this issue 
was Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker's publication Uncharted Waters: The 
UK, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question, which offered a fascinating 
glimpse into the complexities associated with the potential relocation of the system. 
Yet while their work makes known the consequences of getting the 'politics of this 
issue wrong' , this thesis is different because it explores the historical experiences of 
civil society, the disarmament movement, and Scottish political parties over a 
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twenty year period.4s Additionally, this research provides detailed investigation into 
both the Fife and Strathclyde Region's interaction with the system. These five 
subjects serve to set these two works apart. 
Other publications have touched upon the Scottish dimension of Trident, but they 
have not attempted to grasp the issue adequately. Angie ZeIter's publication on 
defiance in Scotland, Trident on Trial: the Case for People's Disarmament, was 
concerned primarily with the disarmament movement's attempts to decommission 
the system. Moreover, her work is focused on advancing the movement's cause, is 
primarily based on personal experiences and, understandably, makes no attempt at 
impartiality. Both F.D.R. Yell's Trident Facilities and Keith Hall's Images of 
Scotland: the Clyde Submarine Base discussed the necessary preparations for 
Trident establishments at the Gareloch site, but neither makes an attempt to address 
the Scottish experience. Hall's work is largely a local history of the Helensburgh 
area, while Yell's publication is concerned with the technical aspect of Trident and 
the efforts of those who contributed to the system. Unlike this particular study it 
was not the intention of any of these publications to consider Scotland's interaction 
with the national deterrent. Therefore, a methodical effort in fusing together scraps 
of information, piece by piece, would be required. 
To fill several historical gaps it was necessary for this researcher to seek out 
appropriate alternative sources. Nearly fifty written correspondences and in-depth 
45 Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p.154. 
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interviews with numerous Members of the British and Scottish Parliaments, 
individuals from Scottish civil society and the disannament movement was 
essential. Due to the classified nature of this topic interviews with relevant figures 
like David Corbett, former Project Manager at Rosyth Royal Dockyard and former 
Project Management Applications Programmer responsible for the Faslane 
Development Management Reporting System, proved invaluable to this research. 
Yet this approach brought with it several complications. Oral and contemporary 
history relies on living people as sources of information and because of this there 
are several potential pitfalls. Because oral history uses spoken sources the 
allowable evidence expands dramatically. Much also depends on the accuracy of 
the interviewee's memory and there is the possibility of inconsistency or incorrect 
information. Furthermore, oral history, like written and contemporary history, is 
likely to contain either personal or social biases.46 Therefore, the accuracy of 
memory has been tested against other sources of information and the integrity of 
these individual responses was strengthened through numerous conversations with 
other relevant figures to ensure consistency. Yet it should be noted that without oral 
and written contributions this thesis could not have been successfully completed. 
Methodology 
Though this research is important to Scottish history the topic is very recent, and 
highly classified, with the researcher only able to coHeet infonnation that was 
available to the public domain. This included oral and written testimony, yet in 
46 See P. Thompson, The voice o/the past: oral history (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
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many instances there was a noticeable reluctance for some participants to discuss 
certain specific issues. This obstinacy may have stemmed from fear of violating the 
Official Secrets Act or concerns that such discussion conflicted with the interests of 
their employers. Those opposed to the deterrent's presence in Scotland were 
naturally more prepared to make their feelings known, yet the sheer volume of 
response from advocates for disarmament potentially made for a lopsided depiction. 
Other times the researcher was granted formal interviews with Scottish Members of 
Parliament who did not openly oppose Trident but the author was later left, on 
several occasions, abandoned. Finally, there was, at times, a willingness from some 
to contribute to this research but in certain instances participants chose to remain 
anonymous for fear of the potential implications to their careers. 
When researching contemporary history theoretical problems are not uncommon, as 
it is generally vulnerable to future developments still left to unfold. This particular 
study is not exempt from this problem as the UK's Trident system is currently in 
operation (2004), and is both a classified and controversial issue. A considerable 
portion of the information pertaining to the presently classified weapon is not 
readily available for public consumption, and unbiased research of Scotland's 
experience remains non-existent. Therefore, the topic demanded the careful 
assembly of widely scattered information that was ultimately subject to the future 
developments of a system that the Royal Navy expected to maintain until well into 
the next millennium. A greater volume of information pertaining to the system will 
not become available until well after decommissioning, and even then relevant 
materials will undoubtedly be limited in nature due to the fact that the project 
involved various submarine, missile and warhead technologies. 
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When contemplating the Scottish dimension of Trident several questions 
immediately spring to mind. How is Scotland's reaction to Trident best described 
and to what extent did national security influence the public's judgment? Because 
both Polaris and Trident were stealthy systems, did this feature influence Scottish 
opinion? It is also essential to understand the economic impact Trident had on 
Scottish civil society. Therefore the question must be asked, how concerned were 
the Scots about the presence of the Polaris replacement system, and did safety, the 
state of the economy and the potential for greater employment have a role in 
Trident's success? Did the country's long-standing dependence on the defence and 
heavy industries also playa role in Scotland's suitability for accommodating the 
system? Furthermore, if Scotland's imperial past was bound up with economic 
interests did its past experience with empire somehow apply to the SSBN? Since 
the arrival of Polaris the disarmament movement's position on nuclear weapons has 
been made transparent. Nevertheless, was the geographic location of where Trident 
would reside a factor in public protest? Finally, what were the chances of ridding 
Scotland of Trident after its successful completion in 19991 These are the issues 
that will be addressed within this thesis 
This study opens with a discussion pertaining to the Strathclyde territory. the 
operational centre for Trident's operations and ground zero for the debate in 
Scotland. The Trident Works Programme is subjected to analysis, and we attempt 
to gauge the Strathclyde Region's general response to Trident over two decades. 
The system's environmental record, and reputation for safe operation, is also 
brought to light. We then discuss local government's experience with the system, 
and reveal the true economic impact of Trident to the area (Appendix A). Because 
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refits for the Vanguard class submarine were originally intended for the region of 
Fife, the following chapter will examine the experiences of those in the east of 
Scotland. Projects designed to prepare the Dockyard for the system's arrival are 
presented, and there is an attempt to determine the Fife Region's general response to 
Trident. Safety practices at this facility are considered, but then it is necessary to 
investigate local government's experience with losing Trident. Because the 
Dockyard's responsibilities for the SSBN were stripped away in the post-Cold War 
era, one must consider the industrial competition that provided for this most 
controversial result. At this point we will have established an understanding of the 
experiences of those who resided in direct proximity to the three major Trident 
facilities in Scotland.47 
Moving on to the Scottish political dimension of Trident, Chapter Three evaluates 
the perf~rmance of those who were elected to represent the interests of their 
constituents. Therefore, the political reaction to the system over the 1979-1999 time 
frame is investigated. Chapter Four then makes an attempt to gauge the direct 
response of Scottish civil society to the system's procurement, construction and 
operation. This analysis includes reactions from seven components, including 
Scotland's religious community, its legal system and universities, the media and 
public opinion. Finally. because Trident was once an intense issue in Scotland it is 
ideal to complete this study by evaluating the obstacles and strategies of the 
disarmament movement. Both the anti-Polaris and anti-Trident movements are also 
considered. The conclusions are presented in Chapter Six, and matters concerning 
47 The Vulcan Naval Nuclear Propulsion Test Establishment located in Dounreay was used as a test 
facility for Trident's reactor. Scottish CND also believed that its weapons contained plutonium and 
26 
national security, economic necessity and Scottish indifference to Trident are 
evaluated. 
tritium from the nuclear power station in Chapelcross, located in the southwest of Scotland near 
Dumfries. 
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Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde Region 
Years previous to the Cold War's conclusion the territory ofStrathclyde was 
immersed in controversy, as it was this region that was designated to be the site of the 
UK's Trident SSBN and SLBM. However, even before the fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe it is unequivocal that Scottish concerns with the system and its shore 
facilities subsided considerably, leaving many Strathc1yde residents no longer viewing 
Trident as an issue of overwhelming importance. The intention of this chapter is to 
explore the various reasons for this. Despite the earliest forewamings from Trident's 
adversaries it appears that the system and those associated with its operation 
performed their responsibilities impeccably. Furthermore, Trident's shore facilities 
provided indispensable employment opportunities and secure, safe operation of the 
system gathered no unfavourable attention to Trident. Nevertheless, to comprehend 
fully the region's experience with Trident it is imperative for this chapter to highlight 
a number of the system's shortfalls. During the Cold War Dumbarton District 
Council and Strathclyde Regional Council fiercely opposed the system, in terms of 
employment it consistently failed to satisfy predictions, and despite Trident's safety 
record there remained lingering concerns with firepower and safety after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. To appreciate fully the region's experience with the system, 
interviews with former local councillors, Faslane employees, and documentation from 
Strathclyde Regional Council assisted gready in this process. From a Scottish 
perspective it appears that along with Trident's successes have come a number of 
deficiencies. The Trident Works Programme was a prime example of this. 
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Coulport and Faslane: From their origins to the Trident Works Programme 
Water had been a significant influence in the industrial development of the Faslane 
area since the late eighteenth century, with the origins of the submarine base dating 
back to February 1941 after a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
established Military Port No.1 at Faslane Bay (Photograph 1.1,1.2).1 Yet the Port 
became increasingly irrelevant during the Second World War as skilled dock troops 
were relocated to the south coast while preparations for the invasion of Europe were 
completed. According to author Keith Hall's concise account of the Clyde Submarine 
Base, from February 1944 staffing levels at Faslane were systematically downsized, 
and by July 1946 the property was leased to the shipbreaking finn, Metal Industries.2 
This by no means marked the end of operations at the facility. The Base did face 
closure in the post-war era but tensions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, along with dramatic improvements in the fields of nuclear propulsion, ballistic 
missiles and various other submarine technologies, brought with it a replacement for 
the outdated hydrogen peroxide powered boat. 3 These developments caused 
Faslane's stock to skyrocket as the nuclear age of the British submarine was set to 
commence. 
Through American technical assistance, Scotland's interaction with nuclear 
submarines began soon after the completion ofHMS Dreadnought in October 1960.4 
I Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 37. 
2 Ibid. 
3 After the Second World War the British experimented with Hydrogen PeroxidelKerosine engines 
which could be used both above and below the surface. The results were not encouraging enough for 
this technique to be adopted at the time. 
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Photograph 1.1: Faslane Bay, 1941 
In 1941 the materials for Military Port No. 1 started to arrive. 
Photograph 1.2: Faslane Bay, 1941 
At this point the piling for the lighterage jetty was nearing completion, with the infilling under way. 
4 The Americans launched USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear submarine, in 1955. US Admiral 
Rickover visited the UK and laid the grounds for the 1958 USfUK Agreement aIlowing greater 
cooperation between the US and Royal Navy. HaII, The Clyde Submarine 8a e, pp. 53-55. 
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By 1961, and to the dissatisfaction of the SCND, the Americans established a forward 
operating base in the Holy Loch to accommodate the US Polaris deterrent. 
Refurbishment at Faslane and the construction of Coulport was also required after 
Harold Macmillan secured an arrangement with President Kennedy to grant Britain 
the system in May 1963.5 Previously, the Admiralty produced a list of possible 
alternative bases throughout the UK but, after extensive deliberation, geographical 
suitability and arguments on operational grounds dictated that Faslane was the Royal 
Navy's most suitable choice for its Resolution class fleet.6 Though both Coulport and 
Faslane were not fully operational by the time of the system's first patrol, all major 
services functioned sufficiently to ensure the system's well-being.7 The Polaris fleet 
soon formed the 10th Submarine Squadron with the Port, renamed Clyde Submarine 
Base HMS Neptune, commissioned in 1967. The first of this class sailed on 15 June 
1968 on what was the first of over 200 patrols, with facilities at Coulport and Faslane 
supporting the deterrent with distinction.8 
In the Strathclyde Region several communities were within proximity to Coulport and 
Faslane, including Dumbarton, Dunoon, Greenock and Helensburgh, with Glasgow 
being Scotland's major popUlation component some twenty-six miles southeast of the 
facility (Map 1.1).9 As Polaris submarines set otT on their assigned patrols, they 
travelled through the Gareloch, into the River Clyde, past Loch Long and the Holy 
Loch, and through to the Clyde Firth. With Dumbarton situated further east down the 
5 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. 
6 For a fascinating look at these developments see: Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, pp. 17-
21. 
7 P. Nailor, The Nassau Connection: The Organisation and Management of the British Polaris Project 
(London: HMSO Publications, 1988), p. 98. 
B Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 100. 
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Map 1.1: Communities in Proximity to Trident Facilities 
9 Communities surrounding Faslane included Cardross, Coulport, Cove, Dumbarton, Garelochhead, 
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River Clyde, these boats passed communities such as Rhu, Rosneath, Helensburgh 
and Dunoon before either docking at Coulport for service or reaching the open sea 
(Photograph 1.3). Because nuclear submarines had become a common sight for 
Strathclyde residents, they were well acquainted with the SSBN over time. Yet after a 
decade of service an ageing system that was falling behind in technological terms 
encouraged centra) government to contemplate its replacement. As has been noted in 
the introduction, the Thatcher government opted to acquire the upgraded Trident 
system in March 1982.10 Due to Coulport and Faslane's successful service of Polaris, 
both sites were to retain their status and undergo expansion in order to accommodate 
the significantly larger Trident programme (Photograph 1.4). 
One cannot overstate the massive undertaking that the Trident Works Programme 
represented as it was similar in complexity to both the Channel Tunnel works and the 
extraction of North Sea oil, requiring thirteen years to complete involving roughly 
110 separate projects. lIOn 2 June 1981 the Ministry of Defence released its first 
Notice of Proposed Development and emphasised that works services on the new site 
had to be completed by the end of the decade, accentuating the government's push to 
begin construction.12 While Faslane would serve as port for the larger Vanguard class, 
Coulport, which not only handled strategic missiles for Polaris but also high explosive 
torpedoes and possibly thermonuclear tactical missiles, would also be modified to 
Glasgow. Gourock. Greenock. Helensburgh, Kilcreggan, Port Glasgow. Rosneath and Rhu. 
10 It was seriously considered that cruise would be able to strike at a wider range of military targets and 
might well be cheaper to acquire and operate. Report from the Defence Committee, Memoranda on 
Strategic Weapons Policy. Session 1980-198I,p. 28 
11 The Channel Tunnel was a rail link between the UK and France beneath the English Channel. Ninth 
Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress o/the Trident Programme, HC 237 of Session 
1989-90, p. 17. 
12 Ministry of Defence, Notice of Proposed Development: Proposed Development 0/ a site for the 
Trident Weapon System (DlLandslSOI/14F), 2 June 1981. p. 1. 
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Photograph 1.3: Resolution class Polaris submarines 
Three-quarters of the Polaris fleet cruising down what appears to be the Gareloch. 
Photograph 1.4: Entrance to Polaris School at Faslane 
Power and Pride: SLBM grac ing the entrance to the Polaris School at Faslane. 
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service Trident's more powerful warheads.13 On 7 March 1985 George Younger, 
Secretary of State for Scotland, approved the planning application and by September 
of that year development of the Northern Area at Faslane and work at Coulport 
commenced.14 
To deflect any doubts the Soviet Union might have had with British detennination 
while overriding heavy resistance from the disarmament movement in Strathclyde, the 
Ministry of Defence pushed forward the Trident Works Programme with tremendous 
speed. In August 1985 plans for the Trident training facility were released, and by 
December formal proposals for projects such as the Shiplift, berth 12, the finger jetty, 
and the Northern Utilities Building (NUB) were submitted to Dumbarton District 
Council. By 1986, plans for ancillary hardstandings, roads, perimeter fences and 
berths 1-4 were also presented, with initial works at Coulport, and construction of the 
Garelochhead bypass and Northern Access Road soon underway following the 
removal of several types of asbestos from Faslane. 15 In January 1988 both the bypass 
and the Glenn Fruin Haul Road were opened, with the refurbishment and upgrading of 
berths 1-6 in progress and the Trident training facility in operation by July 1990.16 
The Programme's advancement became transparent when construction of the 
Strategic Weapons Support Building and the General Services Building, which 
13 Report of Inquiry into the proposed extension of the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport. 
Dumbarton. for the Trident Weapon System 20124 June, 9 September 1983, p. 40. 
14 Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 99. 
15 PSA, UK Trident trainingfacility: Notice of Proposed Development (Clyde Submarine Base), 
August 1985; PSA, Shiplift and Berth J 2. Finger Jetty and Utilities building: Notice of Proposed 
Development (Clyde Submarine Base), December 1985; PSA, Notice of Proposed Development: 
General Services Building. Boilerhouse I. and paintstore,' stores building,· and ancillary roads (Clyde 
Submarine Base), July 1986; PSA, RNAD Cou/port Depot Perimeter Fence Upgrade: Notice of 
Proposed Development (PSA Directorate of Defence Services II), 1986; PSA, Extension and 
Refurbishment of Naval Technical Department Facilities and Berths 1.2.3 and 4 facilities: Notice of 
Proposed Development (Clyde Submarine Base), November 1986; Third Report from the Defence 
Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, HC 356 of Session 1986-87, p. 11. 
16 Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 99 
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housed both Trident crews and the Submarine Training Centre. was completed by 
1991.17 By 1992 Coulport's explosives handling jetty was floated and towed to 
Hunterston, and its generating station, jetty access roads, support areas, and the 
explosives' area main works handed over. IS Following the satisfactory completion of 
all contract work, the finger jetty, with its 125 tonne and 20 tonne cranes, was 
delivered to Faslane in September of that year. Furthermore, the NUB became 
operational and dredging work in Rhu Narrows was completed in October 1992, with 
the Ministry of Defence assuming full responsibility for the facility in December. 19 
On 19 August 1993 the Northern Development Area Trident Support Facilities were 
officially opened by Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence, with the Clyde 
Submarine Base renamed HM Naval Base Clyde in October 1996.20 By this time 
Faslane had already received the first three Vanguard class boats, with only HMS 
Vengeance set to arrive by 1999.21 
This compact synopsis of the Trident Works Programme suggests a smooth transition 
between systems, yet superficial analysis ultimately proves deceiving. By June 1989 
the estimates for works at Coulport had risen from £222 million to £275 million and 
works at Faslane had risen from £267 million to £339 million. with much of the 
increase in cost attributed to pay and unexpected additions to the Programme.22 By 
mid-1991 key elements in the project were up to two years behind schedule and the 
17 Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 99. 
18 Sixth Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, He 549 of 
Session 1992-93, p. 28. 
19 Ibid; Hall, The Clyde Submarine Base, p. 99. 
20 Ibid 
21 Built at VSEL Barrow-in-Furness, these boats also included HMS Vanguard, Victorious and Vigilant 
22 Fifth Report from the Defence Committee. The Progress of the Trident Programme, He 374 of 
Session 1988-89, p. 21; Ninth Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident 
Programme, He 237 of Session 1989-90, p.19. 
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scheme was reported to be running at more than double the original estimates.23 The 
reasons for delay were numerous, but it is apparent that ever-improving nuclear safety 
standards hounded several projects causing unexpected complication. Delays 
surfaced with the explosives handling jetty, a facility that permitted British 
manufactured warheads to be joined with Trident's missiles while aboard the boat, 
due to additional construction made necessary to meet stringent safety requirements.24 
Another principal site experiencing complication included the NUB, which provided 
an independent power supply to sustain reactor instrumentation, control and cooling 
systems while boats sat in berth, and power to the facility in the event of national grid 
failure.25 Undoubtedly, the project's numerous suspensions proved to be costly. 
According to David Corbett, former Project Management Applications Programmer 
responsible for the Faslane Development Management Reporting System, in order to 
be ready to support the operational programme for Trident, facilities had to be 
operational by a fairly rigid deadline. Combine this with, for example, the novel use 
of Shiplift technology and fairly common civil engineering problems, such as 
unexpected ground conditions, 'and the time pressures certainly mount,.26 
Consequently, when deadlines became an issue, projects became more expensive and 
were more prone not to meet original specifications or requirements. 
Complications with Faslane's Shiplift were particularly troublesome and deserved 
undivided attention. Built by Cementation Construction Ltd., this complex, sheltered 
23 GH, 13 June 1991, p. S. 
2 .. National Audit Office: Report by the Comptroller General and Auditor General, Management of the 
Trident Works Programme, HC 621 of Session 1993-94, p. 20. 
25 Second Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, HC 297 of 
Session 1993-1994, p. 21. 
26 Ship Lifts had not been used before to lift a 'dirty' reactor. VSEL used a ship lift, but they only 
handled new/clean reactors that did not have a decay heat removal problem to deal with. 
Correspondence with David Corbett, Project Management Applications Programmer responsible for 
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apparatus was designed to elevate SSBNs from the Gareloch to provide the necessary 
system maintenance that the boat's nuclear reactors demanded over the course of their 
service.27 The Lift rested on approximately 600 vertical piles and 188 raker piles, 
which were essentially hollow steel tubes set in concrete sockets and drilled into the 
Scottish rock. It was this suspension system that presented serious obstacles 
(Photograph 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.81IlIustration 1.1). Problems with the Lift arose when 
seventy-one raker piles were found defective. By May 1989 half of the defective 
piles were removed, one-third were replaced and there were ongoing concerns with 
corrosion.28 However, by July 1992 the Lift was considered virtually complete and it 
was handed over to the Ministry of Defence in July 1993, two and a half years past 
the original completion date. By April 1996 the Lift cost £314 million, £200 million 
over budget, and when the Royal Navy intended to raise HMS Vanguard it first had to 
receive special permission from the UK Atomic Energy Authority.29 Nevertheless, the 
Shiplift's complications were not atypical amongst the elaborate projects at Trident's 
shore facilities and its various intricacies merely served as a single example amongst 
the many that the Property Sales Agency encountered. 
Safety, adaptation, poor co-ordination and time restraints all contributed to increased 
expenditure with the Trident Works Programme. By July 1994 the majority of 
individual projects had been completed, although permission to operate independently 
the Faslane Development Management Reporting System from October 1986 to September 1988 
(10/10/03). 
27 W.J. Paterson, R. Dunsire and D.A. Blackburn, 'Design and construction of the Shiplift and Finger 
Jetty', in F.D.R. Yell (ed.), Tridentfacilities: Proceedings of the conference by the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, held in London 14 April 1994, (New York: Thomas Telford Books, 1994), p. 99. 
28 Raker piles were set at an angle and required to take the lateral forces of wind during submarine 
berthing. Eighth Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, He 
286 of Session 1990-91, p. 20; HA, 20 May 1989, p. 5; Fifth Report from the Defence Committee, The 
Progress of the Trident Programme, HC 374 of Session 1988-1989, p. 21; Ninth Report from the 
Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, HC 237 of Session 1989-90, p. 19; HA, 
11 May 1990, p. 3. 
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Photograph 1.5: Faslane Shiplift 
Shjpli ft piling during insta Ilation 
Photograph 1.6: Faslane Shiplift 
Interior view of the Shiplift during the construction phase 
29 Paterson, Dunsire and Blackburn, ' Design and construction oJthe Shiplifi', p. 96. 
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Photograph 1.7: Faslane Shiplift 
Photograph].8 Faslane Shiplift 
(Above) View from Rosneath peninsula (Below) View from Glenn Fruin bypass 
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Illustration 1.1: Faslane Shiplift 
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still remained to be given due to rigourous safety standards. Safety case 
considerations arising from additional projects, and revised Ministry of Defence 
requirements, also resulted in a number of design and safety alterations after the 
contract award. One example of these technical revisions involved facilities designed 
to handle the warheads and missiles on the dockside at Coulport. This consisted of 
ten separately briefed facilities that included stores, missile handling and support 
buildings, an integrated security system and the construction of access roads. At 
considerable cost upgraded facilities were later required to provide the necessary 
technical, maintenance and control services for Trident submarines. Poor co-
ordination of these projects by the Ministry of Defence led to compromised 
efficiency, which ultimately led to the Programme's added expense and further 
delay.3o 
Costs for the Programme spiralled out of control. Because of tight timetables 
contracts were let with designs incomplete and contractors were able to submit claims 
for extensions of time, delays and disruption costs, many of which were rejected. 
Other difficulties that ultimately led to disruption and possible exploitation involved 
contracts that were awarded on the basis of a tender, with the transfer of some work to 
an incentivised cost reimbursement basis in 1991 eventually requiring careful 
monitoring of the contractor's labour productivity. Mounting costs to the British 
taxpayer were ultimately justified through the highest of safety standards, though the 
quality of guidance provided by the Ministry of Defence, and inadequate design, 
inevitably produced governmental waste. Furthermore, consistent pressure to finish 
construction as quickly as possible led to numerous safety delays and cost overruns, 
30 National Audit Office: Report by the Comptroller General and Auditor General, Management of the 
Trident Works Programme, HC 621 of Session 1993-94. See in its entirety. 
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resulting in massive tax expenditure.31 The Trident Works Programme had cost £1.92 
billion at 1994 prices, 72 per cent more in real tenns than originally expected, with a 
case-study by the Central Unit for Procurement criticising the Ministry for its 
'mismanagement on a grand scale' after the cost of new facilities grew by an 
astounding £800 million.32 In contrast to the development of Polaris the perfonnance 
of the Trident Works Programme, though successful in its completion, was handled in 
such a way that it left much to be desired (Photograph 1.9, 1.10).33 
General responses to Trident within the Strathclyde Region 
Despite the covert nature ofSSBN operations, residents of Dum barton, Dunoon, 
Glasgow and Greenock regularly witnessed the national deterrent's comings and 
goings while the community of Helensburgh sheltered thousands of Royal Navy 
personnel. It should be noted that unlike Portsmouth, Plymouth or Rosyth, 
Helensburgh was not regarded as a traditional naval town though the Royal Navy was 
a part of the Clyde community. After 1945, Helensburgh maintained an intimate 
relationship with both the Royal Navy and the Ministry of Defence as a significant 
proportion of its residents was linked to either Coulport or Faslane in some capacity. 
In March 1996 Faslane accommodated 2,337 servicemen at the base, with 228 of that 
figure being officers.34 This figure did not represent the numerous military personnel 
that integrated into surrounding communities and maintained residence over the 
31 NAO, HC 621 of Session 93-94. 
32 Central Unit for Procurement, The Trident Works Programme: A Case Study (CUP Guidance: 1995), 
E' 3; ITG, 6 July 1995, p. 2; HA, 20 May 1994, p. 1. 
3 At that time Defence Secretary, Dennis Healy, stated that the Polaris programme would not proceed 
with a fifth boat as the decision saved about £45 million in capital costs. Such savings allowed central 
government to resume the nuclear propelled hunter-killer programme and the overall timetable for 
Polaris was kept. J. Ring, We Come Unseen: The Untold Story o/the Britain's Cold War Submariners 
(London: John Murray, 2001), p. 59. 
34 Navy Accommodation, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 274 Col 634, 27 March 1996. 
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Photograph 1.9: Clyde Submarine Base 
Photograph 1.10: Clyde Submarine Base 
(Top) Aerial view of Faslane (Below) View from Glen Fruin Bypass. 
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course of thirty years. Furthennore, the relationship between community and shore 
facilities was highlighted by the Helensburgh Advertiser, which habitually featured 
articles pertaining to the activities of military residents or the Royal Navy itself. 
Articles such as 'Officers tender care', a feature with a photo of an officer and his 
model trains, or 'New crest for sub squadron', honouring the 10th Submarine 
Squadron, made for frequent reading.3S It is a certainty that many in Helensburgh 
prided themselves on hosting the UK's nuclear deterrent, an attribute best 
demonstrated when the community council intended to include Trident expansion 
plans in their 1986 'Historic Helensburgh' exhibition.36 However, this unique 
relationship was made most apparent through the Faslane Fair. Since 1988 this naval 
celebration consistently reinforced the Royal Navy's relationship with Helensburgh's 
civilians through numerous exhibits, amusements and presentations.37 Yet despite the 
area's general enthusiasm for Trident, there were those who were uncomfortable with 
the SSBN 
In the summer of 1992 a deliberate exercise to preserve the relationship between the 
SSBN, the Royal Navy and the Helensburgh community was conducted when the 
local paper released the sixteen-page promotional document, Faslane Features. 
Issued just previous to the introduction of the first Trident boat, HMS Vanguard, the 
true intent of this document was to prepare civilians for its arrival and con finn to the 
general public that every possible safety precaution was finnly in place. Articles such 
as 'Always safety first: how Faslane monitors radiation and is monitored itselr were 
strategically positioned to accentuate the numerous safety elements of the 
35 HA, 2 September 1983, p. 7; HA, 6 November 1992, p. 8 
36 The Ministry of Defence did not permit this. HA, 25 July 1986, p. 2. 
37 HA. 20 May 1988, p. 1; HA, 17 June 1988, p. 3; HA, 30 May 1996, p. 9. 
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programme.38 Moreover, it skilfully shifted focus from the nuclear aspect of Trident 
by concluding with the human dimension as articles like 'Loneliness of the long 
distance wives' and 'Working together: there at the berth!' reminded civilians that 
submariners served a specific military function but were also family-orientated. 39 
Though Jonathan Aitken, then Defence Procurement Minister at Faslane, wilfully 
disregarded the Programme's £800 million overspend and hailed Trident as an 
'industrial success story', responses from communities outside Helensburgh were less 
favourable but varied over time.4o 
While the disannament movement's response to Trident in Scotland was categorical, 
especially from activists who resided within Strathclyde, the reactions of communities 
outside Helensburgh were varied, with local media only able to provide the most 
general ofinterpretations.41 After the decision to implement Trident in July 1980, the 
Helensburgh Advertiser's transparent headline declared, 'The future of the Base is 
secure', with this renewed sense of confidence attributed to sustained employment. 
Yet it should be noted that the potential for job creation was an incentive for greater 
Scottish cooperation with the project. Central government's decision to implement 
this strategic programme was based purely on security interests as the Soviet Union's 
occupation of Afghanistan at that time verified Trident's applicability.42 Stewart 
Noble, former Chairman of Helens burgh Community Council, stated: 
38 Faslane Features, summer 1992, p. 1. 
39 Faslane Features, summer 1992, p. 12, 15. 
40 HA, 9 October 1992, p. 4. 
41 It should be noted that newspapers have an editorial opinion that may not concur with the views of 
their respective communities. See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. 
42 A. Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New 
York: Times Books, 1995), p. 440. 
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I think it goes without saying that everyone in Helensburgh (not just the 
community council) believes that Trident offers considerable employment 
to the area. Some have argued that its presence has deterred employers, 
but I would tend to suspect that the net effect must have been to provide 
considerable employment. 43 
On economic grounds the Greenock Telegraph also exhibited interest in Trident when 
it asked, 'Will submarine orders surface for ScottS?,44 In 1916 Scotts of Greenock 
completed HMS Swordfish, the first steam submarine for the Royal Navy, and later 
performed refit work on the conventional Oberon class.4s Despite its experience with 
submarines, the yard's aspirations failed to materialise as Vickers Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Limited (VSEL) in Barrow-in-Fumess was selected to construct the 
Vanguard class.46 Yet various sections of these, and other communities, supported the 
decision to strengthen national security through Trident. However, editorial opinions 
that read 'No Christian should support nuclear war' and 'Scrap Trident and give us 
peace' also appeared within the pages of Dum barton's Lennox Herald, indicative of 
the tensions within the region.47 
From 1980-1985 the acquisition of Trident pressurised the Strathclyde Region, with 
the system's frequently advertised yet speculative economic benefits, and its 
effectiveness as a deterrent, not universally accepted. Regardless of the level of 
employment the system was thought to provide, the decision to upgrade Trident in 
March 1982 encouraged the Lennox Herald to proclaim a 'Fury over Trident II 
purchase'. A Glasgow Herald headline at that time also advertised that the 'Trident 
43 Correspondence with Stewart Noble, Chairman of Helensburgh Community Council 1992-1995, 
(07/10/02). 
44 HA, 18 July 1980, p. 1; GT, 22 July 1980, p. 3. 
45 D.M. Fraser, Scottish Disasters (Edinburgh: Mercat Press, 1996), p. 64. 
46 By 1990 Scott-Lithgow was fmished. 
47 LH, 12 March 1982, p. 3; LH, 26 February 1982, p. 5; LH, 15 August 1980, p. 4. 
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system is offtarget,.48 Clashing headlines proliferated within regional papers as the 
Strathc1yde territory harboured both champions of the system and advocates for 
disarmament. However, Trident was an issue capable of transcending either personal 
religious convictions or political allegiances, a characteristic that ultimately fuelled 
the intensity of this debate. While the Labour Party supported disarmament up until 
1989, Catholic assimilation into Scottish society. 'the increasing orientation of 
adherents' towards Labour since the early 1900s, and their numerical presence in the 
industrial west did not prevent 79.7 per cent of the electorate in lochside wards from 
voting against the party' and their policies on Trident'. 49 This was in 1984, at the 
height of opposition to Trident in Scotland. However, this is not to say that the 
system was well received as an unspecified number of residents also believed Trident 
was an act of futility. While the Royal Navy's participation in the Falklands 
campaign generally muted anti-Trident sentiment nearer to Helensburgh, there were a 
number of those who defied the logic of deterrence and noted that British possession 
of Polaris failed to repel the Argentinians in 1982. so Regardless, it would be 
misleading to suggest that there were levels of opposition to Trident comparable with 
Scottish reactions to the arrival of the US Polaris fleet in 1961.51 
48 LH, 12 March 1982, p.l; GH, 12 March 1982, p. 1. 
49 Strathc1yde was home to the largest percentage of Scotland's Catholic community. HA. 1 June 1984, 
p. 4. I. Maver, 'The Catholic Community', in T.M. Devine and R.J. Finlay (eds.) Scotland in the ]Uh 
Century (Edinburgh: EUP, 1996), p. 274. 
so This was a topic of discussion in an interview with lain Leitch. American possession of Trident also 
did not deter Al Qaeda in September 2001. Interview with lain Leitch, former Labour representative for 
Dumbarton North, Dumbarton District Council (19/11102). 
SI See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. 
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Ifwe fast-forward to 1992 the Trident Works Programme was approaching 
completion with the Vanguard class sailing into the Gareloch unimpeded. Arguments 
against the system were very much contained. The Chemobyl catastrophe in 1986 
failed to inspire resistance to Trident in Scotland, the Soviet Union fell defunct, and 
the project was no longer a viable political issue, though the disarmament and 
Christian peace movements struggled to preserve interest in the issue. 52 With the 
October 1992 arrival ofHMS Vanguard, the Helensburgh Advertiser sustained its 
usual demeanour when it exclaimed, 'A leviathan comes home to Faslane' and 
'Hundreds wait to see history made' ,53 The Dunoon Observer and Argyl/shire 
Standard, apparently unimpressed, placed this introduction on page eight and simply 
described it as 'the largest submarine ever commissioned by the Royal Navy. ,54 Much 
ofDunoon's indifference to this event was derived from the community's 
geographical remoteness, with Trident-based employment having little influence over 
the area. However, twelve years after Scotts dockyard was denied the contract for 
Trident the Greenock Telegraph lost its enthusiastic tone by announcing that 
Vanguard arrived to 'her new home at Faslane on the Clyde ... amid angry protests 
from angry protesters', 55 The Glasgow Herald headline, also concentrating on 
objection, further announced that 'Anti-Trident protesters brushed aside at Faslane'. 56 
Though defiance is accentuated this cryptic headline proved misleading as few 
members of the disarmament movement actually challenged its arrival. The 
52 The Chemobyl disaster occurred 2,500 kilometres away but it is still contaminating Scottish sheep 
with levels of radioactivity considered unsafe to eat. After the nuclear reactor at Chemobyl in the 
Ukraine exploded and spewed radioactivity over most of Europe in April 1986, people were assured by 
the authorities that its effects would be seen off in a matter of weeks. This had considerable impact on 
public opinion and the issue was allowed to rest. In 2004 fourteen farms covering 16,300 hectares of 
southwest and central Scotland are still subject to restrictions on the movement and slaughter of 
radioactive sheep. SH, May 22, 2004, p.4. 
53 HA, 30 October 1992, pp. 30-31. 
54 Dunoon Observer and Argyllshire Standard, 31 October 1992, p. 8. 
55 GT, 26 October 1992, p. 1 
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weakened state of protest that coincided with the arrival of this first boat proved to set 
the standard. As the remaining Vanguard class SSBNs moved into Faslane, it seems 
that the intensity of this issue was successfully contained. Pre-conditioned through 
Polaris, Strathclyde residents had grown accustomed to the presence of the national 
deterrent. 
With the final three boats set to arrive by the end of the millennium, the public's 
interest in Trident plummeted throughout the region due in no small part to the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union and the restoration of the Scottish Parliament. By 
1994 the US Navy was on the verge of receiving its sixteenth Ohio class Trident 
SSBN. Therefore, in the opinion of the Ministry of Defence the May introduction of 
HMS Victorious, the second of the Royal Navy's Vanguard class, must have appeared 
as anything but excessive. 57 Nevertheless, when HMS Vigilant, the UK's third boat, 
entered Faslane in March 1996 a significant proportion of the Scottish media still 
retained its focus on protest.58 Though this had little influence over Scottish civil 
society, it did make clear that a lingering element of antagonism still remained both 
regionally and throughout Scotland. However, though certain sections of the national 
media attempted to rekindle interest by May 1999 concern with HMS Vengeance, and 
the Trident issue overall, was superseded by Labour's delivery of greater autonomy. 59 
Despite the efforts of the Sunday Herald to inspire a reaction, thus sending a 
unilateralist memorandum to Westminster, Scots opted to employ Scottish 
parliamentary elections as a mechanism that would improve their everyday living. 60 
56 GH, 26 October 1992, p. 2; LH, 30 October 1992, p. 10-11. 
57 Hutchinson, Submarines War Beneath the Waves, p. 178. 
58 TS, 20 March 1996, p. 1; HA, 21 March 1996, p. 1. 
59 See Chapter Four: Civil Society and Public Opinion. 
60 SH, 25 April 1999, p. 3; SH, 21 February 1999, p. 2. Also see Chapter Three: The Scottish political 
dimension of Trident. 
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Defence was generally considered irrelevant. Tucked away into the back of the 
Scottish psyche, Trident was permitted to remain in relative peace. 
Environment, Safety and Trident 
With the procurement, construction and operation of any complex weapon system 
came a long list of safety concerns for both the governments that employed these 
weapons and those communities within close proximity. Therefore, both the Trident 
Works Programme and the day-to-day operation of the SSBN and SLBM naturally 
coincided with Scottish concerns over environmental and public health issues. In 
environmental terms, Trident's presence within the Strathc1yde Region initially 
brought several inflammatory developments. In the interests of both security and 
operational preparedness, seemingly endless lines of security fences, penetrating 
observation towers, extensive geo-physical alterations to the surrounding landscape 
and waterways, unsightly support facilities and frequent construction traffic made for 
perpetual criticism (Photograph 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14). In terms of public risk, the 
nuclear dimension of Trident brought with it considerations regarding Soviet 
targeting, ecological devastation, radiological contamination and fears of an 
accidental detonation involving a Trident warhead on site. All these issues were of 
significant concern to local authorities regardless ofprobability.61 
61 It must be understood that specifics on safety practices during service operations for Trident were not 
intended for public consumption and much of the information in this section is based on what is 
presently available to the public domain. 
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Photograph 1.11: Coulport Construction 
Photograph 1.12: Faslane Perimeter Fence 
Behind the security fence are several rows of razor wire, with a centred walkway for 
security patrols with dogs. Numerous security cameras and infrared sensors also insure 
the integrity of the perimeter fence. 
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Photograph 1.13: Coulport Observation Tower 
Numerous observation towers are strategically set across the grounds of the Coulport facility 
Photograph 1.14: Coulport Ancillary Hardstandine 
It is believed Trident's powerful warheads are stored inside this structure. 
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When submitting planning applications for the system poor decisions by the Ministry 
of Defence did little, if anything, to inspire cooperation from local councils. 
Indicative of the Ministry's obvious concerns with national security and completing 
the Programme as timely as possible environmental and operational safety took 
highest priority. However, local authorities believed the June 1981 Notice of 
Proposed Development failed to provide a suitable environmental impact 
assessment. 62 Tight restrictions on information by the Ministry of Defence therefore 
sparked an unfavourable reaction from the Labour-controlled Dumbarton District 
Council, and although there was a clear political element to the council's 
dissatisfaction, it was missile servicing and the frequent handling of hazardous 
materials at Coulport that worried them most. After consultations with Strathclyde 
Regional Council, serious efforts were made by both councils to conduct a special 
inquiry regarding the system's installation on the Clyde. Though it was designed to 
encapsulate all the concerns both councils had with Trident, the Inquiry brought few 
new findings upon its release in May 1983. 
Incomplete proposals and patchwork information provided by the Ministry of Defence 
did nothing to bolster either Trident's popularity or the findings of the Couiport 
Inquiry. Due to Crown exemption, the Inquiry explained that the Ministry of Defence 
was not legally required to provide an environmental impact assessment for Trident 
and did so only of its own will.63 The Ministry's reasons for such vagueness were 
62 Ministry of Defence, Notice of Proposed Development, 2 June 1981. 
63 The document noted that although central government encouraged the use of environmental impact 
assessments since 1972, they were not mandatory. However, according to the Health and Safety statute 
it was the responsibility of employers to notify the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) if they handled 
certain specified hazardous materials, with nuclear sites and military installations subject to HSE 
notification procedures. The European Commission's Directive 'on the major accident hazards of 
certain industrial activities' also made it mandatory for the UK to introduce hazard surveys into their 
statute, but this would not take effect until sometime in 1989. Though Strathclyde Regional Council 
requested the Ministry of Defence to meet with the Council's consultants in January 1983 to discuss 
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attributed to the magnitude of the project because the start date was years ahead of its 
completion date; there were matters of national security along with incomplete site 
surveys; and it claimed that it wanted to take into account the views of local 
councils for their environmental planning matters. There are several examples of this 
obscurity. Plans provided by the Ministry of Defence did not specify the location of 
submarine berthing facilities, but did indicate that that they would be within a 
kilometre of the existing berthage. The number and exact locations of installations 
handling missiles and warheads at Coulport also remained undetennined, with a 
consideration in the detailed site planning required to maintain safeguarding distances 
between certain buildings in order to reduce damage from accidental non-nuclear 
explosions (Photograph 1.15,1.16). Finally, along with navigational and airspace 
restrictions in the vicinity ofCoulport and Faslane, the details ofCoulport's 
safeguarding map involving yellow safety lines could not be provided to the public 
without permission from the Ministry,64 With the project shrouded in secrecy, 
Strathclyde Regional Council's research was compromised from the very beginning. 
Because of restrictions applied to classified information, theoretical arguments both 
for and against the system did little to strengthen the credibility of the Inquiry despite 
contributions from specialists. The council appointed the firm Cremer and Warner in 
December 1982 as consultants on the issues of accidental and war induced hazards. 
technical data associated with Coulport's hazard analysis and risk assessment, the Ministry would not 
agree to such a discussion. IT Strathclyde Regional Council, An Environmental Impact Assessment of 
the Proposed Extension of the oyal Naval A rmament Depot. Coulport for the purposes of the Trident 
Weapon System, Part One: General Report (HDB Torrance ARIBA ARIAS FRTPI Director of 
Physical Planning, May 1983), p. 1-10. A copy of this is also available at the Mitchell Library. 
64 The proposal emphasised that Coulport was subject to the Town and Country Planning Act which 
required the Ministry to be consulted about the development of a clear safety distance in the event of 
accidental non-nuclear explosion, referred to as a yellow line. Until consultations on these lines had 
been completed, local government considered the document incomplete. However, it was eventually 
detennined that yellow safety lines could not be published as this information potentially revealed the 
location of certain classified materials to adversaries through complex mathematical formulae. 
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Photograph 1.15: RNAD Coulport 
The Coulport facility rests upon Loch Long 
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Photograph 1.16: Trident SSBN at Coulport 
Final destination unknown (2004): A Trident SSBN departs from the Coulport facility (background). 
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Specific hazards that could be introduced into the Strathclyde territory, or pre-
existing hazards that could be increased following the introduction of Trident, were 
also addressed. Peacetime safety considerations included the potential for risk to 
local popUlation not only from Coulport itself but also from the transport of toxic 
materials to and from the facility. Topics such as accidental fire, explosion of trigger 
devices within warheads and dangers associated with the rocket fuel hydrazine were 
also included in this analysis. However, in the most general oftenns the Inquiry 
could only estimate that missile servicing at Coulport added to the risks of accidents 
'if it involved more frequent handling of hazardous materials, or if any test firing of 
missile propUlsion systems were to occur. These assumptions were hardly 
unexpected. In the event of an accidental explosion involving a warhead, the Inquiry 
also emphasised that anyone within twenty-one kilometres downwind of an accidental 
explosion not taking well-protected shelter within the first hour would likely receive 
fatal doses of radiation. Due to Trident's assumed capabilities this also failed to 
remain unforeseen. Finally, as accepted with Polaris the first half of the Inquiry 
suggested that numerous accidents could occur while the missiles were aboard 
submarines and believed there were also risks of damage to submarines from collision 
with other shipping or grounding.6s Bound by the concealment ofinfonnation, to a 
large extent the consultant's engineers and scientists simply reinterpreted the obvious. 
Continuing with its hypothetical analysis, the second halfofthe Coulport Inquiry 
provided a most interesting War-Induced Hazards Assessment, which envisioned a 
scenario involving a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. The findings of the 
65 The chances of these incidents actually occuning were described as remote by the Strathclyde 
Inquiry. See: IT An Environmental Impact Assessment of the Proposed Extension of the Royal Naval 
Armament Depot, Coulportfor the purposes of the Trident Weapon System, Part Two: SCientific Report 
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Inquiry concerning attack patterns against the Strathclyde territory were heavily 
influenced by the 1980 UK Government Exercise 'Square Leg', with the exercise 
suggesting that an initial attack would involve roughly a dozen warheads with a total 
yield of some 16 megatons.66 Estimations further dictated that the reliability of Soviet 
warheads was roughly 70 per cent, with 30 per cent of those weapons failing to 
explode on or near their targets. Targets in Strathc1yde were therefore believed to be 
covered up to three times, increasing the probability of a successful strike. If only 
nuclear installations in Strathclyde were attacked then estimated civilian casualties 
due to burns and blast would be roughly 30,000 deaths and 100,000 injuries, but the 
radioactive fallout could have caused hundreds of thousands of other fatalities. If the 
attack included targets within the Glasgow conurbation then the casualties would have 
been very heavy whether or not the installations were also targets.67 Nevertheless, 
while the contents of this analysis made for an interesting read, such findings 
generally stated what was already to be assumed. Taking great care so as not to leak 
information and thus provide ammunition to either Strathclyde Regional Council or 
its consultants, the Ministry of Defence maintained secrecy but also, arguably, 
sabotaged the Coulport Inquiry. However, the inconclusive nature of this study 
certainly did not condemn Trident, thus providing for a meaningless document that 
effectively neutralised the objectives of local authorities. 
The Trident system had been upgraded and underwent modifications in 1982, and in 
the wake of the failed Coulport Inquiry it could be presumed that both the Ministry of 
on Hazard. (HOB Torrance ARlBA ARIAS FRTPI Director of Physical Planning. May 1983). in its 
entirety. This is also available at the Mitchell Library. 
66 Strathclyde was considered a likely target for Soviet military planners as it was home to nuclear 
installations at Coulport, Faslane. the US Polaris fleet at the Holy Loch and NATO Armaments Depot, 
Glen Douglas. 
67 Strathclyde Regional Council. Part Two: Scientific Report on Hazard. p.S-2, 5-3. 
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Defence and the Property Sales Agency attempted to improve relations with local 
government. In May 1984 the Ministry issued a revised Notice of Proposed 
Development that included a rich assortment of analysis, charts, graphs and maps 
which estimated the impact of shore facilities on the surrounding area.68 However, 
because national security supported the utilisation of selective materials, Dumbarton 
District Council was again left unsatisfied. In January 1985 Labour councillors 
expressed fears that earthquakes posed an unacceptable threat to the 160ft high Ship 
Lift, though a British Geological Survey believed that the risk of earthquake damage 
was negligible.69 Local councillors also criticised the proposed perimeter fence 
surrounding the expanded facility and pushed for the construction of escape routes 
from Coulport and Faslane.7o For Scottish historians, this subject also proved to be of 
interest. In the event of either an incoming strike or some tragic accident, a rapid 
departure from the vicinity appeared unlikely, with only main motorways such as the 
A814 and A817 readily available and flowing directly into the A82 near Dumbarton 
(Map 1.2). With tens of thousands of vehicles fleeing the scene, according to lain 
Leitch, former Labour councillor for Dumbarton North, traffic would ultimately 
bottleneck near Dumbarton with the 'walking dead' cordoning off all emergency 
service vehicles into the area. 71 Yet the construction of additional motorways from 
these sites was determined to be unnecessary and in February 1985 the Ministry of 
Defence selectively responded to various criticisms by arguing that Polaris never 
68 Ministry of Defence and the Property Sales Agency, Proposed Development at the Clyde Submarine 
Base Faslane and Coulport: Environmental Impact Assessment (May 1984). 
69 GH, 211anuary 1985, p. 3. 
70 LH, 1 February 1985, p. 14, 15. 
71 In event of a nuclear accident/strike, a much longer route of escape along the AS11 through Stirling 
would have been available. but time consuming. In such an incident Leitch also indicated that limited 
motorway access was beneficial to control unwanted media. Several emergency situations were also 
discussed. During conventional warfare, emergency service vehicles stay within the area to assist the 
wounded and fight fires. In the event of a nuclear strike, emergency service vehicles are evacuated 
from the area if possible, then return after detonation to assist. During a nuclear strike, emergency 
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Map 1.2: Motorways from Coulport and Faslane 
service vehicles near Faslane would have been trapped with those residents fleeing the area due to 
limited access. Interview with Leitch (19/11102). 
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experienced an accidental explosion, and that security fences were necessary for the 
restricted areas surrounding Trident facilities.72 Legitimate questions still required 
detailed response but the Ministry was incapable of assisting Dumbarton District 
Council in their quest for greater information. 
After Younger approved the planning application for the Trident Works Programme 
in March 1985, the decision allowed for a majority of the system's opposition to 
collapse. Though asbestos ground-contamination appeared within two months it 
posed little threat to Trident's progress. Massive quantities of blue, white and brown 
asbestos had been discovered in the repossessed shipbreaking yard at Faslane, and 
according to Dumbarton's Alternative Employment Study Group (AESG), the 
Ministry concealed this discovery until the planning application was outwith the 
limited remit of Dumbarton District.73 Complications ensued. Designated to be 
removed and transported to Glenboig, after a heated response from the local 
community the Ministry reconsidered and decided in June that the asbestos should be 
placed in special container bags then disposed of in Lanarkshire.74 However, during a 
presentation for Dumbarton District Council, Les Robertson, Labour councillor for 
Bonhill East and Convenor of Environmental Health, demonstrated the ease with 
which asbestos could have been released into the environment after he punctured a 
sample bag with a common household spoon.75 At a national level interest was mute, 
72 HA. 15 February 1985, p. 2. 
73 This was according to: DL The Alternative Employment Study Group, Polaris and Trident: The 
Myths and Realities of Employment (1985), p. 14; HA. 3 May 1985, p. 1. 
74 Asbestos and Toxic substances. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 80 Col 879, 12 June 1985. 
7S Correspondence with Les Robertson, former Labour Councillor and Convenor of Environmental 
Health (30/10/02). During the course of this research a letter from North Lanarkshire Council read, 
'Factual details on the transfer of waste from an MOD establishment would be very much restricted, 
preventing any public official from commenting on it. t Received: (31/10/02). 
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and regionally, the situation only slightly intensified when a greater amount of 
asbestos 'than was first envisaged' was to be removed from site in March 1986.76 
In its attempts to defuse the situation the Ministry decided that contaminated dredged 
materials could be dumped off at Cloch Point. Yet this proposal was also rejected 
when it was revealed that contaminated soil dumped either in or near the Clyde could 
foster both an environmental and public hazard.77 According to Robertson, the 
Ministry's final solution involved asbestos being encapsulated in glass globules, 
enclosing the material in sheet-piled walls and covering it with reinforced concrete 
with the removal of this hazardous material costing an estimated £8 million.78 
Because the intensity of the Trident debate in Scotland had receded to such a large 
extent, little was actually made of these events at that time. 
Anatoly Dobrynin, Moscow's ambassador to six US Presidents during the Cold War 
era, has acknowledged that the November 1985 Geneva Summit may be regarded as 
'the beginning of the end of the Cold War', but by December 1986 central 
government would have considered the suspension of Trident's progress as 
irresponsible.79 The project moved forward. In Scotland, noise levels during Trident's 
construction phase proved to be greater than predicted, miles of security fences were 
required for adequate security and a bypass would be constructed at Glen Fruin. The 
Ministry of Defence understood that noise disrupted life near Helensburgh with an 
76 By April 1986 it was conftrmed that the Gareloch was contaminated from battleships dumped by 
Metal Industries. HA. 7 March 1986, p. 3. 
77 GT, 14 April 1986, p. S. 
18 Robertson explained that the Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Forsyth, refused to make 
£100,000 available for asbestos removal in council housing. There 'was no extra money to make 
houses safe {or people, but plenty ofadditional money to make Faslane safe for Trident'. 
79 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. S64. 
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insulation scheme and offers to purchase homes near Faslane extended to residents.so 
However, it is apparent that security measures had a far greater impact upon the 
surrounding countryside. By February 1986 Strathclyde Regional Council informed 
the Ministry that it would need consent to renew a perimeter fence outside Faslane 
under the terms of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984.81 Disregarding Strathc1yde's 
warnings, a 7.5 metre high fence with thirty-five closed circuit television system 
towers and infrared illuminators was erected without council approval. 82 Finally, in 
December 1986 local authorities believed the construction of the Glenn Fruin bypass 
posed credible risks to both Scotland's natural heritage and national security as the 
road permitted public access to within a relatively few metres of the CouJport 
facility.83 Two years earlier the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) attack on the Grand 
Hotel in Brighton nearly wiped out the Thatcher government, with councillors 
highlighting accessibility to a facility that housed the system's powerful warheads.84 It 
appears that these specific concerns were considered to be unfounded as the Ministry 
of Defence disregarded these observations and pushed forward to complete the project 
against a specific deadline, and potentially, international developments.8s 
8°Sellers would be able to repurchase their homes at market's value when noise levels fell. Faslane 
Construction Work, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 89 Col 97, 16 December 1985. 
81 GH, 17 December 1985, p. 2. 
82 There was also a 'clear zone' with vegetation removed from a ten metre wide strip inside the fence 
that extended into the Gareloch, with three extra coils of barbed wire placed inside and at the bottom of 
the fences. The purpose of this cleared zone was for patrols with dogs around the perimeter of Faslane. 
Property Sales Agency, Notice of Proposed Development: RNAD Coulport Depot Perimeter Fence 
Upgrade, (PSA Directorate of Defence Services 11,1986), p. 17. HA, 1 February 1986, p. 5; HA, 21 
March 1986, p. 7; LH, 11 April 1986, p. 16. 
83 GH, 10 December 1986, p. 3; HA, 11 April 1986, p. 1; HA, 11 July 1986, p. 5 . 
... T. Geraghty, The Irish War: the military history ofa domestic conflict «London: Harper Collins, 
2000), p. 211; Interview with Leitch (19/11/02). 
85 During the Reykjavik summit Gorbachev proposed a comprehensive set of reductions for strategic 
arms, intermediate-range missiles and space weapons. He even proposed to eliminate all strategic 
nuclear weapons within a decade. This may have inspired the UK Government to complete the 
programme as soon as possible. Isaacs and Downing, The Cold War, p. 366. 
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In February 1989 it became evident that the Trident Works Programme was a project 
of such enonnity that it had the capacity to alter Scottish waterways. The Ministry of 
Defence's proposal concerning the widening ofRhu Narrows intended to remove the 
landmark on the Gareloch, Rhu Spit, though three years earlier it had pledged the area 
would be left intact. 86 The reason for removing land that ran out into the water was 
both to widen and deepen Rhu Narrows for the massive 16,000 tonne, 150 metre boat. 
For this objective to be achieved, considerable drilling, blasting and dredging was 
required, with approximately one-third (140m) of the length ofRhu Spit removed. 
Two million cubic metres of material was to be dredged from the Narrows though 
some environmentalists suspected that this measure would increase the turbidity of 
water, creating high noise pollution levels and possibly disturbing fish breeding 
grounds.87 The plan also involved the straightening of a bend in the Narrows at 
Kidston Park to provide better steerage for submarines.88 By January 1990 contractors 
blasted away the landmark at the end of the Spit, and from seven to seven, seven days 
a week for nine months the dredger worked the loch until it cleared the channel. 89 
During the final days of this hugely expensive project three issues in particular 
deserved closer attention. The environmental impact ofCoulport was most 
unfavourably described by a Blainnore resident when it was stated that: 
It presented a large scar on the landscape of Loch Long. Since that time 
the scarring [along the shore] has healed slightly as a result of vegetation 
re-establishing itself on the bare rock and concrete. At Ardentinny you 
86 HA, 10 March 1989, p. 1. 
87 A small rock outcrop in Rosneath Bay was also to be removed by drilling and blasting. Property 
Services Agency, Clyde Submarine Base at Faslane: Widening of Rhu Narrows (Description of Works 
and Environmental Assessment, February 1989), p. 8.1. 
88 HA, 7 April 1989, p. 3. 
89 HA, 26 January 1990, p. 1. 
65 
cannot escape from the rape of the landscape ... We do worry about 
accidents but you put it in the back of your mind and get on with life,.90 
Despite a clean environmental record backed by the Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency (SEP A), these comments indicated that Coulport brought with it a lingering 
psychological impact. Yet it should be recognised that those in proximity to the 
facility were able to cope with its presence since the late 1960s though their anxieties 
should not be disregarded (Appendix B, Photograph 1.17, 1.18).91 In terms of safety, 
concerns with Trident's warheads were also raised when Strathclyde Regional 
Council called for an immediate halt to the project after the US government's Drell 
commission expressed fears of an accidental detonation during flight in December 
1990.92 Anglo-American security arrangements prohibited the release of detailed 
information on the subject but in July 1992 the government agreed to appoint a new 
nuclear weapons safety watchdog after the chief scientific adviser to the Ministry of 
Defence expressed concern that reduced expenditure could affect safety.93 Finally, 
complications with the Ship Lift instigated fears that it might collapse while in 
operation, potentially dropping a massive SSBN while being hoisted from the water. 
The full design safety case was expected to be realised by March 1994, yet by 1999 
the Royal Navy still operated the Lift under restricted conditions and had to apply for 
a separate certificate for each hoist, largely due to frequently modified nuclear safety 
90 Interview with a resident of Blairmore across from RNAD Coulport (06/11102). 
91To the credit of the Ministry ofOefence and SEPA it should be noted that over the years the author 
has spent in Ardentinny he, who is not a biologist, has found Loch Long to be teaming with life. 
Thousands of waterfowl rests within the waters beside Coulport at any given time. he has witnessed 
millions of fresh prawn caught along the shoreline at low tide and noticed several species of butterflies 
in the area. 
92 In mid-1990, the Orell Report raised serious concerns about the design of the missile with scientific 
experts believing the missile should have been subjected to an immediate national policy review as 
Trident featured an explosive propellant that 'could be accidentally detonated'. Eighth Report from the 
Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme, HC 286 of Session 1990-91, p. 9. 
93 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement 
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Photograph 1.17: View of Ardeotiony from Coulport 
Photograph 1.18: View of Coulport from Ardeotiony 
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regulations.94 Due to the system's characteristics, public concerns were 
understandable but it should be noted that no serious incident had been reported. 
Upon the project's completion the environmental impact of construction was 
irreversible and shore facilities were visually displeasing when set against the 
breathtaking Scottish countryside. By that time the Clyde Area Public Safety 
Scheme, designed to safeguard the area and strategically revised in 1982 to accentuate 
precautions taken by the Ministry of Defence, was drawn up specifically with respect 
to 'unlikely' accidents with submarine reactors (Appendix C).95 This was a model 
venture in public relations, but the Scheme, replaced by the Clyde Off site Safety Plan 
in 1999, did at least enhance local government's preparedness in the event of some 
unforeseen emergency. One might already assume that Trident's opponents took little 
comfort from these arrangements (Photograph 1.19). However, though specifics on 
safety practices during service operations were not readily available, from 1979-1999 
delays in independent operation, the absence of serious incident and several 
environmental indicators verified the achievement of safety guidelines, regardless of 
ones ideological position on Trident. 96 
94 SoS, 24 March 1996, p. 5; HA, 11 April 1996. p. S; HA. 29 April 1999. p. 11. 
95 Designed with Polaris in mind. it is not clear as to when this plan was introduced. IT Strathclyde 
Regional Council. Report of Inquiry into the proposed extension of the Royal Naval Armaments Depot 
at Coulport,for the Trident Weapon System - 2(/"/24'11 June 1983 (9 September 1983), p. 39. 
96 The Clyde Area Public Safety Scheme was related to emergency responses by fire services, police. 
and hospitals to off site effects of accidents at sites with nuclear submarines. In 1998 the Ministry of 
Defence did admit that there had been thirty-three occasions since 1980 when 'low level' radioactive 
liquids had been 'unintentionally released' from Faslane into the Clyde. SoS. 30 August 1998, p. 3. 
Correspondence with Corbett (10/10/03). 
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Photograph 1.19: Trident on Loch Long 
Shore facilities and SSBNs were within proximity to numerous homes and communities. 
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Dumbarton District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council 
According to naval historian Peter Nailor, during the construction phase of Polaris the 
relationship between the Directorate-General of Navy Works and Dumbartonshire 
County Council was generally good, and improved with Helensburgh authorities who 
were initially concerned with the effects the development would have upon local 
affairs and amenities.97 Under the Trident Works Programme, this close relationship 
was profoundly transformed as both Dumbarton District and Strathclyde Regional 
Council's Labour majorities eventually joined the NFLA while offering nothing less 
than contempt for the project. Though these councils were later dissolved, in 1996 
Charles Gray, former Convenor of Strathclyde Regional Council, wrote that 'a cynic 
might suggest that since local government has taken such a battering at the hands of 
central government in the last decade or so, any directional change would only be an 
improvement. ,98 There is a distinct possibility that this comment was made, at least 
partially, in reference to councils' experiences with Trident. 
Dumbarton itself was only one of nineteen district councils that served the region of 
Strathc1yde, and with its high rate of unemployment in 1981 the government and the 
Ministry of Defence insisted that it could assist in alleviating this depression through 
Trident.99 In May of that year Dumbarton and Strathclyde councillors were invited to 
Helensburgh for a preliminary meeting on Trident, and after repossessing land leased 
to Metal Industries, the Ministry submitted its Coulport development proposals in 
97 Nailor, The Nassau Connection, p. 97. 
98 C. Gray. 'Scottish Local Government in Europe' in Lindsay Paterson (ed.), A Diverse Assembly: The 
Debate on Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: EUP, 1998), p. 256. 
99 I. MacDonald, Faslane Facts and Feelings: A study o/people's knowledge and attitudes, (Edinburgh: 
S.R.T. project, Church of Scotland, 1981), p. 11. 
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June. 1OO Massive expansion at Coulport was attributed to Trident's powerful warheads 
and trigger explosives, and the submitted notice made clear that future provisions 
would be subject to consultation with local authorities though additional infonnation 
would be provided following the project's commencement. 101 However, Dumbarton's 
councillors were unsatisfied, even outraged, with this planning application because 
plans failed to incorporate geological surveys, independent analysis, civil defence 
considerations or evaluate planning against the Clyde Area Public Safety Scheme. 
Additionally, emergency planning for radiological spills only considered clean-up 
operations for those boats positioned in berth, with no assumption or analysis for 
boats on the Clyde. 102 The fact that the Ministry also failed to advise on yellow lines, 
which marked a clear safety distance in the event of an accidental non-nuclear 
explosion, also infuriated local authorities. Nevertheless, the introduction of several 
proposals provided only limited infonnation. In the event that the Ministry chose to 
reject the council's requests, local government was powerless and had only limited 
legal recourse due to Crown exemption. 
Restricted by the interests of national security, Dumbarton's requests for detailed 
information were indeed legitimate but it must be understood that this was very much 
a political confrontation. lain Leitch revealed that the proposal put forward by the 
Ministry of Defence was ultimately imposed upon councils as it was granted Crown 
exemption from all planning permission. He also explained that in 1981 the views of 
Labour-controlled councils were countervailed by the judgements of the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, a cabinet member of the Conservative government. Therefore, 
100 This presentation consisted of summarised details and a display of vague plans and sketches. The 
notice mentioned land required for the site, a road system, support, storage, processing structures and 
berthing facilities. Interview with Leitch (19/11102). 
101 Ministry of Defence. Notice o/Proposed Development: Proposed Development, 2 June 1981, p. 1. 
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many of Dumbarton and Strathclyde's councillors felt their situation was nothing less 
than 'farcical,.I03 
Without question Dumbarton District Council's rejection of the 1981 proposal sent 
shockwaves through to central government. While political feuds intensified between 
Dumbarton's Labour and Conservative councillors, well placed strategic rumours 
emerged to the effect that the government was considering relocation of the system. 
This inflated fears of greater unemployment in Strathclyde Region. While the 
identities of those responsible for this chatter remains unclear, this was certainly not a 
possibility due to Faslane's operational suitability and proven success. It was clearly 
an attempt to pressurise uncooperative Labour councillors. In mid-July, Ian 
Campbell, Labour MP for West Dumbartonshire, wrote to George Younger and 
explained that Trident should be subject to public inquiry. However, Malcolm 
Rifkind, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Scottish Office, did not 
agree. 104 Rifkind rejected Campbell's request, as he believed that there were no 
grounds on which the Secretary could intervene. lOS By August 1981 the stalemate still 
had not been resolved, with Dumbarton's planning committee voting in favour of a 
policy of non-cooperation until vital statistics were supplied. I06 With Coulport's 
yellow lines remaining an issue of particular interest, the situation was far from 
defused. 
102 Interview with Leitch (19/11102). 
103 Ibid. 
104 HA, 17 July 1981, p. 3. 
lOS LH, 31 July 1981, p. 1. 
106 Nine councillors voted to halt talks with the Ministry, five voted to keep negotiations open and only 
one abstained. Dumbartoo's Councillors voted mostly along political lines. LH, 14 August 1981, p. 1. 
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Toeing the party line, Dumbarton's Labour councillors maintained opposition to 
Trident as both the Ministry of Defence and Dumbarton's Conservative councillors 
waged a positive, multifaceted campaign for the system in the autumn of 1981.107 To 
soothe public concerns with Trident, Commodore George Vailings offered to meet 
with Helensburgh residents to discuss their concerns with the project. 108 
Conservatives also argued that Dumbarton's Labour majority was ridiculous in its 
policy of non-cooperation, that local residents were indeed receptive of Trident and 
that the system was necessary to repel foreign aggression. 109 Furthermore, rumours of 
Trident's migration proved to be false when the Ministry followed up these assertions 
by emphasising that, 'too strong a protest, too much inconvenience and too much 
delay' would not discourage the government's intentions and lead to the project's 
relocation. I 10 Economic opportunity, safety assurances and national security were 
therefore valid points employed to undermine the proactive campaign waged against 
the system by local governments, the Christian peace movement and the disarmament 
movement in Strathclyde at that time. 
Dumbarton's Labour majority responded swiftly to this triple salvo, though the 
Ministry of Defence was inevitably prepared for any riposte. Because Strathclyde 
Regional Council was the regional planning authority and responsible for major 
services, Dumbarton consulted Strathclyde on the proposed development at Coulport, 
with the regional council agreeing to lodge objections in September 1981. 
107 Labour policy at this time rejected Trident. See Chapter Three: The Scottish political dimension. 
108 HA, 4 September 1981, p. 1. 
109 Conservative councillor Norman Glen, representing Helensburgh Central, described the Labour 
majority's policy of non-cooperation with the MoD as 'the height offoolishness' and emphasised that 
the District Council must participate in negotiations. Murdo MacGregor, Conservative councillor for 
Lochside, added that the list of objectors to the Trident planning provided an astonishing lack of local 
names. Hamish Williamson, Councillor for Helensburgh East, stated that without Trident Britain could 
not deter potential aggressors from sudden invasion. HA, 4 September 1981, p. 3; HA, 11 September 
1981,p. 5; HA, 18 September 1981, p. 2. 
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Strathc1yde Regional Council therefore believed the Secretary of State for Scotland 
should perfonn an inquiry. III Furthennore, while the regional council lodged 
objections with the Scottish Development Department, the Scottish Council for Civil 
Liberties submitted a draft planning application in October 1981 with Dumbarton 
District Council to build a study centre in the middle of the proposed Trident 
complex. I 12 Leitch also requested written letters of objection from the general public, 
whether they were based on environmental, strategic or moral grounds, so that they 
could be forwarded to Younger. 113 To the satisfaction of Labour councillors, the 
Ministry confinned that Coulport construction was delayed due to the intense conflict 
with Dumbarton District Council. However, for some the Ministry's admission 
contained a strategic element as it portrayed Dumbarton as insensitive to the area's 
rate of high unemployment.114 It is also not unreasonable to assume that central 
government was infonned of the Reagan administration's intentions to upgrade 
Trident in 1980, and therefore used this opportunity to depict local authority's actions 
as detrimental to communities while it awaited the final detennination from 
Washington. Nevertheless, the Scottish Development Department rejected plans for 
an inquiry until 'such time as a view had been established and that view had posed 
issues which the developing Department could not resolve'. II S 
110 HA, 25 September 1981, p. 1. 
III Strathc1yde Regional Council, Part One: General Report, p. 2. 
112 SCCL representatives from that period were not available. However, an email correspondence with 
the Scottish Human Rights Centre revealed that the proposal was probably an attempt 'to block 
construction of the Trident facilities at Faslane'. Also, the Scottish Development Department 
administered a number of duties, including social justice, housing area, regeneration, local government, 
finance, building control. Correspondence with Gillian Econopouly, Administrator for the Scottish 
Human Rights Centre (5/11102); HA. 30 October 1981, p. 3. 
113 HA, 30 October 1981, p. 2. 
114 HA, 27 November 1981, p. 1. 
1t5 Strathclyde Regional Council, Part One: General Report, p. 2: HA, 6 November 1981, p. 2. 
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As discussed in Chapter Three, by 1982 the Thatcher government accentuated the 
economic desirability of Trident in Scotland, rather than an issue of defence, but two 
influential modifications to the project troubled councils in Strathclyde as they pushed 
to organise an inquiry. In January of that year Younger requested Dumbarton to re-
establish a dialogue with the Ministry, but the council still had not received precise 
calculations for yellow lines though it gave an 'unqualified' statement that figures 
would be made available in May 1981.116 Coincidentally, the district council's 
experience with the Ministry paralleled Strathclyde Regional Council's investigation 
of mishandled ballistic missiles at the American Holy Loch Base. 117 Regardless of 
this, significant developments with Trident threatened to encumber the Inquiry. In 
March the Thatcher government opted to acquire the upgraded system from the US 
government, with plans for a ten-fold expansion ofCoulport announced by the 
Conservative Minister of State for Defence, Lord Trenchard. I 18 Then, in September 
1982, central government's decision to surrender Trident's missile fitting and 
servicing responsibilities to the US Navy Trident Atlantic Facility fundamentally 
removed the possibility of 1,500 desperately needed though temporary jobs from 
coming to Strathclyde. Because this developmentjeopardised Thatcher's strategy in 
Scotland the Ministry of Defence agreed that as a result of these changes the 1981 
planning application should be withdrawn. This decision did not deter local 
government from completing an independent study. 
116 HA, 15 January 1982, p. 9; LH. 29 January 1982, p. 3; HA, 1 January 1982, p. 3. 
117 Stratbclyde's investigation started after a missile was dropped into the hold of a supply ship after a 
crane's brake system failed. HA, 29 January 1982, p. 3. 
118 Trident I C4 was upgraded to the Trident II OS programme and the property line at Coulport was to 
be extended from 294 to 2,894 acres. Trident development (Clyde), Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
Vol 27, Col 265-272, July 16 1982. 
7S 
In a late 1990s speech to the conference, A Scottish Parliament: Friend or Foe to 
Local Government?, Rosemary McKenna, president of the Convention of Scottish 
Local Authorities, stated that, 'Our local government colleagues in Europe are 
astonished when they hear of the level of interference and antagonism from central 
government, a situation which simply does not exist in any other European 
country. ,119 Ultimately a critique of the Conservative government's influence over 
local authorities since 1979, it was also a summary applicable to the experiences of 
Labour-controlled councils and their experience with Trident. Conservatives from 
Downing Street to Strathclyde councils were working to clear a path for the deterrent 
and attempted to smother the Coulport Inquiry by exaggerating the cost estimates of 
the study. Their figures claimed that nineteen local authorities in Strathc1yde would 
be forced to contribute £ I million.120 Nevertheless, in August 1982 Strathclyde 
Regional Council agreed to meet the cost of an independent public inquiry and the 
council's £150,000 report was significantly less than Conservative estimates 
suggested. It was completed without participation from the Ministry of Defence. 121 
Released in May 1983, the Coulport Inquiry was dismissed by both opponents and 
supporters of the system. Labelled as 'a failure' by the SCND, Strathclyde Council's 
Conservatives believed the report was nothing more than a 'statement of the 
obvious'.122 What is not surprising is that central government disregarded the Inquiry, 
but what is perhaps most puzzling is the fact that the report ultimately failed to 
119 R. McKenna, 'A Scottish Parliament: Friend or Foe to Local Government' in Lindsay Paterson 
(cd.), A Diverse Assembly: The Debate on Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: EUP, 1998), p. 253. 
120 HA, 21 May 1982, p. 7; HA, 28 May 1982, p. 1. 
121 Interview with Dr. Jim Taggart, former member of the AESG Steering Committee and Labour CND 
(09111102); GH. 7 July 1982, p. 5; HA. 23 July 1982, p. 1. 
122 HA. 24 June 1983, p. 9; GH, 27 June 1983, p. 7. 
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support any position on Trident whatsoever.123 A document of few surprises, the 
Inquiry failed to inspire either the Scottish media or its public. 
As promised the reworked Notice of Proposed Development was released in May 
1984 due to modifications to Trident, with the Greenock Telegraph emphasising that 
the Royal Navy moved 'into action ... with a fresh salvo in the propaganda battle' .124 
The Ministry of Defence still did not offer information that contented Dumbarton's 
Labour councillors, and they never received the full safety zone calculations (yellow 
lines) as it was determined that such data could potentially reveal both the position 
and number of warheads within the Coulport facility. 125 Though the Convention of 
Scottish Local Authorities considered holding yet another public inquiry into 
Coulport's expansion and pressed for amendments of Scottish Development 
Department advice with regard to proposed defence development on Crown land, 
these efforts proved fruitless. 126 According to Leitch, 'the Ministry of Defence 
bulldozed through the plans' after Younger granted approval for the government's 
intentions.127 Though easily construed as the ruthless behaviour of a malevolent 
government, it is more accurate to depict this as an issue of national security being 
temporarily postponed by developments in Washington and, perhaps, through conflict 
between political antagonists at the local level. 
123 GH. 9 December 1983, p. 5. 
124 GT, 14 May 1984, p. 1. 
12S Royal Navy personnel and members of the Property Services Agency team presented a slide 
presentation. A Property Services Agency official said that the safety limits were maximum 
calculations. LH, 25 May 1984, p. 17; LH, 25 May 1984, p. 15. 
126 COSLA wanted to make clear that such developments raised the degree of public concern, and that 
a fublic inquiry should automatically be held. GH, 12 February 1985, p. 7. 
12 This was according to Leitch's description of events. Interview with Leitch (19/11102). Sixth Report 
from the Defence Committee, HC 549, p. 15. 
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Beyond the perimeter fences of Coulport and Faslane a colossal programme was 
underway as Dumbarton District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council lapsed 
into an irreparable state of paralysis. After March 1985 the Ministry of Defence 
continued to release its non-negotiable proposals for Trident facilities, and in the 
aftennath of the Ministry's success Dumbarton's council was forced to visit the more 
mundane aspects of the project.128 As early as October 1985, Labour councillors 
devoted their attentions to the simple visual considerations of Trident, bringing forth a 
noticeable sense of desperation. 129 According to the district's Charter, it proclaimed 
that 'Dumbarton District Council is opposed to the installation of Trident Nuclear 
Missile Systems' because it contended that money spent on greatly increasing 
Britain's nuclear capacity could have been invested in either the National Health 
Service or the education system.130 However, despite strenuous efforts by local 
authorities between 1980-1985, by 1996 Trident facilities flourished as these councils 
were disbanded. l3l 
Strathclyde economy and employment 
Thirty years previous to the Thatcher government's decision to acquire Trident the 
Strathclyde economy struggled despite the production of Oberon class conventional 
submarines just outside Glasgow or the introduction of Resolution class boats 
throughout the 1970s. Therefore, one could not expect Trident to bring forth some 
unforeseen upsurge in the Scottish economy. Ifwe first look back to the early 1900s. 
the government requested John Brown in Clydebank to assemble three submarines for 
128 Property Sales Agency, United Kingdom Trident Training Facility; GN. 2 August 1985, p. 6. 
129 DL Dumbarton District Council, Index of Minutes of Meetings, 14 October 1985, pp. 1386-1387. 
130 HL Dumbarton District Council Charter, (no date). 
131 For more on this disbanding see Chapter Four: Civil Society and Public Opinion. 
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the Royal Navy, but the yard made the mistake of rejecting further offers and stuck 
with surface warships (Photograph 1.20, 1.21).132 With coal and shipbuilding 
suffering rapid contraction since the late 1950s people requiring economic assistance 
doubled between 1962-1972 due to high unemployment, an ageing population, and 
the increased percentage of single mothers and wives. ll3 By this time Scotland 
discovered that, like the rest of Britain, its outmoded industrial plants could not vie 
with contemporary commercial production from abroad. Scottish shipbuilding 
industries were the most apparent failure, and the immense Clydeside shipyards that 
once delivered massive ocean liners became insolvent as several commercial 
enterprises once controlled by Scots had been merged into either English or 
multinational conglomerates. ll4 With the Scottish economy in serious turmoil, by July 
1980 Trident permitted central government to amplify the economic benefits of the 
system to Strathclyde residents in the hope that it would generate greater public 
support for the party, its nuclear defence policy and the system itself. 
The level of employment Trident could provide for Strathclyde's workers would not 
rectify the Scottish economy's deep-seated structural problems, but its ability to slow 
the rising rate of unemployment could not be discounted. According to Hall, during 
the operation of Polaris the civilian complement at shore establishments in June 1969 
accounted for 1,786 employees.13S However, since 1979 the Strathclyde Region had 
lost 154,000 jobs, of which 134,000 had been in the manufacturing sector, and 
132 Scotts were the experts and the yard did not believe the submarine had a future. I. Johnston, Ships 
for a nation: John Brown and Company Clydebank 1847-1971 (West Dumbartonshire Libraries and 
~useUlDS,2000),p. 162. 
133 C. Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Twentieth Century Scotland (Edinburgh: EUP, 
1998), p. 158. 
134 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, pp. 158-159. 
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Photograph 1.20: E class submarine launched in November 1916 
Photograph 1.21: E class submarine on the stocks (1916) 
\3S Hall , Clyde Submarine Base, p. 59. 
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in the Dumbarton district alone the unemployment rate in 1981 was 17.9 per cent with 
a total of 5,432 jobless.136 In 1983 the Strathclyde Region still harboured a 17.4 per 
cent unemployment rate, and by 1984 its sagging economy provided the Ministry of 
Defence with an excellent opportunity to verify Trident's socio-economic worth as 
areas like the Vale of Leven, Dumbarton and Helensburgh sustained 6,716 
unemployed in February, as compared to 6,402 from December 1983.137 By this time 
a strong dependency on the defence industry was made most apparent when the 
Church of Scotland's lain O. MacDonald wrote that Helensburgh's professional 
community claimed that Coulport and Faslane had insulated the local area. 138 What 
was beneficial for Helensburgh was less helpful to surrounding communities. With 
unemployment in Scotland still at 14.8 per cent in 1987, two years later its industrial 
workforce was only 58 per cent of what it was in 1972.139 Of the top ten 
unemployment black spot areas in 1989, Strathclyde, Fife and the Western Isles 
occupied the top three places, representing more than half of Scotland's populace.140 
Left with few alternatives, the working men and women of Strathclyde would have to 
accept any opportunities provided by Trident. 
Despite the arguments of Conservative MPs who believed that Trident had the ability 
to provide tens of thousands of jobs, it must be remembered that the system was not 
acquired by central government to strengthen the Strathclyde economy but to ensure 
greater national security. This was a certainty easily displayed through the rhetoric 
produced in local government and the Commons. Trident itselfwas not a 
straightforward duplication of Polaris and, amongst a number of improvements, its 
136 MacDonald, Faslane Facts and Feelings, p. 11. 
137 HA, 10 February 1984, p. S. 
138 MacDonald, Faslane Facts and Feelings, p. IS. 
139 DL Alternative Employment Study Group, Future Imperfect: Trident and the Clyde, (1988), p. 4. 
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patrol durations were longer, its refit schedules were less frequent and its missiles 
were to be serviced outside the UK. This implied that the system demanded less from 
the Ministry of Defence but provided more in terms of performance. Because the 
Vanguard class incorporated tremendous technical improvements and ease of 
maintenance over earlier designs, this system embodied greater efficiency. 141 These 
improvements held notable implications for shore facilities. With less service time 
required for the modem Trident system, various items were stripped down, cleaned or 
replaced less frequently, and minimal upgrading would be required during the earliest 
stages of its operation. Workshop and support facilities would also have less 
extensive requirements, and, though unclear, it appears that only accommodation 
facilities could be renewed as frequently as that of Polaris. 142 In terms of employment, 
Trident was not designed to support the same numbers as its predecessor. 
Along with the system's technical superiority and reduced maintenance, modifications 
to the project in 1982 further weakened the system's economic influence over 
Strathclyde. In July of that year Lord Trenchard emphasised that Coulport expansion 
was 'essential for the country, good for Scotland and on balance good for the 
locality,.143 There were obvious contradictions to come as the cancellation of Trident 
missile fitting and servicing on 9 September 1982 dictated that the UK transferred 
these responsibilities to the US facility in King's Bay, Georgia. 144 The announcement 
dissolved 1,500 jobs once earmarked for construction and it induced serious anxieties 
for the 2,000 Coulport employees. Dumbarton councillor, Billy Petrie, a strong 
140 Opposition Day. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Col 253 Vol 159. 31 October 1989. 
141 Hutchinson, war beneath the waves. p. 166. 
142 Hotel facilities included bunks. galley equipment, mess compartments. etc. Correspondence with 
Corbett (10/10/03). 
143 Trident Development (Clyde). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 27 Col 265-272, 6 July 1982. 
144 Spaven, Fortress Scotland. p. 137. 
82 
advocate for Trident, soon expressed regret over this decision as young people leaving 
schools early in surrounding areas 'lost their best hopes for employment' . 145 In 1983 
Strathclyde's Coulport Inquiry acknowledged this restructuring, with the '1,00011,700 
construction jobs originally postulated being considerably, if not drastically, 
reduced' .146 Yet while this development challenged Trident's reputation as a reliable 
source of employment, arrangements for processing Polaris missiles at Coulport 
remained unchanged and would continue until it was phased out in the 1990s.147 The 
west of Scotland would therefore accommodate both the Polaris and Trident weapon 
systems at some point. It would eventually do so through reduced levels of 
employment. 
By May 1984 Trident boat designs were approved, construction of the Vanguard class 
at VSEL was set to commence and the Ministry of Defence was prepared to launch 
the Trident Works Programme. After releasing its revised Notice of Proposed 
Development the Ministry opted to provide employment figures for 'peak years' of 
construction, rather than predicting the number of jobs the system would generate on 
an annual basis. This presented figures in the most favourable light. It estimated that 
direct employment from Trident involved roughly 1,550 jobs at the height of 
construction in 1988, with 1,100 of those positions filled by Strathclyde residents and 
390 of those to be filled by Dumbarton residents. It also stressed that a rapid build-up 
of construction workers was expected between 1985 and 1988, 'followed by an 
145 HA, 24 September 1982, p. 7. 
146 The report stated that it would 'not increase the number of permanent jobs in the general area' and 
that temporary employment's impact would be 'short-term'. lain Leitch further empbasised that losing 
Coulport was 'no real loss' due to the temporary nature of the employment, a view sbared by the 1985 
and 1988 studies offered by the AESG. GH, 10 September 1982, p. 4; Strathclyde Regional Council, 
Part One: General Report. p. 30. 
147 Office of Commodore Clyde, Trident _ Public announcement by the Secretary of State for Defence 
on 9 September 1982, (Faslane: Dunbartonshire). 
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almost equally rapid fall from 1988 to 1992', To offset the decline in numbers 
employed, Ministry projections suggested that numbers of Service and civilian 
personnel at Faslane 'will have risen by about 800 by 1990 and by 1300 by 1994, 
thereafter falling back to 500 more than the current level, and remaining at this figure 
in the longer term' ,148 However, this was putting spin on an analysis that potentially 
cloaked unimpressive employment statistics, coinciding with the 1,500 jobs 
previously lost at Coulport, This inspired the Alternative Employment Study Group 
(AESG) to argue that there were other viable options, and that Trident was not the 
ideal candidate for improving Strathclyde's high rate of unemployment. 
The AESG, a Labour Party initiative, was first conceptualised after a Helensburgh 
eND meeting in 1982 and established in Dumbarton the following year to evaluate 
the impact of Trident on the local community, Though debatable, Dr, Jim Taggart of 
Labour CND explained that it was conducted on 'a non-political basis', and also 
involved both the SNP and Faslane shop stewards,149 Addressing such issues as 
Trident development, its impact to Faslane's civilian workforce, defence expenditure 
and unemployment, the Group released the first of two Trident-based studies in May 
1985. 
The Ministry of Defence had at that time stressed the importance ofFaslane as a 
source of regional employment, but the Group asserted that 'practically no new jobs 
have been created as a result of the decision to opt for Trident', 1 so In fairness, it 
should be noted that this was a premature observation as the Secretary of State for 
148 Ministry of Defence, Environmental Impact Assessment, p, 103, 
149 Interview with Taggart (09/11102). 
ISO The Study Group involved MP Nonnan Godman, Jain MacDonald, Russell Fleming, Ian Leitch, 
Steve Schofield and Jim Taggart. AESG, Polaris and Trident, p. 14. 
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Scotland had just approved the planning application for Trident some two months 
earlier. However, the report noted that British companies generally failed to win 
major Trident-related orders in the US, and it would later be revealed that outside 
contractors eventually detracted from Strathclyde as the Property Sales Agency 
awarded massive, specialised contracts to companies like Hawker Siddeley Power 
Engineering Ltd of Loughborough, an English engineering firm. lSI The SSBN was a 
source of considerable expenditure on the Clyde and as a consequence, of various 
forms of short-term employment, but the AESG also emphasised that it was not 
'liable to be a source of new long-term employment' as Trident possessed greater 
efficiency to that of Polaris (Photograph 1.22,1.23). Furthermore, because its 
cancellation would likely have the Royal Navy retain and expand its conventional 
submarine capacity, the Group argued that decommissioning held the potential to 
support an increase in the size of the submarine fleet and workforce while promoting 
improved job security.IS2 For several reasons central government considered this 
unacceptable, as a conventional fleet undermined the very act of deterrence, but this 
analysis provided solutions that complemented both Labour and SNP policies on 
disarmament. Like that of North Sea oil, Scottish participation with Trident 
represented 'a failure of the Scottish economy to take its rightful place 
in ... development and production' of certain submarine technologies as there had been 
no investment in 'a large and powerful indigenous' sector that served the SSBN. ISJ 
lSI A local company was unable to provide the necessary services and this contract was worth £25.3 
million. HA, 22 January 1988, p. 15; Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 82 Col 169, July 
1985; Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol7S Col 509 10 May 1985. 
lS2 AESG, Polaris and Trident, p. 36 
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Photoeraph 1.22: Advertisement in the Helensburgh Advertiser 
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Photograph 1.23: Advertisement in Faslane Fair programme 
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IS3 Yards in Scotland were familiar with the construction of conventional ubmarines but inexperienced 
with the SSBN. P. L. Payne,'The Economy', in T.M. Devine and RJ. Finlay (eds.), Scotland ill the 
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This brings us to a comparison between Scotland's experience with North Sea oil and 
the country's failure to assume an active role in the production of nuclear-powered 
submarines. It was a sequence of events in the 1950s and early 1960s that led to the 
exploration and extraction of what the nationalists referred to as 'Scotland's oil' .154 
Roughly a decade after the Second World War American dominance of the world 
energy market was under threat when Japan, Germany, Italy and France emerged as 
industrial rivals to the US. These were front-line states in the Cold War but because 
they sought to release themselves of US-controlled energy they turned to the Middle 
East, an area considered politically unstable by the Americans, and the Soviet Union, 
which was supplying oil technology. Furthermore, both the American government 
and US oil companies became somewhat apprehensive when the Organisation for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960.155 To compensate for 
these developments, exploration by the US oil industry was to be focused on 
politically stable countries. It also preferred to deal with those who would not bolster 
the Soviet Union's own military-industrial complex through the purchase of oil 
technologies. Therefore, the discovery of North Sea oil was not an accident and it 
was largely a product of strategic planning. 156 
After the discovery of North Sea oil in 1969, the extraction was to be performed at the 
fastest rate possible. Similar to that of SSBN development and production, Scottish 
Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: EUP, 1996), p. 29. 
IS4 In the October 1974 General Election the SNP won 11 MPs and managed to get over 30 per cent of 
the vote in Scotland. The main driving force behind the growth of the party in the 1970s was the 
discovery of oil in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland. The SNP ran a hugely successful It's 
Scotland's Oil campaign, emphasising the way in which they believed the discovery of oil could benefit 
all of Scotland's citizens. Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 167. 
ISS OPEC was a permanent, intergovernmental organisation created at the Baghdad Conference on 
September 10-14,1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
15~ere was a close commercial partnership between American and British oil companies and banks. 
C. Woolf son, J. Foster, and M. Beck, Paying/or the piper: capital and labour in Britain's offshore oil 
industry (London: Mansell, 1996), pp. 15-19. 
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industry was not prepared for the oil industry. With only a narrow window of 
opportunity, it faced insunnountable barriers. For offshore drilling rigs, the steel 
required for platform construction and tubular pipelines was of a totally different 
character from that which the Scottish mills were capable of producing. IS7 
Comparable to platform construction, Scottish yards had no previous experience with 
the design or production of nuclear-powered submarines while VSEL in Barrow-in-
Furness had already assembled Polaris boats. Furthermore, Clyde shipyards proved 
incapable of offering the correct venue for offshore platform jackets. Ships were built 
primarily from welded steel plate, but platform jackets were constructed from rolled 
and tubular steel, connected by a technique requiring specialised rolling machines and 
automatic welding. ISS With the Trident system, the Clyde shipyards did not possess 
the appropriate modernised facilities where SSBNs could be assembled on cradles and 
have a rail system where the vessel, in whole or parts, could be moved out to a 
Shiplift. IS9 At several levels, the comparisons between North Sea oil and the SSBN 
are noteworthy. Scottish industry did not understand the oil industry, SSBN 
production or their requirements until the opportunity had already lapsed. Be that as 
it may, the AESG already had its doubts and made one last attempt to persuade both 
central government and the British electorate to reconsider. 
According to Professor Paul Dunne of the Middlesex University Business School, 
during the 19805 the defence industry in the UK became increasingly important to 
manufacturing as it was 'protected from the ravages wrought on the rest of the 
m Payne, Scotland in the Twentieth Century, p. 31 
158 ibid., p. 31 
IS9 K. Parlington, 'Coulport and Faslane general management' in F.D.R. Yell (ed.), Trident Facilities: 
Proceedings o/the conference organized by the Institute o/Civil Engineers. held in London on 14 April 
1994 (London: Thomas Telford, 1994), p. 121. 
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industry' . 160 The defence industrial base may have supported jobs but Dunne argued 
that it diverted resources from other uses, it crowded out investment from the civil 
sector and he claimed that the Military Industrial Complex 'invented threats'. 161 
While SS-20s in Eastern Europe were a very real source of concern, by March 1988 
the AESG disregarded this and continued with the argument that Trident was 
incapable of reviving the local or national economy because it only supported limited 
employment. Yet what the AESG failed to appreciate was that, for central 
government, strategic concerns took precedence over economics in the midst of the 
Cold War, at least to some extent. It was this set of priorities that prompted concerns 
within the House of Commons over the £5,000 million Trident project in the early 
1980s, and it was this that incapacitated the Group's theory that it was poor economic 
policy to use defence spending to create jobs. 162 However, while the AESG focused its 
arguments on the economic implications of Trident there was a noticeable contrast in 
the tone of Future Imperfect. With the deterrent pushing towards completion at this 
point, and after Thatcher's victory during the 1987 general election, the group became 
disillusioned. After six years of research and little hope of convincing the Thatcher 
government otherwise, the AESG was quietly disbanded as its findings ultimately fell 
upon deaf ears. 163 
With the somewhat unexpected demise of the communist superpower in 1991 Trident 
submarines were late in discharging their responsibilities. Nevertheless, while 
statistics pertaining to the temporary employment provided by Trident remain illusive, 
160 Dunne also argued that 'the results suggest a negative effect of military spending on economic 
growth for advanced economies' and decreased military spending could improve economic 
perfonnance when savings were allocated. P. Dunne, Restructuring of the British Defence Industry 
(Middlesex: Middlesex University Business School, December 1999), p. 8. 
161 Ibid 
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operation of the system itself did not represent the employment bonanza initially 
envisaged by the Conservatives. l64 Also explained in Chapter Three, Sir Hector 
Monro, Conservative MP for Dumfries, insisted in 1985 that 50,000 jobs could have 
been lost in Scotland if the system was not implemented.16S Initial reactions to such a 
figure established a sense of urgency, but there was no detailed reference made to 
specific locations, direct and indirect employment, or estimates pertaining to Service 
personnel, civilian staff or contractors. Therefore, because the definition of this figure 
was so vague it could be construed as misleading. What is certain is that employment 
estimates were predicted on a shifting scale as the transfer of missile fitting and 
servicing in September 1982, and the closure ofRosyth Royal Dockyard in 1993, 
obliterated all previous estimates. Furthermore, from 1980-1997 the deployment of 
Ministry civilian personnel in Scotland plunged from 21,900 full-time employees in 
1980 to 4,800 in 1997 through the influence of the Cold War's thaw.166 However, the 
system still accounted for a majority of the latter figure. 
In terms of employment the proposal of commercial management at shore 
establishments in Scotland also sparked a controversy, and remains so at time of 
writing (2004). According to Robert Purdie, Faslane shop steward, by 1999 the trade 
unions sought protection from privatisation by finding additional savings within the 
Ministry, and unions still experienced redundancies as rumours circulated that Faslane 
was in danger oflosing its exemption clause despite the UK's 'need' for a nuclear 
162 AESG, Future Imperfect, pp. 15-37; Third Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of the 
Trident Programme, HC 356 of session 1986-1987, pp.II-12. 
163 Interview with Taggart (09/11102) .. 
164 For more on Conservative estimates see Chapter Three: The Scottish political dimension of Trident. 
16' Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 82 Col 169, July 1985; Trident, Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard), Vol 78 Col 509, 10 May 1985. 
166 B. Morgan, Defence Employment: /996-97 (House of Commons Research Paper 99/27,11 March 
1999), p. 7. 
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deterrent.167 Civilian employees at Rosyth Dockyard in Fife were also susceptible to 
the impact of commercial management before 1993. Due to safety considerations the 
Defence Select Committee and Public Accounts Committee criticised the idea of 
commercial management ofRosyth in 1988, and the National Audit Office debated as 
to whether the Government's objectives of greater dockyard efficiency, maximum 
competition and better value for money were likely to be achieved. Yet in that same 
year the Dockyard Services Bill was eventually cleared through Parliament after 
twenty-five sittings.168 Despite concerns with privatisation, the He/ensburgh 
Advertiser stressed in 1992 that 'development [at Faslane] has brought huge benefits 
to the local area and to the west of Scotland in general'. 169 The assertion was 
relatively accurate but questions still remained. 
Ifwe disregard estimates for Service personnel, external contractors and such and 
maintain focus on the core number of long-term civilian jobs shore facilities provided 
since the introduction of Polaris, the picture becomes more transparent. In 1969 
Polaris accounted for nearly 1,800 civilian employees, and after Trident came under 
construction both systems supported 3,891 civilians in 1989, with roughly the same 
number in 1996.170 However, it must be remembered that in 1969 the full fleet of four 
Resolution class boats had not yet arrived, and it was not until after the 
decommissioning of Polaris that the number of civilian jobs with Trident finally 
became more stable. By February 2000 John SpeHar, Minister for the Armed Forces, 
stated that Trident shore facilities had a directly employed work force of only 3,300, 
167 Base services considered for privatisation involved transport and support. Interview with Robert 
Purdie, Faslane Shop Steward (02/06/03); HA. 10 July 1992, p. 1; HA, 28 June 1991, p. 1. 
168 See Chapter 2. Dockyard management also had numerous concerns with the transfer to commercial 
management. Report by the Comptroller and the Auditor General, Transfer of the Royal Dockyard to 
Commercial Management, (London: HMSO, 3 March 1988), pp. 1,5. 
169 Faslane Features, sununer 1992, p. 1. 
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'comprising 2,547 at Faslane and 752.5 at Coulport,.171 Between 1989-1999 this was 
an overall reduction in civilian manpower of nearly 18 per cent from a project that 
cost British taxpayers nearly £2 billion at 1994 prices. 
The fact that the system still represented a considerable number of civilian jobs and 
indirect employment is indisputable, but well into the post-Cold War era Trident's 
opposition often argued that the system accounted for zero job growth, the capabilities 
of irrational rogue states did notjustity a British system and Scotland's annual 
contribution to the system of£135 million could be better spent elsewhere.172 
Furthermore, short-term opportunities in Scotland involving the production of 
periscopes, hulls and navigation systems for Trident expired sometime in the mid-
1990s.173 Ravenscraig steelworks was also closed in 1992, despite the production of 
steel plates for Vanguard class boats. One must again bear in mind that the system 
was not acquired to strengthen either local or national economies, but with the 
government's attempts to silence opposition it was repeatedly sold to Scots as such. 
Over the course of decades Scottish workers had been conditioned to rely on the 
Ministry of Defence, and though Trident safeguarded the Strathclyde economy from 
further despair it also did nothing to invigorate it. 
\70 The 1969 and 1996 estimate provided by Hall, Clyde Submarine Base, p. 100: Nuclear Defence 
Industry (Scotland), Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Col 684 Vol 163 , 13 December 1989. 
\7\ Civilians (Fas/ane and Cou/port), Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Col 738W Vol 344, 21 
February 2000. 
172 Civilian employees and the Argyll and Bute territory should see further reductions as efficiency 
continues to improve. The Astute class, to be stationed at Faslane, would not require refuelling 
throughout their anticipated lifetime of up to thirty years. Van Der Vat, Standard of Power, p. 418. 
Interview with Ainslie (24/06/03); SNP 'SNP join Scottish CND in Edinburgh: Only independent 
f..arliament can remove Trident', (SNP Archives), 18 May 1997. 
73 GCUA Speech by Richard Leonard, The Economic Consequences o/Trident (March 1994), p. 2; 
GH, 3 December 1985, p.l. 
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Conclusion 
When attempting to establish a perspective on the Strathclyde Region's experience 
with Trident it becomes apparent that three indisputable considerations clearly 
undennined the aspirations of the system's opposition over the course of two decades, 
regardless of the lingering debate. Firstly, with both Coulport and Faslane 
successfully accommodating the Resolution class since 1968 there was little doubt in 
Strathc1yde that Trident would be deployed from the west of Scotland. Secondly, 
after living with American and British Polaris systems for two decades, an 
unspecified number of citizens believed that a third system was little cause for alann. 
Finally, by 1999 Trident shore facilities still employed 3,300 civilians in the post-
Cold War era, and despite the limited return on a massive investment, it represented a 
sum total not easily displaced. A sequence of events therefore cemented Trident's 
place in Strathclyde. 
In terms of geography and performance the region was already a proven operational 
site for the Vanguard class. Nuclear weapons, which served to bolster national 
security throughout the Cold War era, had also been trafficked through Scottish lochs 
since 1961. Because the Polaris system was implemented safely and remained 
without serious incident, it could be argued that Strathc1yde had become somewhat 
comfortable with the SSBN. Scottish familiarity with the Polaris system therefore 
eased the transition to the Trident system. However, due to consistent economic 
hardship, it was employment that served as Trident's anchor amidst varying waves of 
protest. Few in Scotland chose to challenge either the sense of security or the 
frequently publicised employment that the system was thought to provide. 
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Ifwe disengage from the endeavours of protest groups at this time, it must be 
acknowledged that a considerable degree of opposition in the Strathclyde territory 
was a political undertaking. Labour controlled councils in the west of Scotland 
vehemently followed party policy, as did Conservative councillors, and both made 
clear attempts to achieve their respective party's objectives. Nevertheless, in the early 
19805 Crown exemption, complemented by central government's persistence, served 
as the final detennination. As has also been shown quite extensively, local media, 
willing or not, was frequently employed to broadcast political agendas and this was a 
tactic which thoroughly exaggerated the intensity of the situation. Consequently, 
because of Labour's stranglehold on Dumbarton District Council and Strathclyde 
Regional Council, opposition to Trident was unmistakably distorted and should not be 
construed as the public's true reaction. 
The general public was granted numerous opportunities to make known their 
displeasure with Trident over the twenty-year period, yet only a limited degree of 
resistance was ever exhibited. Such opportunities came when Commodore George 
Vailings offered to meet with Helensburgh residents in 1981 to discuss the Trident 
issue, when the Ministry of Defence released several proposals to Dumbarton District 
Council from 1981-1989 and during the arrival of Vanguard class SSBNs from 
October 1992 to May 1999. Yet none of these events, including the transformation of 
the Scottish countryside or waterways, inspired monumental acts of civil disobedience 
or mass protest. When the Trident Works Programme was granted approval in 1985, 
the issue was emasculated. Trident was indeed unpopular with many ofStrathclyde's 
resident, and the country in general, but this disfavour did not embody a noticeable 
94 
political or civil reaction due to concerns with national security and a somewhat self-
induced form of rationalisation. 
Circumstances during the Cold War's thaw further assisted central government's 
intentions. Scottish fears of nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union greatly receded 
while Strathclyde's civilian employees enjoyed benefits from a deterrent that had, in 
geographical terms, no specific assignment.174 Helen Steven of the lona Community 
also believed that the withdrawal of the US Polaris fleet from the Holy Loch may 
have led to confusion regarding the status of the Vanguard clasS.175 Whatever the 
circumstances, it was this timeline that ultimately worked in Trident's favour. A 
credible number of residents who seriously contemplated this issue willingly 
suppressed their uneasiness with nuclear weapons. Within an unspecified social 
contract established between the people of Strathclyde and central government, so 
long as Trident was maintained safely and provided significant employment the UK's 
deterrent would remain undisturbed. As the next chapter will explain, this peculiar 
agreement was not extended to the residents of Fife. 
174 On May 11, 1995 more than 170 cOWltries attended the 1995 Non Proliferation Treaty Review and 
Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York. S. Howard, 'A Receding Disarmament Horizon? 
Lessons From An Era of Retreat and Defeat', Disarmament Diplomacy, (Vol. 73, OctoberlNovember 
2003), p. 12. 
17S Conversation/Correspondence with Helen Steven, Iona CommWlity (04/03/03). 
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Chapter Two: Trident and the Fife Region 
After acquiring an impressive degree of technical expertise with the Polaris system, 
Rosyth Dockyard in Fife was the prime candidate for Trident refitting and refuelling 
operations. Yet this aptitude for submarine work did not prevent one of Scotland's 
largest industrial employers from being abruptly stripped of these responsibilities. 
Though the system would be successfully deployed from the west of Scotland, 
operations once reserved to the Fife facility were controversially transferred to the 
south of England in June 1993. In economic terms, the loss of these duties proved to 
b~ nothing less than disastrous. Therefore, it is the intention of this chapter to address 
the issues that accompanied this most complicated scenario, and while the Dockyard's 
historic loss has not been properly investigated until this point, it should be recognised 
that at least two inconspicuous factors have remained unacknowledged. The Cold 
War's unforeseen thaw and subsequent restructuring by the Royal Navy were the 
overwhelming influences that undermined the viability of this facility. 
Correspondences with a former Dockyard project manager, Labour party officials and 
a retired member of Dunfermline District Council proved most beneficial to this 
research, with documents provided by Rosyth trade unions and Dockyard 
management assisting in the creation of a suitable historical account. For those whose 
livelihoods relied on this unique facility the handling of this entire affair was most 
unfortunate. In order fully to appreciate Fife's ordeal it is first necessary to explore its 
origins to illustrate why the Fife Region was initially selected to service the Trident 
deterrent. 
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Rosyth Dockyard: From its origins to RD 57 
When exploring the Region's tragic experience with Trident it is first necessary to 
appreciate the significance of the naval establishment to surrounding communities. In 
the early 1900s the Royal Navy sought to establish an east coast naval base and 
dockyard, with the government's 1903 decision to construct a facility in Rosyth 
leading to the creation ofa new-fashioned community with roughly 30,000 residents. 1 
According to naval historian Dan VanDer Vat: 
... the first visible British countermeasure to German naval expansionism 
... took the form of ... a new base at Rosyth, in the Firth of Forth on 
Scotland's east coast, 400 miles or so north of all other important naval 
bases. The port faced north-east - towards Germany'. 2 
Europe at that time was preparing for what would become a most horrendous conflict, 
with work at this establishment steadily progressing as temporary accommodation 
was provided for men who were building, and eventually working, in the Dockyard. 
Coinciding with this came the need for shops, churches, schools and places ofleisure, 
inspiring yet further development (Photograph 2.1).3 Though the Dockyard itselfwas 
not completed at the outbreak of the First World War, it eventually went on 
successfully to repair seventy-eight capital ships, eight-two light cruisers and thirty-
seven smaller craft between 1914-1918. However, despite commendable service the 
civilian workload at Rosyth was considerably reduced by 1926 as the shipbreaking 
I Easton Gibb was awarded the main contract in 1909. M. Rodgers, Images of Scotland: Rosylh 
(Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing, 1999), p. 19 
2 Van Der Vat, Standard of Power, p. 13,14. 
3 During this period Dunfermline Town Council, perhaps interpreting the development of Rosyth as a 
potential rival to its own position in the region, extended its boundaries southwards to incorporate the 
area. Rodgers, Rosyth. p. 19. 
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Photoeraph 2.1: Submarine basin, 1913 
More commonly referred to a the tidal pool, thi i the ea tern view at Ro yth 0 ckyard 
showing foundation wall s for the immediate jetty rendered n ce ary for the deepening of 
the basin. 
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firm, again Metal Industries, only used the facility to dismantle naval and merchant 
ships.4 It would not be until the Second World War that it was fully reopened, with 
men transferred from southern dockyards to bring the facility to strength. S 
With the young community'S well-being directly linked to the establishment, there 
were growing fears that Rosyth would be permanently retired in the post-war period, 
but in 1946 the trade unions were proactive in attempting to counter any move to shut 
the facility down (Photograph 2.2). These efforts may have bought the Dockyard 
precious time. According to local historian Martin Rodgers, a 'considerable amount 
of development work was carried out' during the late 1940s and 1950s with 'more 
houses erected in Rosyth'. 6 Yet despite previous threats of closure the rise of the Cold 
War quickly renewed its function. Just previous to Macmillan completing the deal for 
Polaris with the Kennedy administration in April 1963, the Admiralty Polaris 
Committee already agreed that a nuclear refitting facility would be required for 
Polaris SSBNs. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Ian Orr Ewing, emphasised that 
Rosyth should refit the new sea-based deterrent as well as other SSNs in April of that 
year.' According to Nailor: 
The refit yard for the submarines was to be H.M. Dockyard, Rosyth, 
where extensions to the yard's capacity were already underway to enable 
HMS Dreadnought and later hunter/killer submarines to be refitted. Later 
H.M. Dockyard, Chatham, was equipped to provide a comparable range 
of services for the SSNs and Rosyth was reserved to the Polaris 
Squadron.s 
.. Metal Industries also operated from Faslane. See Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde Region. 
S Rodgers, Rosyth, pp. 7-38. 
6 Specifics regarding trade unions and the term 'development work' are unclear. Ibid., p. 87. 
7 Polaris submarines (Operating Base), Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 676 Col 219, 24 April 
1963. 
8 Nailor, The Nassau Connection, p. 91. 
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Photograph 2.2: The case for retainine the Dockyard, 1946 
As World War Two came to an end, the trade union remained a Ii e in tTying 10 
counter moves to close the Dockyard. Thi i the cover of a bo k1 t publi hed in 
February 1946. 
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Selected as the first British dockyard to perform such refits, it was theoretically 
capable of refitting any naval vessel with the Rosyth yard effectively supporting the 
Polaris deterrent until its replacement with the Trident. 
Communities such as Burntisland, Cowdenbeath, Dunfermline, Inverkeithing and 
Kirkcaldy were within direct proximity to the naval complex that enclosed HMS 
Cochrane and the Dockyard, with St Andrews northeast of the complex and 
Edinburgh, being Scotland's second largest popUlation component, twelve miles 
southeast of the site (Map 2.1).9 The Base alone served as homeport for numerous 
ships and four destroyers, while the Dockyard was responsible for the refitting and 
refuelling of numerous vessels, including the Resolution class. IO 
Refits for Polaris included the maintenance and renewal of those items aboard the 
submarine that wore out, broke or required preservation. These responsibilities also 
included refuelling and cleaning the reactor, capability updates involving upgrades or 
additions to the likes of weapons systems, sensors or communications equipment. 
These items all involved massive work packages, with the boat essentially stripped 
out and the structure of the vessel cleaned. According to David Corbett, Project 
Manager at Rosyth from 1988-1993, refuelling the Polaris propulsion system required 
cutting a hole in the pressure hull, through which the onboard reactor's fuel rods 
could be withdrawn and replaced. This was a highly complex procedure that required 
considerable work both in advance, and after the actual act ofre-fuelling. 11 In addition 
9 The Base, HMS Cochrane. was initially referred to as Lochinvar: the date when its name was 
changed is unclear. 
10 RSCO Fife Regional Council, Dunfermline District Council, Kirkcaldy District Council and North 
East Fife District Council, Rosyth 9 J: The Implications, (January 1991), p.2. 
\I A reactor was most 'dangerous' when its fuel is at the end of its service life due to the nature of the 
physics of fusion. There is considerable work to be done to bring decay heat under control, and 
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Map 2.1: Communities in proximity to the Dockyard 
chemically clean the plant before it can be opened. Correspondence with David Corbett, Project 
Manager at Rosyth Royal Dockyard, (20/06/03). 
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to the work on the vessel itself, there were extensive requirements for workshop and 
support facilities that included the capability to support traditional mechanical, 
electrical, and structural engineering, along with specialised facilities to support the 
nuclear engineering process. 12 It is essential to note that the Fife Region's initial 
reactions to its responsibilities with Polaris remain unclear. However, what is certain 
is that Rosyth's exemplary service encouraged the Ministry of Defence to announce 
that the site was to be expanded to accommodate the significantly larger Trident 
SSBN in July 1984 (Photograph 2.3).13 
When researching the Dockyard's historical experience it becomes apparent that there 
are few proposals available for the Trident refitting facility at Rosyth, as opposed to 
the numerous applications made for Coulport and Faslane. Of the available 
documents for the RD57 project, two dry docks, workshops, offices and support 
facilities on a site at the west end of the Base are mentioned.14 Under RD57 one dry 
dock was designed to measure 190 metres in length by thirty metres in width, and the 
other to be 150 metres in length by twenty-eight metres in width. The main dock 
cover was also designed to be an estimated fifty metres wide, forty metres high at the 
highest point and a maximum of 200 metres long. This structure would not only 
protect against weather but would support the overhead travelling cranes necessary to 
perform various tasks. 1 S Furthermore, the two dock covers were to be linked to 
12 Correspondence with Corbett, (20/06/03). 
13 For the US Navy's Ohio class Trident submarine, refits were to be scheduled every nine years to 
renew new nuclear fuel. Yonn, How They Work: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine, p. 37; 
DP, 12 July 1984, p. 1. Rosyth Dockyard was renamed Rosyth Royal Dockyard in late January 1987. 
DCL J. Anderson, M. Rodgers, A. Law, An Outline History of Rosyth Dockyard Vol I , December 
1999, p. 107. 
14 According to Fife Council two documents were misplaced and may have been discarded as the 
project was never completed. Other documents included: Property Sales Agency Defence Works 
(Navy) Docks and Main Works, HM Naval Base Rosyth Nuclear Submarine Refitting Facility: 
Supplement to Design and Landscape Strategy, August 1989. 
15 There were rumours that covers were to discourage satellite surveillance. GH, 2 May 1986, p. 1. 
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Photograph 2.3: Entrance to Rosyth Royal Dockyard, 1978 
After July 1980 the Dockyard would receive numerou as manc from central g vemment 
that this facility would perform Trident refitting and refuelling operation . 
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support facilities located both between and at the west end of the docks. Initial plans 
dictated that the complex was to be enclosed by security fences, with road and rail 
accesses and car parks provided. This project was thought to require fifteen hectares 
for the development, five hectares of which was existing Ministry of Defence land. 16 
Support services to the complex under RD57 were also intended to involve 
substations, stand-by power generating facilities, a compressor house, plant rooms, a 
materials storage area, external plant areas and demineralised water facilities, with 
design and construction of the facility subject to a quality assurance programme 
addressing safety and reliability in all matters relating to nuclear safety. 17 RD46, the 
other major project involved with preparing the Dockyard for Trident, was far less 
complex. 
While there was another less extensive project for the Active Waste Accumulation 
Facility, referred to as RD66, RD46 was a much smaller project than RD57, and 
consequently, less high-profile. In outline, the project was intended to prepare the 
entrance lock to the main basin as an emergency docking facility. Since there was to 
be a location that could accept nuclear-powered boats with short notice, this facility 
was required for support of the operational cycle ofHMS Vanguard. This implied 
that it would have needed to be ready by the time the first boat was commissioned, as 
it was also required for support of sea trials. The scope of work for the project 
included construction of a docking cradle, provision of reinforced concrete pads on 
which to sit very large mobile cranes and backup power generators. 18 Transit rails 
16 Ministry of Defence, Notice of Proposed Development by the Ministry 0/ Defence: Nuclear 
Submarine Refitting Facility at Rosyth Naval Base, (Ref: DSDINBD1750/16/86RDS7, 1 May 1986). 
17 Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency, Specification Report/or Proposed RosYlh 
Nuclear Submarine Refitting Facility, (April 1986). 
18 There was also potentially a need to tie-back the dock walls for seismic qualification of the dock. 
Correspondence with Corbett (23/06/03). 
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were also to be fitted to the lock to help bring the vessel into the docking facility 
without colliding with the facility's walls.19 There were also a number of other 
upgrades to support services as the reliability of power and other support utilities was 
very important for docking facilities because the Dockyard had to assume that the 
reactor would be contaminated with highly radioactive fission products. Under these 
circumstances, the primary coolant had to continue to be circulated for weeks in order 
to remove the decay heat from the reactor. Therefore, secure external power supplies 
that had back-ups had to be in place to run pumps and other necessary equipment, or 
the reactor could be damaged by the build-up ofheat.20 However, construction of the 
physical facilities was not the entire story. Trident refits were required to be 
undertaken in a significantly shorter time period then was the case for Polaris. 
Because Trident assumed responsibility for the national deterrent as Polaris was being 
withdrawn from service, this procedure was driven by the operational availability 
requirements - incoming Trident boats compared to outgoing Polaris. The need to 
reduce the refit time meant that management had to examine the way the Dockyard 
worked from all perspectives, including the facilities, the working practices, the tools 
and techniques.21 Both these facilities were to be constructed with considerable cost 
to the taxpayer (Illustration 2.1). 
The Ministry's July 1984 announcement for the Trident facility at Rosyth suggested 
that the cost ofRD57 would initially run about £200 million.22 However, by May 
19 According to Corbett, there may also have been some secondary isolation of penstock valves (the 
valves that keep the drainage and flooding culverts closed). Correspondence with Corbett (23/06/03) 
20 A reactor that has recently been re-fuelled does not have the high fission product inventory, and 
therefore produces much less decay heat. Barrow-in-Fumess did not have this problem because they 
only dealt with new reactors! fuel. Ibid 
21 Ibid. 
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Illustration 2.1: Rosyth Royal Dockyard 
RD57 
III. " " . 
Key 
= Docks, Refit Building/Bays • Nuclear Facilities 
Non-Tidal Basin 0 Other buildings 
---.:= I Areas sold 
22 1 DP, 12 Ju y 1984, p. I. 
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1986 a letter from the Ministry of Defence to George Brown, Chief Executive of 
Dunfermline District Council, believed the project would run closer to £220 million.23 
Phase one of the RD57 project began on 12 October 1987 and involved the 
construction of a site access from the west access road, the preparation of the 
contractor's working area and security fencing.24 When Corbett started at Rosyth 
Royal Dockyard in August 1988 he recalled 'land reclamation being underway at that 
time, and ongoing work to excavate the docks and pour concrete for the foundation 
structures,.25 Furthermore, phase two of the project, which involved the construction 
of an access causeway, necessary excavation and dewatering, was to be finished in the 
summer of 1991.26 However, what is clear is that RD57 never got past that initial 
concrete pour stage, though the foundations for the project were completed by 
October 1993 with work costing £120 million of the predicted figure. 27 While RD46 
started on site in May 1990, all projects, including RD46, RD57 and RD66, would 
never reach completion (Photograph 2.4). To the dismay of both Dockyard 
employees and the Fife Region, in late June 1993 central government awarded Trident 
refitting contracts to Devonport Dockyard in the south of England. Despite the 
unmatched proficiency Rosyth employees acquired through their interaction with 
Polaris, Trident would be serviced elsewhere. 
23 RSCO J.E. Ethridge, Director Services and Management, Letter to George Brown (Dunfermline 
Carnegie Library), 1 May 1986. 
24 Property Sales Agency Defence Works (Navy), Notice of Proposed Development by the Ministry of 
Defence for Phase 2: Description of Works (HM Naval Base Rosyth: Nuclear Submarine Refitting 
Facility, January 1988), p. 2 
2S Correspondence with Corbett (20/06/03) 
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Photograph 2.4: Rosyth Royal Dockvard 
The entrance lock (RD46), and the large excavations that were part of the di continued RD57 project. 
26 Property Sales Agency, Min is fly of Defencefor Phase 2, p. 2 
27 Correspondence with Corbett (20/06/03). Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline HistalY, p.116. 
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General responses to Trident within the Fife Region 
From its beginnings in the early 1900s much of Dunfennline's existence hinged on 
the economic opportunities afforded by the Royal Navy, and after maintaining the 
Polaris system over its operational lifetime surrounding communities had come to 
pride themselves on the services they provided to these boats. The Dockyard had 
served as the homeport for submarine refits after the arrival ofHMS Dreadnought for 
maintenance in 1963, and by 1991 the Rosyth complex was 'the largest single 
industrial establishment in Scotland' with six principal operating locations employing 
7,400 civilians and a further 3,800 service personnel (Photograph 2.5).28 Similar in 
nature to Helensburgh, Dunfennline was very much influenced by its relationship 
with the Royal Navy and these figures alone did not represent the numerous military 
personnel that integrated into surrounding communities. Additionally, the 
Dunfermline Press highlighted the connection between community and complex by 
regularly featuring articles pertaining to military residents or the Royal Navy itself. 
Articles such as 'New man at the helm - Ahoy there!', announcing the new 
commanding officer ofHMS Seotis, or 'Warriors last scrap', honouring HMS Ulster's 
final voyage to Inverkeithing's shipbreaking yard, made for common reading.29 In 
March 1983 the establishment also received high praise from the Royal Navy for the 
work it completed during the Falklands War.30 Bill Livingstone, Editorial Director of 
the paper, was certain that the community's reaction to Trident was 'generally 
28 The complex also included Maritime HQ, Pitreavie, the RAFIRN Administration Centre for Scotland 
and Northern Ireland providing a function for search and rescue activity; RNAD Crombie, which 
employed 250 and Lathalmond Royal Naval Stores Depot and Admiralty Research Establishment. 
RSCO Rosyth 9 J,' The Implications, (January 1991), p. 3. 
29 DP, 12 September 1980, p. 1; DP, 7 November 1980, p. 1. 
30 DP, 25 March 1983, p. 1. 
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Photograph 2.5: HMS Dreadnought at Rosyth Dockvard, December 1963 
HMS Dreadnought was the first British nuclear powered submarine to reach Scottish waters. 
III 
favourable as it guaranteed continuity of specialist refittingjobs,.31 It should be noted 
that improved security through Trident was also a factor. While there were those who 
were concerned with the radiological work hazards associated with refuelling or the 
storage of waste generated from this process, like the west of Scotland, there was a 
special bond that existed between the Royal Navy and Fife communities. 
Because opposition to Trident in Fife was noticeably mild, the Conservative 
government could have withheld its economic indoctrination from this region. Had 
Trident undergone refits at Rosyth Royal Dockyard, like Polaris, all missiles and 
warheads would first be demated and removed from the Vanguard class at Coulport 
on Loch Long, with SSBNs arriving to Rosyth unarmed.32 The disarmament 
movement's activities were therefore focused on Faslane, with headlines that read 
'Nuclear debate rages on' and 'CND unfurl their banner' only intermittently 
appearing in the Dunfermline Press throughout the early 1980s.33 According to 
Livingstone, sporadic CND protests tended to be mounted by outside activists.34 John 
Ainslie, head administrator for the SCND, confirmed this assumption when he stated 
that facilities in Strathclyde had been the main focus of the movement and that any 
protest centred on the Dockyard usually travelled from Edinburgh.35 There are yet 
further indicators that highlight the pallid state of opposition in Fife. Established in 
July 1982, the Rosyth Dockyard Workplace Branch of the Labour Party believed it 
was imperative to involve defence workers in creating an alternative employment 
3J Correspondence with Bill Livingstone, Editorial Director of Dunfermline Press (19/06/03). 
32 The term 'demated' refers to the process of removing warheads from individual missiles. 
33 DP, 26 June 1981. p. 16; DP. 27 February 1981. p. 15. 
34 Correspondence with Livingstone (19/06/03). 
35 Interview with Ainslie (24/06/03). 
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strategy to Trident, yet the inaugural meeting was only able to attract a total of 
roughly one dozen new members.36 
Fife's initial reactions to Trident's procurement were relatively straightforward due to 
the region's former relationship with the SSBN, with local media again only able to 
provide general interpretations.37 Following the government's decision to acquire the 
system, the Dunfermline headline read 'Missile boost for Base', expressing 
contentment now that 'the future of Rosyth has almost certainly been guaranteed' 
with the purchase ofTrident.38 On 2 January 1981 that same paper explained that, 
'Optimism was high when Trident was announced with little doubt that Rosyth would 
refit,.39 Finally, the Dunfermline Press stated in December 1984 that, 'the proposed 
new Trident submarine fleet will be refitted at Rosyth Dockyard ... [and] with a double 
figure number of Polaris carrying submarine refits under its belt, was always a firm 
favourite,.40 According to Labour MP for Dunfermline West, Rachel Squire, roughly 
a third of the community supported the eND line but the Dockyard had accumulated a 
wealth of experience with Polaris, with the majority holding the view that refitting 
operations at the Dockyard meant security for thousands of desperately neededjobs.41 
There is also strong evidence which suggests that even those not directly linked to the 
complex supported Trident refits at Rosyth. Just previous to the government's 
decision to relocate refits to Devonport in 1993, a letter addressed to Ian Lang, then 
Secretary of State for Scotland, from faculty at Dunfermline's Lynbum Primary 
36 AF Speech from Alex Falconer, Labour MEP for Mid Scotland and Fife, rite Pursuance of Labour 
Party Policy. Defence and Disarmament, 11 August 1981. AF Rosyth Dockyard Workplace Branch 
(Labour Party),ln-augural Meeting Notes, 6 July 1982, (Transport House: Dunfermline). 
37 It should be noted that newspapers have an editorial opinion that may not concur with the views of 
their respective communities. 
38 DP, 18 July 1980, p. 1. 
39 DP, 2 January 1981, p. 1. 
40 DP, 12 July 1984, p. 1. 
41 Interview with Rachel Squire, Labour MP for Dunfermline West (12/05/03). 
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School, described their anxiety concerning the devastating effect a decision against 
Rosyth would have on their schoo1.42 Furthermore, after the decision was announced, 
Rev. W.E. Farquhar of the Presbytery of Dunfermline wrote that governments as 
much as individuals have 'a moral duty to keep their word once it is given, and ... we 
believe that Lord Younger's pledge should not have been broken. ,43 Despite the 
intense controversy Trident once provoked within Strathclyde, it is clear that a 
majority in Fife wanted the Dockyard to perfonn these refits. 
Safety and the SSBN 
Refits for nuclear-powered submarines were procedures that all but rivalled the space 
shuttle in complexity and these were executed under the most stringent of guidelines, 
constantly reviewed and revised.44 As has been noted, operations for Polaris were 
conducted at Rosyth Dockyard, with the facility also responsible for the complete 
removal and refuelling of both submarine and surface ship reactor cores, the X-raying 
of welds for potential cracks and the overhaul of hulls and all systems.45 Any and all 
radioactive waste produced during the de-fuelling of a reactor was traditionally stored 
in barges, moved ashore and either remained on site or was taken by special train to 
British Nuclear Fuels Limited Windscale reprocessing plant. 46 Due to the nature of 
these responsibilities, it required little imagination to appreciate the concerns such 
operations provoked. On 31 October 1990 The Radiological Protection of Service 
and Civilian Report stated that: 
42 RSCO David J. Paxton, Headteacher at Lynburn Primary School, Letter to I. Lang, Secretary of State 
for Scotland, 12 April 1993. 
43 RSCO Rev. W. E. Farquhar, Presbytery of Dunfermline, Letter to Rachel Squire, 24 June 1993. 
44 Safety guidelines were numerous and far too extensive to cover in great detail. The risk assessment 
concerning Rosyth's preparations for Trident alone required roughly 8 inches of paper. Interview with 
Corbett (20/06/03). 
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The cumulative lifetime radiation dose equivalents at Rosyth are 
noticeably higher than those at Devonport: 46.7 per cent of the registered 
radiation workers employed at Rosyth at the end of 1989 had received 
lifetime exposures over 50 mSv compare with only 25 per cent of the 
dose at Devonport. One reason for this is that the Scottish dockyard has 
been engaged in submarine refit operations for longer - they began at 
Rosyth in 1968 and at Devonport in 1980. The second reason is that 
Rosyth tends to refit older submarines. These tend to be more radioactive 
and require more maintenance, leading to higher exposures.47 
While it is uncertain as to whether or not these findings acutely distressed Rosyth 
employees, what is clear is that a report in May 1990 suggesting the possibility of a 
link between childhood leukemia and Sellafield employees inspired Gordon Brown, 
then Labour MP for Dunfermline East, to support a comprehensive investigation into 
Dockyard operations.48 Despite this, high safety standards at the facility offered a 
sense of comfort for Rosyth's employees as workers had a clear interest in these 
precautions due to the proximity of their families to the facility.49 The same has 
already been implied for civilian employees at Coulport and Faslane, but to appreciate 
fully the weight of this statement it is essential to provide general details on the safety 
procedures for Polaris at Rosyth. 
Safety at the Dockyard was a pervasive consideration throughout the entire refitting 
process. Notwithstanding the nuclear elements, submarine safety, even for 
015 Norris, Burrows and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons, p. 169. 
46 Submarine, UK Horizon, Broadcast Date: 9 September 2001. 
47 The International Commission on Radiological Protection recommended that no personnel should be 
exposed to more than fifty millieSieverts (rnSv) of radiation doses per year, and expounded the 
principle that all doses should be as low as reasonably possible, with economic and social factors taken 
into account. Twelfth Report from the Defence Committee. Radiological Protection o/Service and 
Civilian Personnel, Session 1989-1990, p. 14. 
4S It is unclear as to what transpired following this event. Sella field, formerly Windscale,lies on the 
Irish Sea coast alongside England's Lake District. Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p. Ill. 
49 Squire also addressed the question of storage of nuclear waste. According to Squire 'If nuclear subs 
were abandoned tomorrow we would still have waste, and there is presently nothing anyone can do 
about this as there is not yet a way to properly dispose of these materials. There is no one who can 
dispose of this material and there is no one who wants to store it. During the late 70s and early 80s 
retired subs were taken out to sea and dumped, this was unacceptable.' Interview with Squire 
(12/05/03) 
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conventional vessels, was treated very seriously. According to Corbett there were 
essentially two perspectives: safety of the vessel when it left the refit yard, meaning 
that the quality of the work undertaken directly affected the safety of the vessel in 
service; and safety during the refit process, with consideration to safety of people, the 
vessel, and the environment. There was an extraordinarily wide range of activity 
involved in a refit and the presence of nuclear engineering components had a major 
impact on the whole process of managing safety. Equipment used in the refitting 
process was also considered from a safety perspective· for example, cranes needed to 
be approved to perform nuclear lifts. Furthermore, only facilities licensed by the 
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NIl) were permitted to work on nuclear equipment, 
and a comprehensive safety case was required for all new facilities that demonstrated 
that employees were aware of the hazards, understood them, and responded 
accordingly. so 
As a part of the Dockyard's bid for Trident, an initial safety case was prepared to 
show that it had confidence that it would be able to obtain an NIl licence for the new 
facility. NIl requirements were constantly upgraded, and new facilities had to comply 
fully with the most recent requirements. These prerequisites included the ability of 
the facility to withstand extremes of weather, and even seismic activity. Though of 
low probability the consequences of earthquakes were high ifnot designed for it, as 
radioactive materials could be released into the surrounding environment without 
adequate precautions.51 The RD57 project was also beneficial to the environment in 
that it was covered. This alone brought advantages to the refit process itself in that 
employees would have been sheltered from the weather and also offered safety 
so Interview with Corbett (20/06/03). 
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benefits because there was a higher degree of environmental containment in the event 
of an accidental release of radiological materials. S2 Yet the extensive incorporation of 
environmental and safety procedures for all Trident projects at Rosyth were all for 
naught after the system's relocation to Devonport. 
Dunfermline District Council and Fife Regional Council 
In exploring Fife's relationship with the SSBN it has been revealed that during the 
Polaris era Dunfennline District Council enjoyed a strong civic liaison with the Royal 
Navy. The many Ship Badges and Shields in the possession of the council gave 
adequate testimony to this. In the words of fonner Dunfennline Councillor Pat 
Callaghan, 'the relationship was polite and co-operative at all times,.S3 Yet it is 
important to note that while the Thatcher government announced its intentions to 
acquire Trident from the US government, Dunfennline was a member of the NFLA, 
and was, in principle, opposed to all fonns of nuclear energy inclusive of weapons 
and their proliferation. Despite this predisposition, Dunfennline and Fife Councils 
were forced to balance anti-nuclear sentiment with economic certainties. Callaghan 
went on to explain that, 'we were very pragmatic about the economic disaster that 
could have befallen us if we opposed [Trident] too much and caused inward 
investment to wane in our area'. Therefore, in mitigation of Dunfennline's 
contradictory stance on this issue it must be accepted that Scottish local government 
51 Like an SSBN suspended by the Shiplift at Faslane, refuelling operations at the Dockyard were 
vulnerable to seismic activity and had to be able to withstand such forces. 
S2 Interview with Corbett (20/06/03). 
53 Interview with Pat Callaghan, Leader of Dunfermline District Council 1988-1992, member of 
Council 1984-1995 (09/07/03). 
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under Margaret Thatcher was, as Callaghan put it, 'a difficult furrow to plough at 
times,.54 
Though Dunfermline and Fife councils had concerns with the refitting of the system 
at Rosyth, they were willing to accept any opportunities the system could provide. 
The onset of Trident was initially troubled by liaison and Public Relations issues as it 
affected Rosyth Dockyard, and in February 1986, four months previous to the release 
of proposals for the refit complex, Dunfermline called on the government to dispense 
with nuclear weapons. 55 After central government's acquisition of Trident, 
Dunfermline was led to believe that the procurement of the system was the precursor 
to a reduced UK defence fleet and would have an impact on other works, such as 
refits for Type 42 destroyers. Many believed that Trident thereby reduced Rosyth 
Dockyard's opportunities for essential refit over a period of years. 56 However, 
coinciding with fears oflost economic opportunities through Trident investment, 
safety factors related to the system were also of concern. After the release of the 
proposal in May 1986, by August Fife Regional Council deemed Ministry of Defence 
public safety plans for a potential nuclear accident as insufficient. 57 Though dates are 
unclear, at some point Dunfermline's council employed a specialist in nuclear issues 
inclusive of waste and contamination, which allowed the council to establish a known 
datum from which to base its comments and actions for the future. To ease the 
concerns of local government, Dockyard officials also allowed for the appropriate 
access, and details were shared with Rosyth Public Safety committee.58 After the Fife 
S4 'We maintained job and economic stability and actually increased inward investment to our area in a 
climate of National (Scotland) economic uncertainty.' Interview with Callaghan (09/07/03). 
H Ibid; Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p. 103. 
$6 Interview with Callaghan (09/07/03). 
57 Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p. lOS. 
58 Interview with Callaghan (09/07/03). 
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council received assurances from the Ministry of Defence that nuclear accident 
contingency plans would be renewed, it held no objections to proposals for 
development at Rosyth by September 1986. S9 
Aware of the situation in the west of Scotland Dunfermline District Council was 
particularly attentive to matters pertaining to Trident, but Fife Regional Council's 
acceptance brought forward a period of renewed cooperation. In October 1986 the 
Chief Staff Officer at Rosyth Naval Base gave a presentation to Dunfennline 
councillors on the emergency procedures to be followed in the event of a nuclear 
accident. By January 1987 Malcolm Rifkind, Scottish Secretary of State, gave the 
green light for planning to start for the refitting complex.6o A co-operative demeanour 
energised both Dunfennline and Fife councilS.61 Consequently, Dunfermline made no 
objections to the capping of asbestos-contaminated ground at Rosyth, and by 
September 1987 it reiterated 'their overall objection to the nature of the facility' but 
had no objections to the 'proposals for construction' on the site.62 While both councils 
were familiar with the radiological characteristics of Trident, perhaps events in late 
1988 revealed the most telling example of this cooperation. In August Dunfermline 
District Council was invited to take part in sampling radiation levels in the Dockyard 
as a result of the Ministry's new 'open policy', and by September Fife's local 
59 In January 1986 it was also reported that Fife Regional Council would be closely involved in 
discussions with the Ministry of Defence on the expansion programme for Trident. DP, 7 January 
1986, p. 7. During a special meeting of the Planning Committee, Fife Council stated that 'Ministry of 
Defence be informed that this Council has no objection to their proposed nuclear submarine refit 
complex', subject to agreeing to observe conditions and agreements. Furthermore, the MoD was to 
undertake measures to reduce or eliminate radioactive discharges from the Dockyard, have the Rosyth 
Public Safety Scheme undertaken by the Nuclear Submarine Refit Complex Liason Committee in 
conjunction with local and naval authorities, and prior to construction starting on site a set of noise 
levels shall be taken to check the existing surveys. DCL Dunfermline District Council Meeting, Index 
to Minutes, September/October 1986, p. 529-532. 
60 Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p. 107. 
61 While unclear, Fife councils most likely understood the futility of resistance after witnessing the 
experiences of Strathclyde councils. 
62 DeL Dunfermline District Council Meeting, Index 10 Minutes, September/October 1987, p. 631. 
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authorities raised no objections to a nuclear waste store at Rosyth in connection with 
the Trident complex.63 While co-operation with the Ministry of Defence was imposed 
upon Dumbarton district councillors at that time, a staggering rate of unemployment 
and the inevitability of Trident encouraged local government in Fife to be far more 
accommodating. This had no influence over the final outcome. 
Central government's unexpected decision to sponsor an industrial competition for 
refits between Rosyth and Devonport Dockyards in September 1992 was interpreted 
by Dunfermline and Fife councils as an unexpected breach of faith.64 Both had 
already launched a campaign to defend jobs at HMS Cochrane in December 1990 
after the Scottish media suggested that the Base was to be closed, and local authorities 
did likewise for the adjacent Dockyard.6s According to Callaghan, major cities were 
expanding in UK economic terms but peripheral economies, such as Dunfermline, 
were still struggling.66 With its high rate of unemployment, the region was prepared to 
fight for Trident refits. Fife local authorities therefore supported the case that was 
being made by Dockyard management at Rosyth, and Fife Regional Council argued 
that: 
The impeccable track record of the Rosyth workforce in submarine refit 
work, the technical expertise assembled at the Dockyard, a series of past 
Government commitments and the very significant part of the investment 
for the Trident refit facility already made at Rosyth should have made a 
decision on the issue beyond doubt.61 
63 Dunfermline formally objected to this project in February 1989 but this issue was resolved. 
Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p. 109-110 
64 The September 1992 date was revealed during an interview with Squire (12/05/03). 
6S A Campaign Core Group focused the argument for the Base on long-term economic and strategic 
issues judged against assumed short-term financial gain. RSCO Fife Regional Council in conjunction 
with RSCO Dunfermline District Council, The Fraser of Allander Institute and St. Andrews Economic 
Services, Rosyth: A Report Prepared by Fife Regional Council, November 1992, p. 1.3; Anderson, 
Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p. 113. 
66 Interview with Callaghan (09/07/03). 
67 Rosyth: A Report Prepared by Fife Regional Council, p. 1.3. 
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Economically, Dunfennline council and the people it represented simply could not 
afford the loss of this opportunity and lobbied the government and associated trade 
unions to overturn 'this shabby deceit' .68 These attempts proved futile. Despite a 
monumental effort on the part of the community, its political representation and 
Dockyard management, Trident refits were allocated to the south of England. In 
response to this, D~fennline council reacted angrily by immediately declaring that 
without refitting work no support could be given for decommissioning submarines at 
Rosyth.69 In July 1993, roughly one month after the controversial action, Fife 
assembled a memorandum of evidence that vigorously challenged the government's 
decision-making process and commitments on future refitting workloads. Councils 
also reiterated the economic implications of the decision on Rosyth and Fife.7o 
However, it was not to be. Though Dunfermline and Fife councillors lobbied 
Parliament in its attempts to retain Trident refits, 'the general mood proved to be one 
of despondency' .71 
Fife economy and unemployment 
Despite the Fife yard's considerable experience with refitting nuclear submarines, 
during the 1980s unemployment in the region was rampant with JocaJ economies 
fragile and enfeebled. Polaris failed to invigorate the Fife economy, and many 
communities surrounding the Dockyard were areas of urban deprivation. Similar to 
the situation in Dumbarton, Dunfermline had 3,134 unemployed in July 1979,2,970 
68 Interview with Callaghan (09/07/03). 
69 DCL Dunfermline District Council Meeting, Index to Minutes, June/July 1993, p. 254. 
70 Having analysed the proposals in three different areas, Council believed the proposals should have 
been viewed as a single package of measures - failure in one element cast serious doubts as a whole. 
Rosyth: A Report Prepared by Fife Regional Council, p. 1. 
71 Interview with Callaghan (09/07/03). 
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jobless in July 1980 and over 3,500 unemployed by August of that year.72 In January 
1981 massive job losses from the coal industry placed a severe strain on the local 
economy, offering only lean times for many of Fife's families.73 With companies like 
the American owned Trane-Ltd. prepared to layoff a majority of its employees that 
year, it was not uncommon for local headlines to read 'Regions youth unemployment 
"out of control" or '890 chase four jobs,.74 In February the district had roughly 5,900 
unemployed, with the male unemployment for Dunfermline and Inverkeithing at 8.1 
per cent and an astonishing 20.4 per cent at Cowdenbeath.7s Because Fife 
communities gradually came to rely on the defence industry, Alex Falconer, former 
Labour MEP for Mid Scotland and Fife, explained that by July 1982 the Rosyth 
Dockyard Workplace Branch of the Labour Party, a left-wing shop steward 
movement, offered employees courses to develop policies for an alternative economic 
strategy.76 Little came from this with the economic situation failing to improve. By 
late March 1983 Dunfermline district had nearly 7,500 unemployed and it was the 
Rosyth complex that single-handedly shielded the region from further economic 
disparity.77 Between 1973-1984 Polaris refitting at the Dockyard provided for 1,751 
apprenticeships in the Fife region alone, and at the end of 1984 civilian employment 
72 DP, 1 August 1980, p. 5. 
73 At the industry's peak, in the 1920s, some 27,500 people were employed by the coal companies - a 
quarter of the Fife workforce. By the 1970s, 65 per cent of the coal was mined in Scotland's dozen or 
so remaining collieries. See R.S. Halliday, The disappearing Scottish colliery: a personal view of some 
aspects of Scotland's coal industry since nationalisation (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press), 1990. 
74 Trane Ltd produced air conditioning, ventilation and heat transfer equipment. DP, 16 January 1981, 
~. 1; DP, 16 January 1981, p. 7; DP, 18 September 1981, p. 1. 
, DP, 27 February 1981, p. 11. 
76 The Branch composed an Economic Impact Survey, and as a result, the results were based on 775 
fonus from workers in Rosyth Naval Base and RNAD Crombie. There were 130 forms returned by 
RNAD Crombie and 522 from Rosyth Naval Base. Amongst a number of findings, results mentioned 
that forty-four per cent of households were solely dependent on Rosyth for their income, thirty-five per 
cent depended upon a single pay packet from Rosyth, and fourteen per cent of households faced 
mUltiple redundancies at Rosyth. AF Defence Combine News. Newsletter of Fife, Perth and Kinross 
Defence Workers Combine, Results of Defence Survey Released, (lnverkeithing: Fife, Perth and 
Kinross Defence Combine Committee, no date), p. 2; Interview with Alex Falconer, former Labour 
MEP for Mid Scotland and Fife (16/06/03). 
77 DP, 25 March 1983, p. 7. 
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at the complex represented up to 25 per cent of all employment in the Dunfennline 
Employment Office area with 83 per cent of all employees from Dunfennline district 
and 93 per cent from within Fife.78 Through a combination of refitting experience and 
economic necessity, many considered Malcolm Rifkind's May 1987 announcement 
that 1,000 construction jobs would be necessary for the new submarine complex at 
Rosyth a 'well-deserved' victory. 79 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implications of peace threatened the 
certainty of Trident refits remaining at Rosyth with many in Fife becoming all too 
aware of the connection between Base and Dockyard. Appreciation for the naval 
complex was also compounded by overall economic conditions throughout the 
country, as Scottish historian Christopher Harvie noted that: 
By 1990 the heavy industries had dwindled to only three shipyards on the 
Clyde, collieries at Longannet and Monktonhall, and the threatened 
steelworks complex around Ravenscraig. Mechanical engineering output 
alone slumped by 28 per cent between 1979-1985. The Silicon Glen 
phenomenon, instead of achieving the 'critical mass which would 
generate high value-added concerns, obeyed the policies of the 
multinationals which controlled it and slowed up; textiles and whisky 
were in trouble; and manufacturing (including energy production) was 
down to less than thirty per cent of GNP, employment dropping from 
605,000 in 1979 to 412,000 in 1986. and investment falling two-fifths, 
from £561 to £339 million. so 
With nowhere to tum the Dockyard's civilian employees naturally hoped to avoid the 
economic difficulties of the outside world. While the complex still provided a major 
78 Rifkind was the Secretary of State for Scotland at that time. Devonport Dockyard in Plymouth 
created 2,863 apprenticeships during 1984. Twenty-second Report from the Conuruttee of Public 
Accounts, Control of Dockyard Operations and Manpower (London: HMSO), HC 342 of Session 
1983-84, p. 32; RSCO Rosyth Naval Base Trade Union. Giving the Royal Dockyards a Chance: a 
consultative document for government. the community management and union.~, December 1984, p. 3. 
79 DP, 22 May 1987, p. 1; DP, 12 July 1984, p. 1. 
80 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 165. 
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economic impact to Dunfennline and Fife in January 1991, at this time it only 
accounted for 17 per cent of all employees in Dunfennline district with roughly 85 per 
cent of all employees living in Fife.81 Yet in July of that year Babcock Thorn Limited, 
the Dockyard's management, announced 500 job losses with the government also 
stating that 800 civilian jobs and 1,200 Royal Navy personnel were to depart from 
HMS Cochrane by January 1992.82 If all civilian jobs related to the complex were 
lost, it was projected that unemployment in the district would rise from an already 
high 9.4 per cent to well over 20 per cent. 83 
These conditions pushed some workers to begin considering employment alternatives 
to that of the SSBN, and by late 1992 it was reported that a 'promising' post-Cold 
War experiment in diversification of the military-industrial plant was underway to 
assist in developing civil business work.84 From a Scottish perspective, Rosyth trade 
unions believed the relocation of refitting would lead to closure of the Dockyard and 
discourage procurement agencies who sought contractors capable of 'conceiving, 
designing, building, repairing and refitting, updating and upgrading their warships i.e. 
offering one-stop shopping' that was available in Scotland.8s Following the departure 
of civilian jobs from the Base the local unemployment rate shot upwards to 11.8 per 
cent by November 1992, accentuating the importance of Trident refits to Fife 
communities.86 For Dockyard employees the economic climate was inescapable, with 
viable employment alternatives largely unavailable. 
81 This was a decrease in employment from 1984. Rosyth 91: The Implications, p. 3. 
82 For convenience Babcock Thorn Ltd will be referred to as Babcock from this point. Anderson, 
Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p.IIS. 
83 Rosyth 91: The Implications, p. 3. 
84 There are numerous discrepancies in employment figures, probably attributed to stressing the 
importance of refitting work at Fife. RSCO D.Greenwood, The Dockyard Question: Issues and Options 
- A Report prepared for the Rosyth Trade Unions, November 1992, p. 1. 
U Ibid., p. 2. 
86 TS. 20 November 1992, p. 8. 
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Civilian employees pressed to avoid defence cuts in the post-Cold War era as the 
potential impact of Trident to Fife's local economies became increasingly evident 
during the final months of the refit competition. According to the regional council, in 
November 1992 the impact ofHMS Cochrane and Rosyth Dockyard on the Scottish 
economy was estimated to be of the order of £380 million per anum, equating to more 
than 14,000 jobs. Jobs related to the complex were worth around £220 million to the 
local economy, representing almost 10 per cent of the regional Gross Domestic 
Product. During the 1991192 financial year Fife council stated that an average of 
4,484 persons were directly employed at the Dockyard and the total 'spend' of the 
establishment on wages, materials, goods and services was roughly £169 million, 
£124 million of that being spent within Scotland. Should both the Base and the 
Dockyard be run-down, estimates suggested some 18,000 people in total would be 
affected.87 Described efficiently within the Independent on Sunday, it was stated that: 
With only 4,000 at Rosyth and 5,000 at Devonport, their economic 
importance nationally may have been diluted, but to the Jocal economies 
they served, they remained crucial. Like Linwood and Ravenscraig before 
it, Rosyth had become a national symbol of Scottish industry ... Waiting for 
the MoD to deliver its judgement would not be easy. For many, it was 
hoped that their children would have something still there for them. 88 
Over the course of twenty-five years Fife's coal industry expired and the area became 
highly dependent on SSBN refits, yet this involvement did not shelter the region from 
abject poverty. By April 1993 45.5 per cent of those children at Lynbum Primary 
School in Dunfermline were in receipt of free school meals.89 This high percentage 
reflected the state of the local economy. Yet the far-reaching implications of 
relocation were also made apparent when Rosyth's commercial management, 
87 Rosyth: A Report Prepared by Fife Regional Council, p. 3·12. 
88 The Independent on Sunday, 3 January 1993, p. 22. 
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Babcock International, announced 450 redundancies at its Renfrew works near 
Glasgow in May 1993 and warned of 'thousands' morejob losses ifit did not receive 
Trident refits.90 When the Conservative government opted to transfer refitting 
facilities to Plymouth, the psychological and socio-economic impact to Fife and other 
regions would prove to be nothing less than devastating. 
The force of this decision was felt immediately and Fife communities responded in 
the negative. Following the announcement that refits were to be directed south, 
Ritkind provoked further distress when he declared that 450 jobs at Rosyth would be 
terminated immediately, though Babcock believed up to 1,000 jobs would be lost in 
the wake of the Devonport decision.91 As compensation for the loss. central 
government guaranteed surface vessel refit work extending over twelve years but few 
in Fife were prepared to accept more promises.92 Amidst this intensified atmosphere 
there were predictions that roughly 2,500 redundancies would be created over 
Ritkind's more conservative estimate. Jack Dromey. national secretary for the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), went as far as accusing the 
Conservative Party of placing political motivations above national interests.93 There 
were an increasing number of residents who also believed that if Trident refits were to 
be performed elsewhere then retired nuclear-powered boats could find sanctuary 
somewhere other than Rosyth. According to a Fife memorandum, the concept of 
continued basing of the strategic nuclear deterrent in Scotland was directly related to 
promises that the refitting of the Trident vessels would be at Rosyth. Consistent with 
89 David J. Paxton, Letter to I. Lang, April 1993. 
90 TO, 28 May 1993, p. 19. 
91 350 jobs were also lost at Devonport. TI, 25 June 1993, p. 8. 
92 Rosyth: Memorandum of evidence from Fife Regional Council. p. 3. 
93 Rosyth Dockyard, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 227 Col 236, 24 June 1993; DP, 2 July 
1993, p. 13. 
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this initial reaction, by the late 1990s the scrapping of decommissioned submarines at 
the Dockyard became an intense political issue in Fife (Photograph 2.6).94 With 
Fife's economic future left uncertain civilian employees were forced to rely on 
government assurances. 
After 1993 the Dockyard did continue to refit surface ships, though at a noticeably 
reduced level. By late July 1995 property consultants handling the sale of HMS 
Cochrane received several bids while the Dockyard announced a £27 million contract 
to carry out a major refit ofHMS Newcastle, £10 million of work on HMS Coventry 
and a £ 16 million order to refit HMS Dumbarton Castle.95 Though these refit orders 
were significant they were simply not enough. The decision to relocate Trident refits 
devastated Fife's communities, and though exact figures are still unclear the agreed 
figure came to roughly 10.000 job losses.96 Several thousand indirect job losses were 
linked to local businesses in Dunfermline, there was no alternative submarine work 
available and valuable economic and human resources were ultimately squandered. 
Like many communities in Fife, Dunfermline's identity was with Rosyth Royal 
Dockyard as the community gradually became what was described as 'a wasteland' 
after 1993. It would be years before the future of the complex was secured by the 
~ Rosyth: Memorandum o/evidence/rom Fife Regional Council, p. S. According to the SNP, what 
Scots were now being asked to 'stomach' was being used for the continual basing of nuclear weapons 
by a Government which had reneged on the other part of tile bargain, and now appeared to be unable 
firmly to guarantee surface ship refitting in its stead. Seventh Report from the Defence Committee, The 
Royal Dockyards, (London: HMSO), HC 829 of Session 1992-93,22 July 1993, p. 71. 
95 TS, 28 July 1995, p. 6; TG, 25 July 1995, p. 16. 
96 Interview with Squire (12/05/03). Events proved that Devonpon was the more expensive option, as 
Rosyth had already laid down a seismically-proved foundation for the Trident refit bay, at great public 
expense, and Devonport spent years trying to pile-drive foundations through geologically unsuitable 
strata. It was an illogical transposition because 'it placed nuclear refitting at a yard with a background 
in surface ship refitting and transferred core surface-ship work to a yard with a track record in refitting 
the nation's nuclear deterrent'. Interview with Livingstone (19/06/03). 
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Photograph 2.6: Decommissioned submarines at Rosyth Roval Dockyard 
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Dockyard's proximity to the fast-expanding high tech and corporate business 
communities of Dunfermline's bridgehead area. 97 
Industrial competition for Trident 
For a decade employees of the Dockyard and residents of Fife were assured that 
Trident refits were to be performed at the complex, leading communities in the area to 
prepare psychologically for the upcoming task while planning for their economic 
futures. After the government's intentions for Trident were announced in July 1980, 
Rosyth received confirmation of its responsibilities in December 1984 through John 
Stanley, Armed Forces Minister.98 In July 1985 Stanley once again stressed that the 
Thatcher government had made an undertaking for the refitting of SSBNs to be 
continued at Rosyth Dockyard.99 By early May 1986 the government's objectives 
must have appeared unquestionable as the Ministry's proposals for the refitting 
facility at Rosyth were circulated throughout Fife local government. Furthermore, as 
late as 1991 construction of the RD57 project was progressing well as the Defence 
Committee reported that: 
It is still the Government's intention that Trident refitting and refuelJing 
procedures should take place at Rosyth, and work on the RDS7 
programme is being continued because 'it is the only current programme 
which assures that we will meet Trident refit dates' In these 
circumstances, it seems likely that the refitting and refuelling facility will 
go ahead as originally planned. 100 
97 Babcock International, which had taken over management of the facility in 1987, acquired it in 1997, 
making the Rosyth Royal Dockyard the first privatised dockyard in Britain. Interview with Squire 
~12/05/03). 
8 DP, 12 July 1984, p. 1. 
99 Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 82 Col 169, 12 July 1985. 
100 Eighth Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress o/rhe Trident Programme, (London: 
HMSO) He 286 of Session 1990-1991, p. 23. 
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However, complications surfaced in February of that year when HMS Cochrane 
appeared on the closure list after the Options for Change review confirmed that the 
necessity of present bases was under consideration. 101 This factor held serious 
implications for the Dockyard. 
With HMS Cochrane under serious threat, management at Devonport Dockyard in 
Plymouth intended to exploit the situation in Rosyth. In 1991 the potential conclusion 
of the Base was being viewed more and more as a Scottish issue, with the Campaign 
Core Group formed and representing the interests of communities through local 
authorities, Members of Parliament and the trade unions.102 However, reductions in 
defence spending during the early 1990s came with rapidity, and defence workers 
everywhere were all too often unprepared for the deceleration brought about by the 
subtle nature of the post-Cold War peace. t03 By January 1992 the government did 
give a commitment to the continued operation of the Base, albeit at a reduced level, 
with Type 42 frigates and numerous service personnel to be redeployed to 
Portsmouth. Interpreted as a sign of things to come, Fife and Dunfermline councils 
believed that the outcome of considerations by central government would decide the 
future of both the Dockyard and the Base. 104 These assumptions proved correct, and 
Devonport Management Limited (DML) sought to create an opportunity within the 
competitive post-Cold War market. After the English Dockyard made an unsolicited 
bid to refit Trident in July 1991, and went as far as arguing for a one dockyard 
solution, a fierce campaign got underway between DML and Babcock 
101 Despite its reduced continuation after 1991, the Base would be closed by 1996. The Trident refitting 
complex was considered exempt and the Ministry of Defence 'could safely proceed with its 
Ptrogramme'. Ibid., p. 23. 
02RSCO Core Campaign Group, Rosyth 91: Rosyth Naval Base- The Economic and Social Issues, p. 5. 
103 1. Clark, The Post-Cold War Order, p. 31. 
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(Map 2.2). lOS By January 1992 the Trident contract became a national issue in 
Scotland, and during parliamentary recess in September of that year the Major 
government formally announced that an industrial competition for refits would take 
place between the two yards. 106 Despite Rosyth's vast experience with Polaris, the 
mUltiple commitments made to Rosyth and initial construction of the RD57 project, 
previous assurances made to the Dockyard proved meaningless. 
Both yards were desperate to obtain, or in Rosyth's case, retain, Trident refit 
operations, with local economies for both regions presenting strong cases for the 
pursuit of such responsibilities. Under the provisions of the Dockyard Services Act 
1986, both Rosyth Dockyard in Fife and Devonport Dockyard in Plymouth had been 
transferred from Ministry of Defence supervision to commercial management on 6 
April 1987.107 Rosyth Royal Dockyard was a joint venture company owned by 
Babcock Thorn Limited, with Babcock the majority and Thorn the minority 
shareholder, heavily dependent on naval refitting but commercial work steadily 
increasing after privatisation. The Dockyard was one of the largest industrial 
104 RSCO Fife Regional Council in conjunction with Dunfermline District Council. Rmlyth: A Report 
Prepared by Fife Regional Council. p. 1.1. 
105 Babcock argued that Rosyth had made progress with RD57 and met all current nuclear safety 
constraints, which included the latest earthquake prediction levels. By December J 99 J Babcock 
approached the Ministry of Defence with a view to buying the Dockyard outright. Anderson, Rodgers, 
Law, An Outline History, pp.114-115. 
106 Ibid, p.114. This was completed at a time where there was probably planning by the Conservatives 
to do this at a time most convenient for their intentions. The suggestion and September date is 
according to the Labour MP. Interview with Squire (12/05/03). 
101 See Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde Region. The Dockyard Services Bill was eventually 
cleared through Parliament with Babcock Thorn Ltd and DML appointed in January and February 1987 
respectively. Report by the Comptroller and the Auditor General, Transfer of the Royal Dockyard to 
Commercial Management, (London: HMSO, 3 March 1988), pp. 1,5. 
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Map 2.2: Rosyth and Devonport Dockyards 
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establishments in Scotland, and by November 1992 employed an estimated 4,200.108 
Since 1987 1,045 jobs were lost, local unemployment was at a staggering 11.8 per 
cent and some £120 million in construction had already taken place on the RD57 
project. 109 DML's primary function was to support the Royal Navy and Devonport 
Dockyard was the largest marine support complex in Western Europe. In November 
1992 the southern facility employed 5,200, it had already lost an astounding 5,949 
jobs since 1987 and Plymouth's local unemployment rate matched Fife at 11.4 per 
cent. I 10 With both regions experiencing severe economic hardship, the government's 
decision to retain two dockyards was founded on the perceived value of ensuring 
viable competition. Though unclear it appears Rosyth's management anticipated the 
government's strategy for the dockyards and announced plans for a substantially 
cheaper Trident refit facility than initially proposed by the Ministry of Defence. I I I 
Previous to the September 1992 announcement, the bidding war had in fact already 
begun. 
While a study produced by Babcock broadcast the advantages of having two yards 
under single management, with submarines at Rosyth and surface warships at 
Devonport, the intensity of the competition became most apparent when the Financial 
Times reported in December 1992 that confidential details of the DML bid had been 
clandestinely passed to the Scottish yard. I 12 Furthennore, in a letter to John Major, 
Rachel Squire re-emphasised that the government made a commitment to Rosyth in 
108 TS 2 
, 0 November 1992, p. 8. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Devonport Dockyard. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 210 Col 263·269, 25 June 1992. 
III Seventh Report from the Defence Committee, The Royal Dockyards, (London: HMSO), He 829 of 
Session 1992·93,22 July 1993, p. 8; FT, 23 June 1992, p. 3. 
112 FT, 18 November 1992, p. 8; FT, 11 December 1992, p. 10. 
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1985, and that refitting work would take place there. I 13 Management at Rosyth 
believed it had assembled an excellent financial and strategic case for maintaining the 
refit facility in Fife, and released a glossy document to the Ministry of Defence that 
argued: 
Devonport presently carries out by far the greater volume of large surface 
ship refitting work. If Devonport were to be awarded the submarine work 
in addition, it would have the capacity and financial strength to undercut 
Rosyth's prices ... By contrast, if Rosyth was awarded the submarine 
contract, both dockyards would have a substantial future. I 14 
Rather than adopting an aggressive take-over strategy, it was clear that Rosyth 
management somehow believed it was at a distinct disadvantage, opting to employ a 
more pragmatic approach toward refits. I IS 
Babcock promptly reacted to this precarious situation and pushed forward with a 
series of revised proposals. It was reported that the Ministry of Defence RD57 
scheme would have cost taxpayers £500 million but Babcock felt it could complete 
the task for £267 million by omitting the covered dockyard and employing a high 
level crane with a new low level fuel handling system with relocation of both nuclear 
and non-nuclear buildings and services. In summary, the new RD57 proposal was 
expected to reduce capital cost; maintain the required completion date; conform to 
stringent nuclear safety requirements; reduce refitting costs and integrate and build on 
the RD57 site work already performed. I 16 At one point Babcock even looked at 
treating the project as a completely new site so that management could change the 
113 RSCO Rachel Squire, Labour MP for Dunfermline West, Letter to Rt Hon John Major, 2 December 
1992, (Rachel Squire Constituency Office), ' 
114 RSCO Rosyth Royal Dockyard, Trident nuclear submarine refitting at Rosyth offers the betler 
solution, (Babcock Thorn Limited: No Date), p. 3. 
115 This strategy was most likely adopted due to the situation with HMS Cochrane. 
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employment conditions for employees in order to support the changes to working 
practices the Dockyard needed to implement. Once Babcock's project management 
teams approached the Ministry of Defence with their intentions, and it became 
apparent that there was a genuine interest, the level of involvement escalated 
dramatically. I 17 
Corbett explained that management had a team of roughly fifty employees working on 
the bid, which included the entire board of executive directors and senior operational 
managers in the company. Babcock ultimately produced a comprehensive package of 
documentation that made clear their objectives, including what the Dockyard would 
do, how it would do it, what was required, how much it would cost, its impact to the 
community and the draft safety case. The risk assessment itself was so thorough that 
it required roughly eight inches of paper, a collection of summary documents were 
professionally produced and a similar set of documents were released for the work-
force to explain what was happening. IIB Nonetheless, by 1993 the situation between 
the two yards had noticeably intensified when in mid-February Malcolm Rifkind, now 
Secretary of State for Defence, suspended a decision on which dockyard would be 
awarded the lifeline contract to refit Trident. I 19 
A new timetable was announced in March 1993 due to the need for the government to 
be 'even handed', and when DML submitted a bid £64 million lower than Rosyth, 
Babcock reviewed the requirements for RDS7 and started the process of 
116 RSCO Rosyth Royal Dockyard, RD57 New Docks Proposal (Babcock Thorn Ltd; no date), p. 1,4. 
117 Interview with Corbett (20/06/03). 
118 Interview with Corbett (20/06/03). In November 1992 DML proposed a dual site, single 
management structure and claimed it could save the Government 400 million. Rosyth stated these 
claims were half-truths and inaccuracies and that Rosyth could save the Government £500 million over 
fifteen years. Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline History, p.116. 
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simplification. 120 Management went through this cycle a number of times, each time 
responding to further cost reductions from Devonport. The management team for 
Rosyth had very little confidence that DML could actually upgrade its facilities for 
the money they were proposing. and Rosyth had been studying the planning of 
Trident refits for years before it reached this point. I 21 Despite all this, at the request of 
the Ministry of Defence Babcock submitted their final proposal in mid June 1993 that 
sliced an estimated £70 million off its previous offer. According to Corbett, it was the 
growing realisation that Babcock could reduce the refit times significantly, and also 
reduce costs. which led the company to suggest that it had the ability to move to a 
single site capable of refitting the entire nuclear fleet. 122 The final proposal offered by 
Babcock argued that Rosyth could accommodate from an early date the refitting, 
repair and decommissioning programme for all nuclear submarines with some 
dockings conducted at Faslane. Substantial work had already been completed on the 
preparation of a nuclear safety case for the new facilities. and Babcock was prepared 
to negotiate the acquisition of existing dockyard assets, participate in the funding of 
Low Cost RD57 and manage the implementation of the project.12l Besides parking 
nuclear submarines at Rosyth Dockyard, all refuelling work, including the removal 
and replacement of radioactive materials. could be successfully completed in an 
upgraded facility.124 For reasons yet to be revealed, the Ministry of Defence, senior 
naval officials and central government ultimately disregarded this last proposal. 
\19 'rt Tv. 10 February 1993. p. 1. 
120 The Devonport bid put its capital cost at £236 million. Anderson, Rodgers, Law, An Outline 
History. p.116. Interview with Corbett (20/06/03). 
121 Babcock knew 'far more about the implications of Trident than did DML'. Interview with Corbett 
(20/06/03). 
122 Ibid. 
123 Low Cost RDS7 was Babcock's proposal for £267 million. 
124 RSCO Rosyth Royal Dockyard. No Title (Babcock Thorn Ltd; no date). 
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The men and women of the Fife yard were distraught by the government's decision to 
relocate Trident refits to Plymouth. Releasing waves of bitter resentment, accusations 
of deceit and industrial protest, on 24 June 1993 Rifkind announced that the £5 biUion 
in refit contracts would be allocated to DML because its proposal for upgrading docks 
and running costs undercut Rosyth's bid by some £64 million. The results of the 
analysis for capital costs showed that the proposal to build new docks at Rosyth cost 
some £369 million on top of the £100 million already spent. The proposals for the 
upgrading of docks in Rosyth would cost £248 million, and the proposals for 
Devonport would cost roughly £236 million in total. Regardless of funds already 
spent, Rifkind believed the RD57 project was more expensive than other proposals. 
Bids were much closer in capital cost, but there was a difference in Devonport's 
favour of £12 million. With regard to operating costs, Rifkind's analysis showed that 
Devonport was cheaper by a total of some £52 million over the period. 125 Taking 
those factors into account without including redundancy costs, the total difference 
between the two bids was £64 million in favour of Devonport. However, it was 
argued that Devonport savings estimates were minuscule in relation to the size and 
importance of this project and failed to validate the relocation of Trident operations. 
For Fife residents and employees of the Scottish yard this decision was 
understandably interpreted as a betrayal of numerous promises given. Furthermore, 
many believed Rosyth no longer had a long-term future, and alleged that the 
reallocation of refit operations back to Rosyth would have threatened the 
, I' . .. C 126 Wh 'd . government s s 1m eighteen-seat maJonty 10 the ommons. en const enng 
12' Tl, 25 June 1993, p. 8;Dockyards, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 407 Col 47, 24 June 1993. 
126 There was outrage at the upside-down decision, which was slammed at the time as a political fix to 
secure Conservative seats. Interview with Livingstone (19/06/03). Squire believed the decision was 
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Rosyth's bitter disappointment, John Major recalled in 1984 that the Labour Party 
was keen to decommission Trident and added, 'how strange it is, people would think, 
that they want to scrap military hardware one day and fight for it another', 127 Major's 
assertion was ajab at Labour's grip on Scotland, but despite the party's flop on 
disarmament some four years earlier the Fife Region's dedication to the project was 
unquestionable. 
Local government immediately fired back a negative response to central 
government's decision, and within weeks of this verdict Fife Regional Council wrote 
to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence that: 
The decision to award the Trident refit contract, alongside all other 
submarine refit work, to Devonport reverses commitments given to 
Rosyth by Government Ministers over the last nine years." The future of 
Rosyth now depends on an allocated programme of surface vessel refit 
work. It is therefore understandable that there is significant doubt over the 
strength of Government commitments to the future of Rosyth Royal 
Dockyard. 128 
Fife's trust in the government's judgment was irreparably damaged, and at the time of 
the council's submission the Defence Committee also scrutinized the decision, 
considering the process by which management were asked to make proposals for 
refits as flawed and potentially unfair. Ultimately, the Committee could not confinn 
that the decision reached was a 'prudent one' ,129 Furthennore, the Ministry of 
Defence had 'insisted' on Rosyth continuing to develop RDS7 whilst Devonport 
politically motivated, and that the Conservatives felt the decision to relocate refits would assist them in 
the 97 General Election. Interview with Squire (1215103). 
127T1, 2S 1une 1993, p. 8. 
128 RSCO Fife Regional Council, Rosyth: Memorandum o/Evidence/rom Fife Regional Council 10 Ihe 
House o/Commons Select Committee 0/ De/ence (Fife Regional Council: July 1993), p. 12. 
129 They also considered that a decision made on the basis of a relatively small cost difference as 
'unsafe'. Seventh Report from the Defence Committee, The Royal Dockyards (London: HMSO). HC 
829 ofSessionI992·93, 221uly 1993, p. 71. 
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worked up in detail its refurbishment plans, placing the Fife yard at a serious 
disadvantage.13o The late acceptance by the government of this inequity delayed the 
decision by six months, but the delayed consideration of the issue by Rosyth was used 
against the Scottish yard for arguments in favour of Devonport.13I By 1995 rumours 
circulated that Trident refits might be returned to Rosyth, but it was argued that if the 
decision was reversed it would merely con finn that the selection was 'motivated by 
interests of the Tory Party' .132 After Labour's landslide victory in 1997 Defence 
Ministers did consider reversing the decision, though it would have created uproar in 
England, but Fife's fate was sealed after final details of the contractual agreement 
were completed by the Major government and settled just one month previous to the 
general election.133 Regardless of the numerous accusations concerning political bias, 
there were other far less obvious factors that significantly influenced the outcome. 
Fife's local authorities were correct when they assumed that the future of both the 
Base and the Dockyard were intertwined, as the closure of HMS Cochrane was part 
of the whole consideration in that it was indicative of the Navy's preference to be 
based in the south-west rather than in Scotland. In the midst of industrial competition, 
Babcock management also understood this to be true. The decision to refit at 
Devonport was also part of this situation· refits sometimes required up to two years 
to complete, and in that time, there was a significant naval presence at the refit 
location. Ifadded into the equation that Babcock's proposal was to undertake the 
entire nuclear refit programme for Royal Navy submarines, not just SSBN but the 
130 Work at Rosyth already completed was added to expense calculations, placing costs higher in Fife. 
131 Fife Regional Council, Rosyth: Memorandum 0/ Evidence, p. 1. 
132 TS, 18 May 1995, p. 1. Admitting that at this late stage would bring no dividends for the 
Government either in Scotland or England. TS, 4 November 1995, p. 11. 
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entire SSN fleet as well, there remained a very difficult case to make in order to keep 
Devonport open. If the southern Dockyard was retired as a refit centre the situation 
became even more difficult to keep open the equivalent operational base for surface 
ships at Devonport, particularly given the spare capacity at Portsmouth. Furthermore, 
Devonport had a rich naval tradition as its origins dated back to 1691. when William 
of Orange commissioned the building ofa new dockyard to support the Royal Navy in 
the Western Approaches. 134 Because of the sentimentality attached to the southern 
yard there were those in the Royal Navy who wanted this work given to Devonport. 
Due to the Royal Navy's vast presence in Plymouth, it is 'fair to say' that senior navy 
officials supported Rosyth but there was a significant number who pushed for 
Devonport. 135 It was therefore a combination of these factors that sent Trident refits, 
and Fife's socio-economic situation, south. 
Conclusion 
After successfully refitting and refuelling the Resolution class under conditions more 
primitive to that of Trident, over the years Rosyth had indeed performed the dirty 
work of nuclear-powered submarine operations. With this impressive technical 
experience under their belts, by 1980 Dockyard employees. Fife representatives and 
everyday residents believed the region had earned the right to conduct maintenance on 
the replacement deterrent, perhaps going as far as assuming that such responsibilities 
were indeed reserved to the east of Scotland. It is without question that the likelihood 
of such operations heading south must have appeared incomprehensible. 
133 This contract guaranteed that if a Labour government attempted to relocate work from Devonport 
and back to Rosyth it would require massive compensation to Devonport. Interview with Squire. 
(12/5/03). 
134 Interview with Corbett (20/06/03) 
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Nevertheless. both a decade's worth of guarantees and considerable investment from 
Conservative governments were left both abandoned and unfulfilled. Despite a 
prolonged history of commendable service to the Royal Navy, the end of international 
tensions once again threatened, and ultimately extinguished. that need which justified 
the Dockyard's existence. For the workers ofRosyth. the situation was a cruel twist 
of fate. Rather than collapsing under the weight of a hot war, the Dockyard had 
quickly succumbed to the influences of peace. 
When considering Rosyth's experience it should be recognised that throughout the 
Cold War, NATO had been basically a defensive coalition. organised for the purposes 
of deterrence. The earliest concept of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons gave 
way to a strategy of flexible response. This involved more emphasis in US and 
NATO planning on controlled nuclear responses and general purpose forces that 
could hold their own against a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. The third 
and final phase of NATO Cold War military planning was that associated with the 
forward defence strategy, and the accompanying maritime strategy. formally adopted 
in 1984. This policy sought to bring war into the Soviet's backyard with counterforce 
attacks on Soviet naval facilities. 136 The American and British Trident systems were 
key components of this collective strategy. However. by the mid-l 990s NATO faced 
an uncertain future. its traditional strategy in disarray now that the Soviet Union no 
longer served as a threat to the West. Some critics argued that because of the 
135 Interview with Squire (12/05/03). 
136 Strategy involving mass retaliation was a credible deterrent only while the US possessed 
overwhelming nuclear superiority. This came to an end in the late 1950s after the introduction of 
growing Soviet capabilities in long- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and aircraft posed an 
unmistakable threat to the US and its NATO allies. With the forward defence strategy, it added depth to 
the battlefield in Europe by targeting and destroying Warsaw Pact rear echelon forces, probably the 
weakest link in the Soviet order of battle. S.L Reardon. 'NATO's Strategy: Past, Present and Future'. in 
S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss (eds) NATO in the Post-CoM War Era: Does;t have a 
Future? (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), p. 72. 
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disintegration of communism in Eastern Europe, NATO strategy, like the alliance 
itself, had outlived its usefulness. As NATO moved into the post-Cold War era, its 
interests turned to the alliance's political strategy, emphasising such issues as its role 
as a peacekeeper and its future relations with former members of the Warsaw Pact.137 
Therefore, what once appeared to be vital additions to the NATO arsenal essentially 
became luxuries. 138 By the mid-1990s it seemed difficult not to consider Trident as an 
extravagance. In 1995 a British Pugwash Group report concluded that during the 
Cold War Britain's nuclear weapons had no detectable influence over events; no 
allied country depended on them; and their actual use would have invited a disastrous 
nuclear strike to the UK. However, central government frequently argued that 
possessing nuclear weapons gave Britain more influence in international negotiations 
than it would have without them, a proposition difficult to substantiate or contradict, 
let alone quantify.139 Conservative and Labour governments repeatedly employed this 
argument as ajustification for Trident, but it did nothing to secure the future of the 
Dockyard. 
Accusations of political bias were plentiful in Fife during the period after June 1993, 
but evidence has revealed that the unforeseen demise of the Scottish complex actually 
had more to do with the inclinations of the Admiralty, tremendous reduction in 
defence expenditure and the Royal Navy's consequential restructuring. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that Fife communities failed to appreciate either the 
complexity or potency of industrial politics, as the unexpected by-products of the 
137 The Warsaw Pact was created in May 1955 and linked the USSR with the eastern states of Europe 
in a military alliance, completing the dualities of East versus West, NATO versus Warsaw. 
138 S.L Reardon, NA TO's Strategy, pp. 73-75. 
139 It is not clear what locations are possible targets for the Trident system following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. R.S. Pease, 'An End to British Nuclear Weapons?' in Douglas Holdstock (ed.) British 
Nuclear Weapons Programmes. 1952-2002 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). p.134 
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Soviet Union's collapse were ultimately responsible for Trident's relocation rather 
than some vicious act on behalf of the Conservative government. Yet even if this was 
a general misunderstanding, the actual circumstances would have provided no more 
comfort. Due to an unexpected transfonnation within the strategic setting, both the 
Major government and dockyard facilities were thrust into a dilemma influenced 
through economic austerity. For the Fife establishment, the final verdict proved 
unfavourable. However, without the collapse of the Soviet Union it is highly unlikely 
that senior naval officials would have disrupted Trident's operations when 
construction for the Rosyth complex was well underway. Fife's heavy reliance on the 
UK's defence industry in times of peace proved fatal, but one might also suppose that 
Scotland's long-standing relationship with the Labour Party did nothing to assist 
either the Dockyard or the region in regards to central government's decision. 
Beneath the surface of these implications, there were also other less influential factors 
that impaired the case for Rosyth. All dockyards initially failed in some degree to 
meet basic Polaris requirements, and dockyard qualifications contained certain 
prerequisites that were not exclusive to the Rosyth facility. 140 Therefore, the transition 
of refits to an alternative site hardly represented an impossibility. Oflesser 
consideration, Fife's arguments for refitting Trident were also potentially 
compromised by the disarmament movement and Scottish civil society's traditional 
hostility toward nuclear weaponry, with Dunfennline and Fife councils also 
professing their initial discomfort with the act of deterrence. In the post-Cold War 
environment, all these factors arguably contributed to Rosyth's deprivation, and 
140 The operating base for Polaris was required to be in close proximity to deep water; to offer easy 
navigational access; and to be a short distance by sea from the associated armament depot. Polaris 
submarines (OperatingBase). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 676 Co1219, 24 April 1963. 
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Devonport's success. As a result, Fife's residents suffered from this combination of 
factors and the weight of this most difficult situation could not be understated. Yet to 
fully grasp the experiences of both Strathclyde and Fife, there remains a need to 
address the Scottish political dimension of Trident. 
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Chapter Three: The Scottish political dimension ofTrjdent 
The third chapter of this study will consider the policies of the four main parties 
competing in Scottish electoral politics, as well as the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (CPGB) and the Scottish Green Party, so that one might determine the 
successes and failures of their various strategies with the national deterrent. 
Thatcher's decision to replace the Polaris system initially served as the stimulus for 
intense hostility in Scotland. However, the Callaghan government had already made 
significant progress with its negotiations over Trident, and, of particular interest to 
Scottish historians, the decision to pursue the system was withheld from the electorate 
so as not to influence either the 1979 devolution referendum or the upcoming general 
election. This was the first occasion where the system failed to incite a noticeable 
reaction from the Scottish electorate. Ifwe fast-forward to 1997, the Cold War was 
no more and the disarmament issue had become largely debilitated in the years 
previous to the second attempt at devolution. With the system functional and the 
electorate fully familiarised, Trident again held little influence over Scotland's 
determination for greater autonomy. The Strathclyde and Fife chapters have shown 
that Scots generally dismissed Trident's presence in their lochs for economic and 
security reasons, and, as will be seen, this was best demonstrated through the way in 
which they voted. 
Procurement and political reaction 
According to political scientist Ritchie Ovendale a report by Professor James Mason, 
Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, and Sir Anthony Duff. Deputy 
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Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, at some time suggested that Prime Minister 
James Callaghan replace the increasingly dated Polaris system with that of Trident. I 
With the credibility of Labour's economic policies all but destroyed in the late 1970s, 
the Scotland Act 1978 becoming law and a general election on the foreseeable 
horizon, Callaghan understood that the procurement of this incredibly expensive 
system held the potential for unfavourable political ramifications.2 By this time 
Thatcher had already committed the Conservative Party to a policy of maintaining an 
effective deterrent, as Harold Macmillan and the party had in 1963, but in March 1978 
Fred Mulley, Secretary of State, insisted that 'there is no need to take a decision' 
because 'the Polaris fleet has many years of effective life ahead of it'. 3 However, it is 
clear that Callaghan appreciated the increasing inadequacies of Polaris, and began 
making arrangements with Carter in January 1979 to acquire Trident while agreeing 
to the siting ofGLCMs at Greenham Common in response to the Soviet Union's 
installation ofSS·20s.4 This clandestine agreement was contrary to Labour's policy at 
that time, and within its 1979 manifesto the party took the line that Polaris should not 
be replaced. S For obvious reasons, matters under the shady umbrella of national 
security are strictly withheld from the public arena. Yet with both the referendum and 
general election drawing near, it likely that this arrangement was concealed from the 
electorate so that Trident would not assist the SNP in the midst of a referendum and 
have no bearing on the return of a Labour government. 
I This was due to Soviet technical advancements in ABM systems. Ovendale, Anglo.American 
Relations, p. 138. 
2 Labour's troubles were heightened by an effective series of election posters for the Conservatives 
with the slogan 'Labour isn't working' striking a chord with voters. ibid., p. 142; Harvie, No Gods and 
Precious Few Heroes, p. 164. 
3 P%ris, Hansard (Lords), Vol 391 Col 601, 18 May 1978. 
4 Polaris, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 946 Col 1315, 21 March 1978; Ring. We Come 
Unseen, p. 151. 
S Ibid, p. 151; The Labour Way is the Better Way-The Labour Party Manifesto 1979 (London: Labour 
Party, 1979). 
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In Scotland, questions over its constitutional status had been sustained for over a 
century but the inept Scotland Act 1978 did nothing to rectify the case for greater 
autonomy.6 While much has been written by historians about the Scottish Home Rule 
movement, the political gravity of these campaigns ebbed and flowed, with the 
movement gathering noticeable strength during the late 1960s. Coincidentally, the 
historic victory of nationalist Winifred Ewing in the November 1967 Hamilton by-
election occurred while the first Resolution class boats made their way to Faslane 
around that time. This was followed by the SNP obtaining 34 per cent of votes in the 
Scottish local elections in May of that year, a total higher than that of any other party.7 
The Scottish electorate was about to experience its first glimpse of Britain's model for 
sea-borne nuclear deterrence, and by November 1968 the boats HMS Resolution, 
HMS Repulse and HMS Renown were either stationed at Faslane or close to arrival, 
while the American Polaris fleet simultaneously occupied the Holy Loch. It is likely 
that Scottish apprehensions with the SSBN were tempered by concerns with national 
security, or fears of a nuclear holocaust, as the blasts over Nagasaki and Hiroshima. 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis, were stored finnly within living memory. Though this 
is another aspect of Scottish history that deserves further exploration, it is without 
question that the Labour and Conservative parties were desperate to appease 
nationalist sentiment at that time. 
6 While Scottish and English parliaments merged in 1707 under the Treaty of Union, events in the 
nineteenth century, especially campaigns between 1877-1885 for Irish Home Rule, produced an 
increasing desire for a measure of internal self-government. The post of Secretary for Scotland expired 
in 1746, was revived in 1855, and after the creation of the Scottish Home Rule Association in 1886 it 
later became a Cabinet post in 1892. The position was upgraded and became a full Secretary of State 
post in 1926, with a separate Scottish Office created as a government department. Nevertheless, talk of 
restoring a sovereign Parliament and the concept offederal arrangements failed to subside. See: D.G. 
Boyce, The Revolution in Ireland (London: Macmillan Press, 1988); C. Burness, 'Strange Association': 
the Irish question and the making of Scottish unionism, 1886-1918 (East Lothian: Tuck we 11 Press, 
2003); G. Morton, Unionist nationalism: governing urban Scotland 1830-1860 (East Lothian: 
Tuckwell Press, 1999), p. 197; and L. Paterson, 'Scotland's Parliament' in Lindsay Paterson (cd.>, A 
Diverse Assembly: The Debate on Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: EUP. 1998), p. 287. 
7 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 148. 
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Despite the build-up of Britain's own nuclear arsenal, by October 1973 the 
Kilbrandon report recommended a fonn of legislative devolution as pressure was 
sustained in the mid-1970s. During the 1974 general election the SNP won eleven 
seats and 30 per cent of the vote. Though the SSBN is not acknowledged in her book, 
Stop the World: the autobiography of Winnie EWing. could it be that the staggered yet 
speedy arrival of Polaris boats served to benefit the SNP to some extent?8 Finally, in 
1978, the government had put forward legislation to establish a Scottish Assembly.9 
Though questions with Polaris remain, Trident would not increase support for the 
SNP. 
Despite the Callaghan government's precarious situation, and considerable 
parliamentary struggle. the Scotland Act 1978 was finally realised though persistent 
complexities with the devolution process remained. According to Oxford professor 
Vernon Bogdanor, the Act failed to address the continued over-representation of 
Scotland in the Commons, the sustained retention of the Secretary for State for 
Scotland in the Cabinet and underwent the 'supreme folly' of establishing a 
legislature with the power to spend, but not tax.10 According to Harvie, there were 
fierce divisions within the Labour Party but Scottish MPs were somewhat pacified by 
a clause which made the final enactment dependent on over 40 per cent of the 
electorate voting 'Yes,.l1 Consequently, the Scotland Act's ineptitude encouraged the 
various parties to use the bill to suit their own distinct political agendas. The SNP 
employed the Act as a gateway to separation, the Liberals used it as a step to 
8 Winnie Ewing with Michael Russell, Stop the World: the autobiography of Winnie Ewing 
~Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2004). 
L. Paterson, 'Introduction' in Lindsay Paterson (ed.), A Diverse Assembly: The Debate on Scottish 
Parliament (Edinburgh: EUP, 1998), pp. 75-77. 
10 V. Bogdanor, 'The Defeat of Devolution' in Lindsay Paterson (ed.), A Diverse Assembly: The 
Debate on Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: EUP, 1998), p. 132. 
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federalism and for Labour it was purely a means in which to retain its hold on 
power. 12 After the referendum of 1 March 1979 the devolution scheme was supported 
by an uninspired 52 per cent of those voting, with this figure only accounting for 33 
per cent ofthe total electorate. 13 The Scottish Assembly was left unrealised. The 
'Scotland says No' campaign had also been successful in advertising the 'expense, 
bureaucracy, and disruption' of devolution at that time. 14 
Regardless of Callaghan's ability to distance Trident from the referendum. his 
concealment did not secure the future of the Labour government. By the end of the 
summer of 1976, 'seismic shudders' rattled the party as the British economy had 
become so fatigued that the government sought assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund. Deep cuts in public spending soon coincided with over 1,600,000 
unemployed by August 1977.15 In 1978-79, Labour unrest reached its peak during the 
'Winter of Discontent' when Callaghan hoped to keep public sector pay claims under 
five per cent. Several of the major trade unions went on strike and the collapse of the 
Social Contract became a 'devastating disappointment' for its trade union architects. 16 
Other strikes threatened. However. Callaghan was labelled as 'out of touch' after the 
famous Sun headline, 'Crisis? What Crisis?' was released, and this series of events 
struck and fatally wounded the government as the resurgent Conservatives ultimately 
succeeded in pinning the blame for the state of the country on Labour.l? Thereafter, 
the 1979 general election led to the party's downfall as Labour's relative success in 
II The 40 per cent rule that had been set by George Cunningham and Westminster as a benchmark 
standard to be crossed. Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. J 63. 
12 Bogdanor, The Defeat of Devolution, p. 132. 
13 Ibid, p. 132. 
I .. Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 165. 
15 H. Wainwright, Labour: The Tale of Two Parties (London: The Hargoath Press, 1987), p. 30. 
16 The Social Contract of the 1974-1979 Labour government was to be a combination of political 
education and trade-union action. Ibid, p. 209. 
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Scotland was eclipsed on 3 May by its colossal defeat south of the Border. Trident's 
future was guaranteed as the Conservatives maintained power for the next eighteen 
years. 
In the midst of the Cold War, Thatcher made known her detennination to maintain 
British national security, and upon her arrival to Downing Street she considered it 
'constructive' when Callaghan allowed her to observe his correspondence with Carter 
over TJ1dent. 18 However, because the Conservatives were opposed to devolution and 
believed there was no evidence to suggest that Scots sought change in their 
constitutional status, Thatcher sent shockwaves throughout the country when one of 
the first acts of her government was to repeal the Scotland ACt.19 With calls for 
greater autonomy effectively neutralised in Scotland, there may be a correlation 
between Thatcher's rejection of home rule and central government's negotiations for 
Trident with the US government. This is merely an assumption and will remain as 
such until appropriate sources throw more light on this issue. Yet while the 
suspension of home rule undoubtedly had much to do with traditional Conservative 
Party values, constitutional change in Scotland held the potential to influence an 
agreement over the system with the Americans. Arguably, political tranquillity in 
Scotland reassured the Americans of Britain's stability and this may have proved 
advantageous for central government in its pursuit of the system. Thatcher's progress 
with the deterrent option began almost immediately. 
J7 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 163; K. O. Morgan, Callaghan: A life (Oxford: OUP, 
1997). 
18 Ring. We Come Unseen, p. 161. Thatcher stated that 'my main concern in 1979 was that resistance of 
NATO to the latest Soviet threat was less adequate than I would have liked'. Thatcher intended to 
restore British self-confidence. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 238. 
19 B. Taylor, The Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1999), p. 12-29 .. 
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Although dates are unclear the investigative committee, Miscellaneous 7 (MISC 7), 
was assembled to review the various alternatives to the SSBN with the main argument 
for Trident attributed to the approaching obsolescence of the Polaris system.20 Over 
the course of some fifteen months a settlement regarding the deterrent's replacement 
was made official. 
Similar to that of Polaris, Trident represented a fonnidable, stealthy system that also 
enabled the UK to maintain cooperation with the US as it had since the 1963 Polaris 
Sales Agreement.21 With the GLCM option discarded, after December 1979 Thatcher 
concluded an agreement for Trident with Carter before he became too preoccupied 
with the 1980 presidential election.22 Without hesitation, she stated in a letter to the 
President: 
I write ... to ask you whether the United States Government would be 
prepared ... to supply on a continuing basis, Trident I missiles, equipment 
and supporting services, in a manner generally similar to that in which 
Polaris was supplied.23 
Sometime before July 1980, Carter agreed. Despite the US administration's request 
for political and financial returns, in order to replace Polaris by the mid-1990s the 
Prime Minister consented to severalless preferable conditions.24 However, soon after 
Carter's massive electoral defeat the government was forced to reconsider its previous 
arrangements as the recently established Reagan administration opted to enter full 
20 MISC 7 kept a low profile to maintain minimal leakage to the Cabinet's larger Defence and Overseas 
Committee. This was a continuation of Labour's 1978 ultra secret committee. S. McLean, How 
Nuclear Decisions Are Made (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1986), p. 46. 
21 Polaris Sales Agreement Cmnd 1995 (London: HMSO, 6 April 1963). 
22 This decision left the smaller proportion of opposition in Scotland to deal with Trident. Thatcher, 
The Downing Street Years, p. 246. 
23 Britain's Future Nuclear Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force. Defence Open Government Document 
80/23 (Ministry of Defence, July 1980). 
24 For information on these conditions see Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 246. 
151 
\ 
development with the Trident II D5 programme in November 1981. It did not take 
long before Thatcher came to the conclusion that, 'the more we considered the 
question the more it seemed that if we were to maintain a credible deterrent ... we must 
have Trident II. ,25 Under an agreement preferable to that offered by the previous 
administration, Britain entered into contract with the US to purchase the modified 
system in March 1982.26 Because Trident's sizeable fee was to be paid over the 
course of fifteen years, naval historian Jim Ring explained that many questioned 
'whether the country could afford the weapon. ,27 Nevertheless, the decision to adopt 
Trident stood. 
As discussed in Chapter Five the disarmament movement experienced a noticeable 
surge in public support during this period, with the government's political opposition 
using this opportunity to explore a number of avenues in which to challenge the 
procurement of Trident. After the summer of 1974 a small but growing unilateralist 
wing of the Labour Party was provoked by Britain's testing of a Polaris missile, yet 
several members believed there was no evidence to suggest that British disarmament 
would affect the policies of other countries.28 This split in ideologies would trouble the 
party for years to come. After the 1979 election Michael Foot replaced Callaghan as 
party leader and encouraged Labour to 'somehow ... translate anxieties and perils [with 
nuclear weapons] into the material for an election contest,.29 Yet this strategy 
amounted to little more than a political catastrophe as within the party the 'Gang of 
2' Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 247. 
26 These conditions included reduced overheads and levies. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 
248; The British Strategic Nuclear Force, Cmnd 8517 (London: HMSO, 11 March 1982) 
27 The government pledged itself, with some controversy, to match overall NATO spending. increasing 
the defence budget by three per cent annually. Trident was also considered by many as an unnecessary 
escalation of ftrepower. Ring, We Come Unseen, p. 162. 
28 Wainwright, Labour: A Tale o/Two Parties, p. 61. 
29 M. Foot, Dr. Strangelove.l Presume (London: Victor Gollancz, 1999), pp. 75-76. 
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Four' flatly rejected Labour's return to disarmament. The issue was therefore 
partially responsible for the creation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP).30 
Following the Special Labour Conference at Wembley on 2 March 1981, twelve 
Labour MPs resigned the party whip and announced that they would not seek re-
election. By April the SDP was launched with fourteen MPs, in June the SDP 
Scottish Liaison Committee was assembled and by 1983 this became the SDP Council 
for Scotland.31 Rejecting complete disarmament the party believed that only Polaris 
should be retained as 'Britain [needed] friends in a dangerous world, which means 
playing our full part in the European Community and in NATO, vigorously pursuing 
multilateral but not unilateral disarmament. ,32 With Labour left free to self-destruct, 
Dr. Gavin Strang, Labour MP for Edinburgh East, subscribed to Foot's position and 
argued that Trident represented a 'first strike weapon' that compulsorily conscripted 
the west of Scotland into the front line of 'nuclear madness', 33 The SNP concurred. 
Harvie has made it clear that 'since the 1963 conference' the SNP went left on the 
disarmament issue, with Chalmers and Walker emphasising that the party had 'drawn 
on genuine moral concerns and a long pacifist tradition in Scotland' that was 
entrenched in 'a nationalist depiction of England as Scotland's exploiter',34 The SNP 
therefore condemned Thatcher's decision and by March 1982 Donald Stewart, SNP 
30 The 'Gang of Four' involved Shirley Williams, David Owen, William Rodgers and Roy Jenkins. 
31 SOP, Focus on the Future: A strategy for innovation (London: Policy document No.22, no date), 
32 Trident was rejected and Polaris would be maintained. C. Cook, A Short History of the Liberal 
Party: /990-/997 (London: MacMillan Press, 1998) p. 168; I. Bradley, Breaking the mould? The Birth 
and Prospects of the Social Democratic Party (Oxford: Martin Robertson Press, 1981). p. 123. 
33 For more on Trident's offensive capabilities see M. Dando and P. Rodgers, The Death of Deterrence 
(London: CND Publications, 1984); The UK Trident Programme, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
Vo121 Col 21, 8 April 1982. 
34 The party also went left on land nationalisation, with both baving value in directing its campaigns. C. 
Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994 (London: Routeledge Press, 
1994), p. 176, 199. Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 23. 
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MP for the Western Isles, prophesised that the government would 'face massive 
opposition' in Scotland.35 This assumption never fully materialised. 
Thatcher, being both shrewd and unwavering, understood that Scots had learned to 
live with Polaris and would eventually do so with its successor, especially in the midst 
of economic depression. Consequently, for the next five years the Conservatives sold 
Trident to Scotland not on the merits of security, but through the promise of financial 
gain. In mid-March 1982, Bill Walker, former Scottish Affairs Select Committee 
Member, suggested that Trident 'excited' Scotland with 'Scottish engineers given the 
opportunity to participate in the work at Coulport'. Furthermore, Sir Russell 
Fairgrieve. Conservative MP for Aberdeenshire West, defended the system's 
technological superiority over that of Polaris by arguing that the British infantry did 
not restrict themselves to 'single repeater rifles upon the arrival of the machine gun' .36 
Yet this is not to suggest that the government was oblivious to the controversy in 
Scotland. According to the Glasgow Herald, during her first public endorsement for 
her Falklands recovery strategy at the Scottish Conservative Centenary Conference at 
Perth Thatcher went about 'substituting a controversial motion that supported Trident' 
with a patriotic endorsement of the British response to the Argentinean invasion in 
May 1982.37 Coinciding with the development of Defence Secretariat 19 (DS 19), a 
special unit inside the Ministry of Defence designed to counter CND influence, 
Conservative propaganda, combined with economic hardship, ultimately succeeded in 
suppressing a considerable degree of anxiety with the system in Scotland.38 Perhaps in 
part due to the discernible absence of civil unrest from Strathc1yde and Fife territories, 
3S The UK Tridentprogramme, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 21 Col 47·50, 8 April 1982. 
36 The UK Trident Programme, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 21 Co129, 29 March 1982. 
37 GH. 13 May 1982. 
38 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. 
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by June 1983 Callaghan also appreciated the stamina of Scottish rationalisation and 
warned his Labour colleagues that disannament was a 'dead issue' for the 
electorate.39 
Political scientist James Mitchell has explained that 'opponents of home rule argued 
that it was possible to be culturally Scottish but politically British', but this should not 
imply that Britain's desire to defend itself through Trident, or its victory in the 
Falklands, bolstered this sentiment.4o Nor should the Falklands campaign suggest a 
swing towards the Conservatives in Scotland. Before the Falklands invasion of April 
1982, the Hillhead by-election was won by Roy Jenkins of the SDP. This was a 
symbolic victory as it was the last Conservative seat held in Glasgow, Scotland's 
largest population component. There was considerable support in Scotland for the 
SDP, and along with the Liberals they took 2S per cent of the Scottish popular vote in 
the 1983 general election.41 Furthennore, some Scottish Labour MPs and many of 
their constituents were less enthusiastic about the war than the 'flag-waving jingoists' 
in England, not least the patriotic overtones exploited by the Conservatives.42 
Nevertheless, at a British level disannament policies proved to be a dismal failure for 
the political left despite the fact that Polaris did not deter Argentinian aggression. 
Throughout the remainder of the UK the conflict in the South Atlantic clearly 
demonstrated that Trident was essential for British security, and its interests, both 
home and abroad, thereby discrediting those parties that chose to abandon the 
deterrent. In Scotland, and in Strathc1yde and Fife particularly, the Trident issue 
39 This should not imply that Scots were enamoured with either Trident or the jobs it provided. GH, 30 
June 1983, p. 1. 
40 The Scots Guards served in the Falklands campaign. The identity issue is examined in greater detail 
in Chapter Four. J. Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government (Edinburgh: Polygon Press, 1996), p. 26. 
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experienced an economic twist as it was transformed into a simple question of 
employment. However, the Falklands was a matter far less volatile in Scotland than 
Trident at that time, and it is this that explains Thatcher's strategy in Perth. Yet the 
nuclear issue itself was becoming a topic of lesser importance, even in Scotland. 
Though central government promoted the system as a vehicle for economic returns, in 
1983 a majority of Scots sided with Labour despite the party's opposition to the 
system, and the jobs it ultimately supported. This was another sign of Trident's 
fading potency north of the Border. When the party reversed its policy on 
disannament, as will be seen, both Strathclyde and Fife remained Labour strongholds 
between 1983 and 1997 regardless of this deviation.43 Moreover, when given the 
opportunity to elect the first Scottish Parliament in nearly 300 years, Scots reiterated 
their support for Labour despite the fact that they were granted yet another institution 
in which they were able to voice their opposition to the system. Despite the initial 
success of the disannament movement, after the Secretary of State for Scotland 
approved the Trident Works Programme the political impact of Trident should not be 
exaggerated. 
It came as little surprise that the SNP's 1983 manifesto again emphasised concerns 
with Scottish nuclear bases and military installations, and Labour's manifesto, later 
described by Labour MP Gerald Kaufman as 'the longest suicide note in history', also 
., H. Drucker, 'The Curious Incident: Scottish Party Competition Since 1979' in D. McCrone (cd.), 
The Scottish Government Yearbook. 1983 (Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Govemment in Scotland, 
1982), p. 18 . 
• 2 P. Routeledge, Gordon Brown: the biography (London: Simon and Schuster UK, 1998), p. 99. 
43 Both retained a high percentage of employees at Faslane and Rosyth. C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, 
New Britain: New Elections. the media guide to the new political map o/Britain (London: Vacher Dod 
Publishing, 1999), p. 68,74. 
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pledged to 'cancel Trident,.44 Because Labour was a political heavyweight in 
Scotland it serves as yet another indicator of the identity dimension, but from a UK 
perspective the party was, according to Thatcher, by this time associated with 'high 
tax' and a 'host of other irresponsible policies' .45 However, Trident's controversial 
status led to an over-abundance ofidentical disarmament policies throughout the 
1980s. Though this was of little consequence in Scotland, it presented an 
unfavourable situation for the major parties as it ultimately cornered the British 
electorate. The CPGB had also remained opposed to the SSBN since the earliest days 
of Polaris, the Green Party went as far as stating, 'No nuclear weapons of any 
description', and the new Social and Liberal Democrat Alliance, headed jointly by 
Liberal David Steel and Social Democrat Roy Jenkins, supported the 'cancellation of 
Trident and the inclusion of Polaris in disarmament negotiations,.46 Of six distinct 
parties, and to the government's advantage, the British electorate was left with two 
simple alternatives when considering British security. After the 1983 general 
election, the Conservatives attained a clear majority with 397 seats within the 
Commons as Labour's position slipped a further sixty from 1979. The Liberal-SDP 
Alliance, curtailed by the first-past-the-post voting system, took twenty-three, and the 
44 SNP, Choose Scotland: The Challenge of Independence. 1983 General Election manifesto, p. 10; The 
New Hope For Britain: Labour's manifesto /983 (London: Labour Party, 1983); Foot, Dr Sfrange/ove, 
E· 75. 
S Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 290. 
46 The CPGB was not good at looking after its records and the interest of historians was not at the 
forefront of the minds of party officials. Limited information was available over the course of this 
research. Interview with Willie Thompson, Visiting Professor at Northumbria University (20/02/2003). 
The Green Party was very much a minority party in electoral terms, numbering only 6,000 members in 
the mid-1980s. The Liberal Party was traditionally opposed to Britain's possession of nuclear 
weaponry. P. Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 206. The 
Liberal Party agreed to work with the SOP to construct a winning manifesto for the 1983 General 
Election. Liberal SOP Alliance, Working Together for Britain: Programme for Government, /983 
Liberal SDP Alliance Manifesto (London, published for Liberal SOP Alliance by SOP, 1983); The 
Liberal Democrats: A Short History (policy briefing 40), February 2001, p. 1 
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'inexperience that cost the SNP nine MPs in 1979' led to internal conflict that 
contributed to another poor result in 1983.47 
During the Cold War era central government benefited from the disannament policies 
of its opposition as the Labour Party and others failed to appreciate the weakened 
state of this issue both in Scotland and throughout the wider UK. With Scottish 
unemployment standing at 14.9 per cent in 1984 Harvie has written extensively on the 
decline of traditional industry in the 1980s. Therefore, it is apparent that the 
acquisition of Trident was considered by many to be an appropriate security measure, 
and a lifeline for the civilian employees ofCoulport, Faslane and Rosyth.48 So much 
so that the May 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and the wave of radiological contamination 
that spread across Western Europe, did little to discourage these workers from 
maintaining the deterrent though another line ofwork was often preferred.49 Yet 
advocates for disannament often argued that the system was merely a source of short-
term employment in Scotland, fostered through wrongful proliferation. At that time 
Labour subscribed to this assumption, but Neil Kinnock, once described as a man who 
'brought to his constituency a breath of ... CND, of sit-ins and of demonstrations 
against Vietnam and apartheid', inherited a shattered party with serious divisions over 
the system. so Changes were in order, but with Labour struggling to gain political 
credibility central government was able to plough through the Town and Country 
47 I. Crewe, The British electorate 1963-1 98 7: a compendium of data from the British election studies 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1991); Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes. p. 179; David Owen retained his 
Plymouth Devonport seat, being elected for the first time as an SOP MP. Roy Jenkins resigned the 
Party leadership following the election, and David Owen was elected without contest as Party Leader. 
David Owen Papers (Liverpool University, Special Collections and Archives), SOP Records 1981. 
1990,07093; I. Crewe, The British electorate 1963-1987. 
48 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 168.; AESG, Polaris anti Trident, p. 32. 
49 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 168. 
50 Ibid, p. 179. R. Harris, The Making of Neil Kinnock (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 18. Kinnock 
stripped away opposition to council house sales, of threatening withdrawal from the European 
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Planning (Scotland) Act of 1972. the law of planning in Scotland and the demands of 
Strathclyde councils as the Trident Works Programme was approved in March 1985.51 
The opposition was clearly in a state of paralysis. 
To some extent it was the government's intention to offer economic assistance to 
Strathclyde and Fife Regions through Trident, and while Thatcher described Mikhail 
Gorbachevas someone with whom she could 'do business', this did not prevent the 
Conservatives from effectively promoting a system that was designed to annihilate his 
country. 52 In 1985 the nationalists initiated a study into non-nuclear uses for Faslane 
and Rosyth, but in May 1986 the Ministry of Defence unveiled a £220 million Trident 
modernisation programme for the Dockyard.53 With local economies in dire need of 
investment, these regions were receptive to such programmes and studies that did not 
apply to the immediate future were of little interest. This general consensus failed to 
discourage either the disannament movement or the political left, and the 
Conservatives, capitalising on this misinterpretation of the public's demeanour, were 
relentless in their propaganda. In 1985 Sir Hector Monro, Conservative MP for 
Dumfries, insisted that 50.000 jobs could have been lost in Scotland if the system was 
not implemented. 54 Michael Forsyth. Conservative MP for Stirling, also warned in 
October 1986 that thousands of jobs would be lost in Scotland if Trident was 
Community, and import controls as answers to economic affliction. BBC News, Bitter fight to a new 
dawn, http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilin_depthluk-politicsl2000/Iabour_centenary/645202.stm 
51 Planning law stated that special inquiry should be performed with 'considerations ofoational and 
regional importance' and when 'unfamiliar technical or scientific aspects' are involved with a proposed 
development. E. Young, The Law of Planning in Scotland (Glasgow: Hodge, 1978), p. 63; Trident 
development (Clyde), Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 27 Col 265-272, July 5 1982. 
52 This was an unprecedented public accolade from her for any Soviet official. Dobrynin. In 
Confidence, p. 560. 
53 SNP 1985 SNP Annual Conference, Resolution 29. According to George Younger the Rosyth project 
would provide for 700 construction jobs during the earliest stages and rise to 1100 at its peak. GH,2 
May 1986, p. 1. 
54 Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vo182 Col 169, July 1985; Trident, Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard), Vol 78 Col 509, 10 May 1985. 
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cancelled, including work at the Ravenscraig plant which supplied steel for the 
Vanguard class.55 There are numerous examples of this calculated message. 56 
However, these admonitions did not prevent Kinnock from again pushing forward the 
fatal concept that the deterrent could be quickly dismantled by a Labour government 
in December 1986, while the National Peace Advisory Committee of the CPGB found 
a non-nuclear defence policy to be an 'absolute priority'. 57 Neither sentiment nurtured 
political success. 
The rationalisation that accompanied the Scottish public's willingness to accept 
opportunities afforded by the system did not necessarily translate into support for the 
Conservatives themselves. The Conservatives had already lost electoral ground since 
1979 and Thatcher's vicious attack on state dependency came as a rude awakening in 
Scotland because her policies on the state's role in economic regeneration came to be 
perceived as 'an attack on Scotland itself .58 Though the government maintained a 
comfortable hold on power with forty-two percent of the British vote after the 1987 
election, the Scottish Conservatives suffered tremendously as they tumbled from 
twenty-one seats to ten that year. 59 Consequently, support for a Scottish Assembly 
was sustained as many had by this time rejected the implications ofThatcherism. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s Trident had become less of a defence/nuclear issue in 
Scotland and more of an economic question. This was a hard lesson for the political 
55 Ravenscraig died through the rationalization programme for privatized British steel. Harvie. No Gods 
and Precious Few Heroes, p. 169; Labour statistics, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 102 Col 
1151, October 1986. 
56Trident, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol 113 Col 145, 24 March 1987. 
57 GH, 10 June 1986, p. 2; GCUA Labour, the bomb and Europe: A discus.rion paper I.uued by the 
National Peace Advisory Committee o/the Communist Party, CPGB Scottish Committee Archive 
W,ucJear Issues Folder). 
8 D. McCrone, 'Thatcherism in a Cold Climate' in Lindsay Paterson (ed.), A Diverse Assembly: The 
Debate on Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: EUP, 1998), p. 207. 
59 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 179. 
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left to learn, one that took Labour and the SDP-Liberal Alliance nearly a decade to 
master and an issue that other parties intentionally disregarded. 
Trident arrives, the Cold War thaws 
Historian David Miller has stated that 'the Cold War does not have two convenient 
dates to mark its start and finish'. Yet it is reasonable to suggest that the opening of 
the Border separating Western and Eastern Germany on 9 November 1989, followed 
by the Supreme Soviet's break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 26 
December 1991, were solid indicators of its conclusion.60 Despite the absence ofa 
clear timetable, within a global context the threat ofnucIear exchange rapidly 
subsided and it was this crucial factor that allowed for an incalculable degree of 
Scottish concerns with the utilisation andlor retaliation with Trident to rest. The 
presence of Polaris had already outlived its controversy in Scotland, and Trident's 
situation became increasingly untroubled as time progressed. By this time The 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly published A Claim of Right for Scotland, and, of 
limited interest to most Scots, Labour's StrathcIyde European MP, Hugh McMahon. 
challenged the widening ofRhu Narrows for Trident's passage though 'the European 
Union ... did not strive to have a common defence and security policy. ,61 Finally. the 
disannament movement questioned Trident's purpose in the post-Cold War era, 
defence spending was drastically reduced and the Conservative government had 
undergone a change in leadership. All these events had no impact on the Trident issue 
whatsoever. 
60 There is much academic speculation as to when the Cold War actually ended. The break-up resulted 
in eleven of the twelve republics forming the Commonwealth of the Independent States. Miller, The 
Cold War, p. xiv. 
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A growing number of residents no longer actively opposed the presence of nuclear 
weapons in Scottish lochs, though a principled opposition to the Trident system was 
sustained. In October 1990 Thatcher postponed the purchase of fourteen Trident 
missiles for budgetary purposes, but after the Poll Tax replaced the rates in Scotland 
in April 1988 she was dislodged from power in November 1990.62 According to The 
Times, the change in premiership implied nothing for the Vanguard class as John 
Major considered it 'geopolitical folly' to hinder Trident's progress, emphasising that 
'Trident is the minimum defence we need in this country and we must maintain 
Trident,.63 Furthermore, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, like 
that of the Falklands War, again tested the UK's defence posture against 'reality 
rather than hypothesis', and though the government proposed reductions in defence 
spending the Options for Change defence review excluded Trident from its 
considerations.64 The Scottish reaction to most of these developments was apathetic, 
and this assumption is corroborated through yet further evidence.6s When the US 
Polaris fleet withdrew from the Holy Loch on 5 November 1991 StrathcJyde residents 
remained uninspired. Furthermore, the government's decision to order its fourth and 
61 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 180. COlTespondence with Hugh McMahon, former 
European MP for Strathclyde, (01/11102). 
62 FT, 1 October 1990, p. 3. Thatcher decided to replace the rating system of local taxes (based on the 
value ofa house) with Community Charge (based on each adult resident in a house) in Scotland first. 
This became known as the poll tax due to people becoming suspicious that the Electoral register would 
be used for the purposes of collecting this tax. It was perceived as shifting the tax burden from the rich 
to the poor. Enforcement measures were thought to be draconian, unrest mounted and culminated in a 
number of riots. In London on 31 March 1990 300,000 protestors took to the streets and resulted in a 
successful leadership challenge by Michael Heseltine. See: D. Butler, Failure in Br;ti.~h government: 
the politics o/the poll tax (Oxford: OUP, 1994). 
63 FT, 7 October 1991, p. 1; IT, 21 December 1990, p. 1. 
64 The Government was insistent that Options for Change was a process rather than a one-off review. It 
began with an analysis of the strategic environment which was not disclosed to Parliament. R. 
Mottram, 'Options for Change: Process and Prospects', RUSI Journal, Spring 1991, pp 22-24; Third 
Report, Options/or Change: The Royal Navy, paras 40 and 41, HC 266 of Session 1991-92. 
65 Despite this statement, it should be noted that the war in Kuwait was much more popular in Scotland 
than the Falklands. 
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final Trident SSBN stirred few emotions in Scotland though it left the British 
submarine scene vigorous.66 
With minor complication the easing of tension between East and West, the ousting of 
the Scottish Conservatives and substantial progress with Trident permitted both 
Labour and the recently established Liberal Democrat Party to rescind their former 
policies on Trident. Kinnock maintained control of Labour after 1987, with Harvie 
noting that the party underwent a drastic 'modernisation' after it completely 
abandoned unilateralism.67 By 1989 the project had consumed millions in taxpayer's 
contributions, and after Conservative seats in Scotland plummeted in 1987 it left 
Kinnock secure in his decision to strip away disarmament and other policies that had 
continued to repel voters.68 Kinnock's reversal was also based on an appraisal ofa 
changing world, and he understood that Trident became an issue of questionable 
importance to the wider UK electorate as it was economic policy, not defence, which 
was hurting the Conservatives most. Though the party in Scotland consistently 
maintained a symbolic non-nuclear defence policy to appease its followers, at some 
point Labour would have to convince the trade unions of this reversal. Nevertheless, 
while the Conservatives opened up a new line of attack on a leader who would 
abandon a deeply held belief like disarmament, another party also made revisions. 
By March 1988 the Liberal-SOP Alliance had dropped joint leadership and had 
become the Liberal Democrat Party, led by Paddy Ashdown, former Royal Marine 
66 'Britain's submarine builders in the post Cold War era', Naval Forces: International Fonlm/or 
Maritime Power (No. V/1992 Vol XII), p. 40. 
67 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 180. 
68 Kinnock also created workable economic, health care, and environment policies. BBC News, Bitter 
fight to a new dawn, see: 
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi1in_depthluk-POliticsl2000/1abour_centenary1645202.stm 
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officer-turned-MP for Y eovil. 69 Launched with 'nineteen MPs, a claim of 3,500 
councillors, a declared membership of 100,000' and positioned to become the third 
largest third party in Britain, it supported the Scottish Constitutional Convention and 
was on the verge of breaking new ground in Scotland.7o After the party exploited a 
number of local issues during the 1990 by-election they seized Kincardine and 
Deeside on a swing vote of 11.4 per cent. They also experienced little, if any, 
uneasiness when it was announced that Trident should not be equipped with greater 
firepower than its predecessor. 71 The Trident issue had by this time become an 
unrevivable topic for the Scottish electorate, and while both had made the transition 
from complete disarmament the SNP adjusted, the Greens held and the CPGB 
dissolved. 
Appreciating the state of the disarmament issue, the SNP was forced to take a more 
practical approach to Trident by emphasising the system's impact on everyday life 
through its massive cost and direct consequences to civil service.72 In October 1991 
Alex Salmond, SNP leader and MP for Banff and Buchan, explained that the Scottish 
share of savings from cancelling the project could have constructed' 12,000 new 
69 Throughout the merger negotiations there was much disagreement between the two panies; however 
a policy statement was finally released on 18 January 1988 and on 23 January the Liberal Pany Special 
Assembly at Blackpool voted by a large majority for the merger to go ahead. At the SOP Sheffield 
conference the Campaign for Social Democracy urged members not to attempt to block the vote. The 
Alliance elected a new leader, Paddy Ashdown, at the end of July 1988. Both panics were weakened in 
the following years by a failure to come to electoral agreement in fighting Parliamentary by-elections, 
local elections and European Parliamentary elections. David Owen Papers. 0709 3. 
70 Chalmers and Walker. Uncharted Waters, p. 30; Cook, A Short History o/the Liheral Party. p. 20 I 
71 IT, 28 February 1992. p. 1. One issue the Liberal Democrats exploited was the threat to the Gordon 
Highlanders as a result of defence cuts. Cook, A Short History o/the Liberal Parry. p. 207. 
72 Colin Campbell, SNP defence spokesman. explained that 'one has to recognise that they [the 
electorate J probably gave more attention to health. education, etc. when they went to vote. than to 
Trident' and that 'the public had a perception in the 1980s that Trident was I necessary evil, and turned 
their backs on it.' Security was indeed a factor in Scotland but evidence suggests that employment was 
the primary issue of concern. Correspondence with Colin Campbell. SNP defence spokesman 
(17/04/02). After Labour reversed its policy on Trident the nationalists considered this as an 
'unprincipled' and 'opportunistic' approach to defence policy. 1988 SNP AMual Conference. 
Resolution 20. 
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homes, 16 new hospitals and 177 new schools' ,73 In its 1992 manifesto the party 
continued with its conscientious stance by explaining that it 'would not tolerate 
Scottish waters being used as dumping grounds for weapons of mass destruction'. 74 
Salmond had also temporarily resuscitated the constitutional issue, but in regards to 
Trident the thousands of employees at Coulport, Faslane and Rosyth, unresponsive to 
speculation, understood that these new hospitals and schools came at the expense of 
Scotland's defence industry, and, more importantly, their own livelihood.7s Those 
parties seeking to decommission the system apparently failed to appreciate the 
influence of industrial politics and were interpreted as a threat to the thousands of 
families who relied on Scotland's role in the defence industry. Thus. the SNP 
remained in limbo while the situation for Labour and the Liberal Democrats showed 
some improvement. 
With its Trident policy in no urgent need of attention the Liberal Democrats secured 
twenty seats in 1992 as Ashdown guided the party to its best general election result 
since the Liberal Party's success in 1935. The party was also able to move forward 
with a more radical programme for government in the run up to the 1997 election.76 
However, despite consistent objections from its Scottish contributors, Labour was 
noticeably reserved about its recent deviation in policy. Tucked away in the back of 
its 1992 manifesto, it just briefly mentioned that it would 'retain Britain's nuclear 
73 Her majesty's most gracious speech, Parliamentary debates (Hansard), Vol 198 Col 908, 31 October 
1991. 
74 SNP,lndependence in Europe: Make il happen now: 1991 General Election m{lni/e.~to (Edinburgh: 
SNP,1992). 
75 Trident was a secure form of employment and residents were generally satisfied with Ministry of 
Defence and UKAEA safety precautions, tolerating the risks that came with a nuclear defence strategy. 
The current situation at Dounreay in Caithness is a prime example of this. 
76 In 1992 the party had twenty seats. While Labour moved to the political centre with reformed 
economic polices and multilateral disarmament, one of the Liberal Democrats key policies, to raise 
income tax by 1 p on the pound to pay for education, was in stark contrast to Labour's pledge not to 
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capability, with the number of warheads no greater than the present total'. 77 Kinnock 
transformed policy-making structures and used new techniques in his campaigns but 
the party only remained in front of the Conservatives until Thatcher's downfall. 
Following the election of John Major as leader, a fourteen-point Labour lead in the 
November 1990 'Poll of Polls' became an eight-point Conservative lead in 
December.78 Labour only gained a modest forty seats in 1992 while the SNP's vote 
rose to 22 per cent with the nationalists picking up 'no marginals' and 'still far behind 
Labour in the central beJt,.79 Although Scotland again sided with Labour the 
Conservatives managed to seize another five years in power, but because John 
Major's ephemeral popularity was generally attributed to the intense loathing of 
Thatcher, his government was seen more as a change in style ifnot in substance. 
When HMS Vanguard arrived at Faslane it encountered little public hostility, but by 
the summer of 1993 the long-term employment that Trident was supposed to provide 
had failed to materialise for the Dockyard in Fife. The basic detenninant that 
originally validated its presence in Scotland experienced drastic transfonnation. As 
has already been discussed in the Strathclyde chapter, in September 1982 central 
government's decision to surrender Trident's missile fitting and servicing 
responsibilities to the US Navy cancelled 1,500 jobs in Strathclyde. Yet thousands of 
jobs still remained. As has also been mentioned in Chapter Two, Rosyth received 
several confirmations of its responsibilities from Conservative governments but this 
did not prevent the relocation of services to England. This time thousands of jobs 
were lost. According to Dr. Alasdair Allan, Parliamentary Assistant to Alex Salmond, 
raise earnings related tax. C. Cook, A short history o/the Liberal Party /900-200/ (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 2002), p. 211. 
77 lIs time to get Britain working again: Labour's 1992 manifesto (London: Labour Party, 1992), p. 19. 
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the SNP assumed that if Scottish shores and waterways accommodated the system 
then the country should also retain most of the employment Trident was able to 
provide.80 Initial plans for refits never materialised, and though it was one condition 
within the unspecified contract between the Thatcher government and Scotland, it 
appeared that circumstances beyond anyone's controlled to painful adaptations. 
After more than a decade of intense controversy the sales pitch had collapsed, with 
those in Scotland left to host Trident for significantly less employment than original 
estimates suggested. In a cruel twist of fate, Fife interest groups that employed 
hypothetical formulas similar to that of the SNP also failed to realise that their own 
analysis would not apply to their immediate future. Though the end of the Cold War 
was unpredictable, Rosyth's experience did not elevate interest with Trident but it did 
serve to vilify the Conservatives and increase demands for a Scottish Assembly. 
In the run-up to the 1997 general election the SNP appeared to be gaining momentum 
as the Trident issue threatened to re-arm itself. By May 1994 the government was 
forced to contemplate the days ofChevaline before an attempt to kill Trident in the 
US House of Representatives was defeated 226-169.81 However, in September 1995 
the SNP assumed that the international climate dictated a sensible reduction in 
Trident's capabilities with Salmond arguing that monies spent on an improved 
National Health Service (NHS) was preferable to funds being wasted on a system 
with no obvious targets.82 Initiating a political firestorm the party wandered into 
hostile territory when it began to question Scotland's role in NATO and the 
78 See E. A. Reitan, Tory radicalism: Margaret Thatcher. John Major and the tran.if(>rmation of 
modern Britain 1979-1997 (Oxford: Rowan Littlefield Press, 1997). 
79 Railings and Thrasher, New Britain New Elections, p. 37; Harvie. Scotland and NOlionali.vm. p. 205. 
80 Correspondence with Dr Alasdair Allan, Parliamentary Assistant to Alexander Salmond ( 16/05103); 
Dockyards, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Co14S7 Vo1227, 24 June 1993. 
81 See Introduction; TT, 21 May 1994, p. 2. 
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composition of a Scottish Defence Force. Andrew Findlay, Scottish Conservative 
defence spokesperson, countered the SNP's anti-Trident sentiment in April 1996 by 
arguing that without the system there would be 'no defence industry and no defence 
jobs,.83 In another attempt to rouse Scottish concerns Menzies Campbell further 
condemned nationalist policy by arguing that 'the best you could say for the SNP 
proposals was that they might make sure more troops were available for the military 
tattoo during the Edinburgh festival'. 84 The nationalists had been brutally dissected 
over its defence policies, and employment issues remained. Yet their critics did not 
anticipate the July 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling which stated that 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons violated humanitarian law.83 Did thirty-three 
years of unilateral policy finally begin to bring dividends for the SNP? A moral 
victory for the nationalists, Greens and the disarmament movement, it will be 
illustrated that this historic verdict implied little in terms of votes but certainly served 
as an embarrassment for central government and those parties recently convinced of 
Trident's applicability. Quandaries with local government, privatisation and other 
economic policies placed Major's premiership under fire. However, in the shadow of 
the ICJ verdict there may be at least some correlation between his visit to Faslane in 
August 1996 to preside over the decommissioning ofHMS Repulse, the first delivery 
of Trident warheads and the return of the Stone of Scone that November.86 
82 SNP A. Salmond, Address to the 61 11 Annual National Conference, Perth City Halls, 22 September 
1995. 
83 Much like Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland the SNP's policy on NATO was that they would not 
contribute as long as it maintained a nuclear strategy. TS, 5 April 1996, p. 2. 
84 TS, 5 April 1996, p. 1. 
85 See Chapter Five and 1. Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an IntiE'pendent Scottish Defence Force: 
Occasional Paper No. I (The Scottish Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow. 1998). 
86 HMS Repulse was a Polaris submarine; Trident became the national deterrent. Harvie, No Goels ancl 
Precious Few Heroes, p. 181. 
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Trident and the Scottish Parliament 
After eighteen years of Conservative rule the Labour Party was again returned to 
power in 1997, but by this time Trident's role in British security was assured. Earlier 
on the unforeseen death of party leader John Smith in 1994 left Tony B lair to 
challenge the trade unions and complete the party's burial of disarmament, which he 
did successfully. Liberal Democrat Menzies Campbell, Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Spokesperson, also argued that the national deterrent 'could function at a reduced 
level of readiness' .87 By this time the Commons had become well stocked with 
Trident's advocates, with the Major government crushed after the 1997 general 
election by losing an astounding 171 seats, taking only 30.7 per cent of the vote.88 
Winning a total of 418 seats, it was Labour's attacks on issues such as Conservative 
divisions over Europe and its promise of a referendum on Scottish devolution that had 
more to do with Major's defeat rather than the solitary issue of Trident.89 In Scotland 
alone, Labour was also able to manage a commanding fifty-six seats.Q() Phil Gallie, 
Conservative MSP for the south of Scotland, believed that Trident was not a 'factor in 
the loss of support for the Tories', though Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute 
for Disarmament Diplomacy asserted that 'the Conservatives inability to provide a 
87 See Chapter Four: Civil Society and Public Opinion. Disarmament had left John Smith with 
unpleasant memories and Conservative MPs had challenged him on employment provided by the 
nuclear deterrent. A. McSmith. John Smith: A Life /938-/994 (London: Mandarin Press. 1994). p. 177. 
Liberal Democrats: A Short History. p. 2. Libera) Democrat Party, Shartd Sf'curiry (Policy Paper No. 
6.1994), p. 4. 
88 RaIlings and Thrasher, New Britain New Elections, p. 31. 
89 Personal scandals before their campaign and the government's record also did not assist the 
Conservatives in 1997. RaUings and Thrasher, New Britain New ElectiOns, p. 37; Harvie, No Gods and 
Precious Few Heroes, p. 182. 
90 Railings and Thrasher, New Britain New Elections, p. 31. 
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stance [on Trident]', left the party flustered by its inability to 'monitor the pulse of the 
voting public,.91 Historians would likely favour Gallie's assumption. 
By this time some Liberal Democrats believed there was no reason to maintain 
Trident as a status symbol. However, this should not imply a willingness to 
decommission as their 1997 manifesto pledged to 'retain Britain's basic nuclear 
capability ... [and] restrict the number of nuclear warheads ... to the same number as 
previously deployed on Polaris' .92 Like Labour, a minority share of Liberal Democrat 
MPs, and, eventually MSPs, openly opposed Trident but by this time current policy 
had assisted the party in doubling its numbers. Winning forty-six seats in the 
Commons, it was the highest number won by a third party since 1926.93 Still, 
complete disarmament had its champions. The SNP rejected Labour's devolution 
scheme in 1997, as a Scottish Assembly would be powerless to remove either Trident 
from the Clyde or expended submarines from Rosyth.94 The Scottish Green Party was 
also 'fundamentally opposed to the billions of pounds wasted' on Trident, but the 
SNP's manifesto promised to negotiate a 'phased but complete' withdrawal of Trident 
and planned to invest these savings in conventional defence, health and education.95 
91 Interview with Phil Gallie, Conservative MSP for the south of Scotland (16/04/02). Johnson, R., 
British Perspectives on the future of Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Centre, 
1998), p. 12. 
92 Liberal Democrat Party, Make the Difference: The 1997 General Election. After 1999 the Liberal 
Democrats emphaSised that Trident should be open to review. Liberal Democrat Party, Global 
Response to Global Problems (Policy Paper 35, 2000), p. 7: W. Wallace, Why vote Liht'rtll Dt'mocrat 
~London: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 112 
3 Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 40; C. Cook, A short history o/the Liheral Party 1900· 
2001, p. 211. 
94 This was only one of several reasons. SNP, Bestfor Scotland: A Real Scottish Parliament (August 
1996), p. 4. 
95 The Greens would decommission Trident immediately if given the opportunity. Also see Nucl(Iar 
'Triple Whammy'facing Scotland (SNP Archives), 27 December 1996; Green Party Executive 
members join SNP - Party offers best way forwardfor Scotland (SNP Archives), 17 December 1996; 
The SNP believed that phased withdrawal allowed for the transition from the nuclear defence industry 
to an alternative source of employment. SNP, Yes we can win the bestfor Scotland: the SNP Gt'nc.'ral 
Election Manifesto 1997; Scottish Green Party Election Manifesto, Scolland's Future: Green of Grey? 
(Edinburgh: 13 February 1997). 
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The nationalists gained two seats and only slightly elevated their vote in 1997, but 
they were now second to Labour in Scotland. With the Scottish Parliament on the 
foreseeable horizon they intended to pursue the Trident issue, and Labour's track 
record on disannament, to the fullest extent.96 The results were questionable. 
Labour's 1997 manifesto promised to readdress the Scottish constitutional question 
although some Scots MPs believed that a Labour victory should be mandate enough 
to deliver the Parliament, as the SNP did not represent a tactical vote with a majority 
of Scots voting Labour in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992. The referendum was therefore 
one of the first acts of the Blair government, and on 11 September 1997 the result 
demonstrated that devolution was indeed the settled will of the Scottish people. A 
total of74.3 per cent voted for the Parliament and 63.5 per cent endorsed its tax-
varying powers, indicating that both the middle and professional classes who had 
been so doubtful in 1979 were now convinced otherwise.97 Years of antipathy to 
Thatcherism and Conservative rule strengthened this sentiment, with the proportion of 
support effectively silencing any opposition. Either a political masterstroke on 
Labour's behalf, or pure coincidence, the system was not permitted to be a factor in 
1979 and the party took confidence from Scottish disinterest with Trident as the bill 
was published in mid-December 1997.98 However, though some have claimed that 
Trident was 'an embarrassment' for the party due to its previous record on 
disannament, after Scotland confirmed its desire for greater autonomy Defence 
Secretary George Robertson emphasised that there would be no return to the 
96 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 182. 
97 Ibid.,p. 182. Also see C. Harvie and P. Jones, The road to home rule: Images o/Scotland's C(luse 
~Edinburgh: Polygon Press, 2000) 
8 Ibid., p. 183. 
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'unilateralism that kept Labour out of power' for so many years.99 Comfortable with 
its decisions and certainly aware that a solid majority of Scots still rejected 
independence, elections for the resurrected Parliament were scheduled for 6 May 
1999. 
Given the extraordinary nature of SSBN and SLBM systems it was understandable 
that central government would exert absolute control over their deployment and 
usage, even if that strained relations with Scotland. Yet in the public's eye, nuclear 
disarmament often meant taking the 'Great' out of Britain, just as the public was 
sometimes convinced that possession of Trident could somehow put it back in. 1OO 
Therefore, the intensity of the nuclear weapons question often varied according to the 
international climate and the state of the British economy, with Trident generally 
considered a necessary component of national security, foreign policy, spending plans 
and employment. However, because central government frequently linked the system 
to jobs, most notably in Scotland, there was a limited impetus for its removal either in 
times of war or peace. Trident was perceived as a provider of sorts. It deterred 
aggression, but it also put food on the table. Under these circumstances, those 
politicians that tolerated Trident often chose to remain inconspicuous, and those 
opposed to the system were reluctant to tamper with the issue. Therefore. ifhandled 
carefully the personal consequences for Scotland's politicians remained minimal, but 
in certain instances it also provided astonishing career opportunities. 
99 M. Mort, Building the Trident Network: A Study 0/ the Enrolment 0/ People. Knowll!dge and 
Machines (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), p. 1; TI,3 October 1997, p. 2 
100 Wainwright, Labour: The Taleo/Two Parties, p. 81. 
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From 1959-1964, the Polaris programme coincided with the first phase of 
Conservative decline. This was a time when CND swept like muirburn through 
Scottish secondary schools and the 'baby-boomer' generation rapidly evolved, either 
for or against. 101 However, because the system embodied a highly divisive issue, a 
number of Labour politicians attempted to place themselves midway between the 
Labour left and the Conservative right. Arguably, former party leader John Smith laid 
the groundwork for the prototypical Labour politician of the 1990s. When 
considering Polaris nearly two decades earlier he is quoted as saying that there were 
'hawks who think that no cuts should be made' to Polaris, and 'doves who want to 
make cuts for the sake of cuts'. Smith did not know 'what species of bird is halfway 
between a hawk and a dove', but he fancied the posture 'of that bird' .102 After its 
transition from left to centre, Labour's lengthy stumble into the middle path brought 
about proficiency with the issue and high dividends to some of its members. 
Labour governments were committed to seeking coHective security on the widest 
scale, yet it appeared that CND membership was one of several prerequisites for 
assembling an extraordinary career in politics. Tony Blair was a member of 
parliamentary CND in 1986. Former CND member Robin Cook was a Labour MP 
for Edinburgh Central between 1974 and 1983, held frontbench posts for the party, 
became Blair's Foreign Secretary in 1994 and took his place as Leader of the House 
of Commons in 2001.103 Dunoon' s George Robertson, one-time opponent of Polaris 
and member of the SNP, was also Labour's Defence Secretary by the time of full 
101 Recommendation from Christopher Harvie (25 November 2004). 
102 As a 'dove', he wanted defence spending tailored to what the economy could afford. As a 'hawk' he 
defended the highly controversial decision to resume testing Polaris. McSmith, John Smith, p. 60. 
103 Cook was appointed a spokesman on economic affairs. followed by a long spell as Shadow Health 
Secretary. Foot, Dr. Strange/ove. p. 171. 
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Trident deployment in 1999 and eventually became Secretary General of NATO. 104 
Their accomplishments with the disarmament question can be attributed to the 
example provided by John Smith. Furthermore, both Cook and Robertson presented 
the Strategic Defence Review to Parliament in July 1998. They skilfully balanced 
retention of Trident with arms control but revoked all previous commitments which 
might appear to oblige Britain to take any unilateral action. lOS Despite Labour's 
abandonment of a deeply held belief like disarmament, this had little influence over 
Scottish elections for Parliament. 
During the SNP's campaign for the Scottish Parliament the party allowed for at least 
one critical oversight with Trident. Schedule 5, Part 1, Paragraph 9 (1) of the 
Scotland Act 1998 clearly indicates that Westminster retained all powers and 
responsibilities for all defence matters. \06 Though it was not an issue open for 
discussion the SNP launched a campaign against Labour, its slippery relationship with 
Trident and the system's immunity from Scottish objections. The SNP and the SeND 
had already voiced their opposition to Scotland's annual contribution of £135 million 
of the £1.5 billion spent on the system, while Alex Neil, SNP's vice convenor on 
policy, suggested that the Scottish Parliament should withhold funding. IO? The 
nationalists also addressed lingering employment concerns, but its strategies were 
confused and attention to detail was left wanting. According to Frank Purdie, Faslane 
Shop Steward, Lloyd Quinan, SNP candidate for Dumbarton in 1999, spoke of 
104 Recommendation from Christopher Harvie (25 November 2004). 
105 Foot, Dr. Strange/ove, p. 171. 
106 Reserved matters included the defence of the realm; the naval, military. or air force of the Crown, 
including reserve forces; visiting forces; international headquarters and defence organisations: trading 
with the enemy and enemy property. Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, Pan I, Paragraph 9 (1). 
107 'SNP join Scottish eND in Edinburgh: Only independent parliament can remm't Tritl"nt', (SNP 
Archives), 18 May 1997; TS. 27 September 1997, p. 1; 'Government say no more missiles 10 be 
174 
bringing work for trains and fishery patrol boats to Faslane as an alternative to the 
system, while the SNP candidate for Rosyth also promised the same. Not only was 
this contradictory, but, in geographical tenns, it was impractical for boats from the 
north east of Scotland to travel to Faslane when Rosyth was closer. lOS So seriously 
flawed was this policy that proposals for a Defence Diversification Laboratory and 
Management Division could not be taken seriously by the electorate. 109 
Labour in Scotland also voted to scrap Trident at its 1998 conference in Perth and 
while George Younger emphasised that the party thought 'it would not be smart to 
continue procuring the system', external pressure from parties like the SNP forced the 
party to re-declare its stance to the electorate. I 10 According to Brian Taylor, political 
editor for BBC Scotland, Labour in Scotland had frequently voted for disarmament in 
the past, but this range of opinion was not unique as it also persisted in England. 
Arguably, the divisions on this issue were sharper in Scotland for three fundamental 
reasons: the party in Scotland was institutionally more left; Trident was sited in 
Scotland; and there were alternatives in Scottish politics as the SNP and Scottish 
Green Party vigorously opposed the system. I 1 I These factors ultimately heightened 
the issue for Labour. The party therefore tended to default slightly more towards an 
anti-nuclear position because it was driven by other outside imperatives. However, by 
1998 the issue became fonnulaic for the Scottish party and Trident no longer 
purchased. yet seven more are ordered-SNP demand an explanation' (SNP Archives), 16 October 
1997. 
108 Interview with Purdie (02/06/03). 
109 Both were to fund the instruction. research and development in areas affected by defence 
restructuring. SNP, Proposalsfor a defence agency. November 1998. 
110 Taylor, The Scottish Parliament, p. 146. This was according to Sir George Younger. Smart 
procurement initiatives, Hansard (Parliamentary Debates), Vol 308 Col 4, 9 March 1998. The Scottish 
Socialist Party, formed in 1998, also opposed Trident. Scottish Labour Action, available: 
http://www.holyrood.org.uklslals98mar.htm. 
III Interview with Brian Taylor, political editor for BBC Scotland (29102103). 
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resonated with voters; there were in the past routine demands for its withdrawal by 
Labour in Scotland but these calls were routinely ignored and Scots MPs did not 
expect anything more. I 12 The situation was similar for Liberal Democrats north of the 
Border, which also had 'leftish and Green sections', and while their opponents often 
referred to this as hypocrisy these parties preferred to label this as pragmatic 
politics.113 Susceptible to sharp criticisms, Labour's participation in the creation of the 
Declaration of Faslane could only make for a hollow and highly symbolic gesture. 
With roughly 10,000 signatures collected, on 11 May 1998 Alex Salmond, Cathy 
Jamieson of Scottish Labour Party executive and the Church of Scotland launched the 
Declaration. I 14 Though nothing more than a gesture, the statement reads as follows: 
We, the people of Scotland, 
do hereby make it known 
that we will no longer tolerate 
nuclear weaponry on our land 
or in our waters. 
In now expressing our clear will, 
we mandate all our political representatives 
to rid Scotland of Trident. 
However, as has been already stated, external influences, and political aspirations. 
were responsible for Labour's participation and the Scotland Act 1998 ultimately left 
their assertion meaningless. The party was incapable of effectively deflecting 
accusations of disingenuousness, but it is irrefutable that it had to consider civilian 
and Service employees who, along with families and friends, could have assembled a 
similar number of signatures for Trident's retention in Strathclyde alone. This crucial 
factor, coinciding with overwhelming civic disinterest, spared Labour from further 
112 The Labour Council maintained opposition to Trident with little complication. 
III Leftist tendency should not be over-exaggerated. Interview with Taylor (29122/03). 
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humiliation though the SNP was ahead by ten per cent in the polls by July 1998.115 
Nevertheless, just months previous to the Scottish parliamentary elections Labour 
endured a battery of criticism over Trident from local and national media. 
Based on the premise that there had been a relaxation of tension since the end of the 
Cold War, in July 1998 the government's Strategic Defence Review confirmed 
Labour's commitment to Trident with the system subjected to 'minor rather than 
fundamental' changes. I 16 This may have played some part in the SNP's recent success 
in the polls but the release of this document previous to the Scottish elections also 
featured the Blair government as confident both in its decisions, and with the Scottish 
electorate. This assertion was bolstered by one highly significant event. Just days 
previous to the vote for Scotland's first democratically elected Parliament, central 
government was so comfortable with Trident's presence in Scotland that it actually 
permitted the fourth Vanguard class boat, HMS Vengeance, to make its maiden 
voyage to Loch Long. I 17 Under heavy attack from the Scottish media, Labour in 
Scotland would have to perform. I 18 
When considering Trident there are numerous examples of the print media's assault 
on Labour, but in one of his more critical articles Ian Bell of The Scotsman argued 
that within the party: 
114 Interview with Ainslie (25/03/03). 
115 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 184. 
J 16 Trident's capacity would be reduced to forty-eight warheads per boat. T. Dodd and M. Oakes. The 
Strategic Defence Review White Paper (International Affairs and Reference Section: Cmd Paper 3999), 
~. 35. 
17 HMS Vengeance was greeted by only a handful of protesters in the loch, see Chapter Five: Scotland 
and the disarmament movement. 
118 GH, 22 February 1999, p. 2; SH, 21 February 1999. p. 4; GH,3 March 1999. p. 2; GN, 30 April 
1999, p. 2. 
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eND memberships were allowed to quietly lapse, and Britain took 
delivery of the Pentagon's latest line in thennonuclear abattoirs. By this 
time, Labour voters should have been accustomed to this .. .It was a 
Labour government that covered the retreat from empire by insisting on 
its share of nuclear hardware, just as it was a Labour government, led by a 
former eND supporter, that spoke about the possibility of nuking Saddam 
Hussein - with deepest regrets, of course. 119 
Yet even the most acrimonious of criticisms failed to rekindle serious public interest 
with Trident, and results from the 6 May 1999 election con finned this. During the 
parliamentary election those who supported Trident gained a majority of seats. The 
Liberal Democrats captured seventeen seats, the Conservatives managed eighteen, but 
Labour, despite its complex relationship with the system, was able to secure a 
reasonable total of fifty-six seats within the Scottish Parliament. 120 Those who 
opposed Trident took the remainder. Both the Green and newly established Scottish 
Socialist Party acquired one seat each, and the SNP. experiencing a swing since the 
1997 election, accumulated a respectable thirty-five seats. 121 This was a bitter 
disappointment for the nationalists, and their position on Trident did little, if anything, 
to assist them. 122 Similar to 1999, the Trident issue would also have no relevance 
whatsoever in the 2003 Scottish elections. 
Conclusion 
First and foremost it is essential to understand that through their ballots the Scottish 
electorate was given numerous opportunities to voice their opposition to Trident 
throughout the Cold War, amidst its thaw and upon the resurrection of the Scottish 
119 TS, 3 February 1999, p. 4. 
120 Rallings and Thrasher, New Britain New Elections, p. 37. 
121 Ibid., p. 82. 
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Parliament. Civilian employees at Coulport, Faslane and Rosyth, and those with a 
specific interest in national security, were indeed relieved to see the Trident system 
delivered. In British society political policy is frequently dictated by the disposition 
of the electorate, although there are numerous examples to the contrary, and because 
resistance to Trident never fully matured in Scotland it left Conservatives able to 
complete the system against only moderate resistance. Anti-Trident demonstrations 
similar to that of the anti-Polaris movement, the 1990 poll tax riots or the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, three examples of highly contentious decisions, never fully 
transpired in Scotland. Therefore, Scots generally held some aversion toward the 
location of the system rather than fully rejecting the act of deterrence. Having grown 
accustomed to the presence of the SSBN through Polaris, this was especially true in 
the midst of the Cold War. Perhaps most importantly, it becomes apparent that the 
silent majority was responsible for Trident's occupancy as the Scottish electorate 
consistently highlighted Trident's status as an issue oflesser consideration through its 
perpetual fidelity to the Labour Party. Policy turnaround brought few, ifany, serious 
repercussions to the party. Finally, both the Commons and the British electorate 
ultimately overruled any Scottish apprehensions with Trident, as Scotland was a 
quasi-autonomous state. Had this become problematic the nationalists most likely 
would have experienced at least some noticeable growth in support. Conceivably, this 
explains the Blair government's confidence after 1997, and though Scots supported 
home rule this should not imply that their sense of Britishness was not intact. This 
being understood it is undeniable that Trident was once a highly divisive political 
issue that rapidly lost its potency in Scotland. 
122 Harvie has stated, 'the decrease in oil prices, farm and fish products and microchips lhal assisted 
Labour as the SNP was forced to admit that the economics of independence appeared unreliable' 
Harvie, No Oods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 184. 
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In the simplest oftenns one must recognise that when a weapon system such as 
Trident is solicited and released, both parties, that being the US and UK governments, 
have a tremendous responsibility in ensuring that the system is implemented properly, 
maintained to the highest of standards and secure in its location. Callaghan exercised 
discretion when he opted to withhold the Trident issue from the 1979 referendum as 
he probably wished to gauge the mood ofthe Scottish electorate. Had the SNP 
experienced some rogue wave of unexpected success after the referendum it would 
have complicated a deal over Trident, as central government would have had to 
consider the possibility of relocation. For Thatcher the situation was far less complex. 
The referendum failed and in one quick stroke she was able to wipe away any 
question of Scotland's constitutional status, securing an essential requirement in her 
multifaceted dealings with the US government. This point should not be overstated as 
the Conservatives were simply opposed to devolution, but repealing the Act also 
answered any questions either the Pentagon or the Carter and Reagan administrations 
might have had regarding the situation in Scotland. This supposition is confinned 
through the US Freedom ofInfonnation Act (FOIA), as it revealed that Reagan 
prepared secret plans to counter the prospect of Kinnock winning power in 1987. 
American diplomats had briefed the President on two possible outcomes of the 
eJection, and a letter prepared to Thatcher was eulogistic while a newly appointed 
Labour Prime Minister was to receive only a brief statement concentrating on the 
party's intentions of expelling American SSBNs from Scotland. Reagan's message to 
Kinnock was to be fairly short, in the vein of ' we both know where we stand, so Jet's 
not do anything abrupt on defense. ,123 
123 United States Department of State, British Elections. Congratulatory Mt'SSClgt'S, Section 010(02, 
(Doc_1987LONDONl1818). 
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Attempting to capitalise on the agitation that the GLCM and Trident initially inspired 
throughout the wider UK, left-wing parties dramatically overestimated Scottish 
intolerance for the SSBN and clearly miscalculated the British electorate's demeanour 
in terms of security. Throughout the 1980s these parties suffered tremendously under 
Trident's wrath as the system's enormous price tag, its implications for the arms race 
and British dependence on American technology did not translate into issues that 
served their cause. For Britain, both the Falklands War and the Soviet Union's 
installation of SS-20s demonstrated the need for greater security, while 
decommissioning also implied lost wages in Scotland. Therefore, in the midst of the 
Cold War a majority ofthe British electorate did not reject Thatcher's intention to 
maintain an effective deterrent. While parties similar to the CPGS and SNP adopted 
a firm, conscientious stance on Trident, at that time Labour and the SOP-Liberal 
Alliance had misinterpreted wide-spread anti-nuclear sentiment as a majority of the 
electorate were more comfortable with the notion of Trident in Scotland rather than 
cruise missiles in England. This view left disarmament parties and the movement in 
Scotland vulnerable as Britain chose not to abandon the concept of nuclear deterrence. 
~uring correspondence with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, he explained that, 'I do not myself 
believe that the Trident programme contributed in any significant way to the 
difficulties faced by the Government in Scotland. ' 124 This appears to be undeniable as 
Thatcher's views on state dependency had much more to do with calls for devolution 
than the Trident issue itself. Taylor has explained that by the 19905 Trident became a 
totemic issue for certain parties and their activists. There was principled opposition to 
the deterrent and its presence in Scotland by Scottish parties, but the issue had been 
124 Correspondence with Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Sheila Dalgleish for Sir Malcolm Rifkind) (22/04/02). 
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arguably subdued by the main UK political parties where the issue 'may have rather 
experienced a function of stasis'. 125 Scottish political opposition to Trident also 
experienced a major disadvantage when the main parties at Westminster all broadly 
accepted the independent deterrent, with little motivation for ventilating the issue 
within the Commons. Equally, there was little scope for innovative opposition on the 
part of those in Scotland who resented Trident's presence, because of the Jack ora 
Scottish Parliament. Rehearsing and repeating the same arguments against the system 
ultimately failed to alter the political structure, though this did not imply that the 
Trident issue in Scotland was insignificant. However, avenues for publicising the 
issue in a fashion that provoked new attention were relatively constrained. 126 
Finally, Westminster retained all powers and responsibilities for defence matters after 
the resurrection of the Scottish Parliament and the majority of its electorate found no 
difficulty with this particular form of intervention. It has already been made clear that 
in 1997 Trident no longer resonated with the Scottish electorate. and. as has also been 
explained, the Blair government's support for a nuclear defence strategy was not an 
explanation for Scottish demands for greater autonomy. It is presumed that Labour 
was comforted by Scottish disinterest with Trident after the Scotland Act 1998 was 
published, and this assumption is verified by Labour's declaration that it would not 
revisit the unilateralism that once debilitated the party. With the system of little 
concern for a majority of Scots, the issue suppressed within the House of Commons. 
and the Scottish Parliament irrelevant it is therefore important to understand what 
exactly transpired within Scottish civil society to assist in achieving these results. 
125 Interview with Taylor, (14/05102). 
126 Ibid. 
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Chapter Four: Civil Society and Public Opinion 
The definitions of 'civil society' are varied and contentious, but for working purposes 
the description provided by American historian Michael Waltzer may be of assistance. 
He describes it as the 'space ofuncoerced human association ... formed for the sake of 
family, faith, interest and ideology'. 1 Civil society might therefore be considered a 
social process that produces a 'mutual understanding and mediates state and market 
pressures', but can take a number offorms.2 The roots of Scottish civil society reside 
within the Scottish Enlightenment, and up until the twentieth century Scotland still 
preferred to protect and nurture its own unique institutions. Due to Scotland's status 
as a region within a unitary state questions of sovereignty lingered, but because 
cultural nationalism did not support a political agenda Scots generally accepted their 
quasi-autonomous status after 1945.3 During this period Labour's welfare state was 
under construction with central government making a vocal commitment to planning 
and reconstruction. Yet there was an upsurge of Scottish nationalism in the form of 
the Covenant movement, and suspicions of too much Westminster control persisted. 
As the economy began to falter tensions became particularly strained by the 1960s.4 
Nevertheless, some argued that it was this arrangement which allowed for the SSBN 
to remain in Scotland. This chapter will assess its influence over the various 
components of civil society using invaluable documentation provided by leading 
members of Scotland's religious community, the STUC and the NFLA. Scotland's 
local government, media, trade unions and people served as the administration, 
information, labour and lifeblood for this social process. However, because religion, 
IN. Deakin, In Search of Civil Society (London: Palgrave, 200 1 ), p. 4. 
2Ibid.,p.4. 
3 L. Paterson, The autonomy of modern Scotland (Edinburgh: EUP. 1994), p. 161. 
• See Paterson's publication in its entirety. 
183 
law and education were the three traditional cornerstones of civil society it is with 
these subjects that we will begin. 
The Christian peace movement (Scotland's religious community) 
Chronological in structure, this section is a selective overview of the Christian peace 
movement in Scotland and focuses mainly on their opposition to Trident though the 
roots of their hostility dated from Polaris. In Scotland Presbyterianism was 
safeguarded as the national religion after 1707, although there were still bitter 
doctrinal divisions within the Established Church during the course of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. These led to schisms, notably the Disruption of the Church 
of Scotland in 1843, which led to the formation of the evangelical Free Church. The 
dissenting denominations had a strong influence on the electoral success of the 
Liberal Party in Scotland from the mid-nineteenth century up to 1914. Heavy 
industrialisation and urbanisation also contributed to church expansion and 
denominational diversity. The Roman Catholic community became particularly 
prominent as a result of Irish immigration. Yet while the United Free Church and the 
Church of Scotland eventually reunited in 1929, as the twentieth century progressed 
the Christian faith continued to experience a multifaceted 'crisis' of diffusion, 
declining religious practice and the waning of people's connections with churches.s 
Callum G. Brown, the social historian, has revealed that various forms of economic 
and technological prosperity may have inspired a public disconnection. While the 
Church of Scotland and the Catholic Church had 1,248,000 and 810,000 
184 
communicants respectively by 1965, in 1995 these figures dropped to 698,00 and 
743,000.6 Of course, the appearance of the Polaris and Trident SSBNs in Scottish 
lochs can not certainly be attributed to this decline, but it is reasonable to suggest that 
these systems may have somehow encouraged an unspecified number to believe that 
human destiny had somehow fallen into the hands of mankind. While many could 
argue that God's influence was highjacked by the implementation of these 
technologies, the threat of nuclear holocaust did inspire some within Scotland's 
religious community to confront the SSBN through the teachings of Christ. 
It should be cautioned that the Christian faith has not always rejected the applicability 
of warfare, and that, in historiographical terms, opposition to any form of violent 
conflict is only a recent development. According to Alastair Ramage, ordained 
minister for the Church of Scotland, around 350 Be the Bishop Athanasius wrote that 
it was 'praiseworthy to kill enemies in war'. 7 It was Augustine, another supreme 
theologian, who formulated the doctrine of the Just War in the early fifth century. 
Evidence from Ramage has revealed that Augustine insisted that, amongst a number 
of conditions, war must have peace and justice as its aim; that only rulers have the 
authority to start wars; and enemies must be regarded as human beings.8 It was not 
until the seventeenth century that the Mennonites and the Society of Friends, or 
Quakers, sought to establish a pacifist view of war; with America's Brethren of Christ 
supporting this position in the eighteenth century. Mainstream churches were slow to 
reject Augustine's theory. However, the First World War inspired Anglicans, 
5 G. Walker, 'Varieties of Scottish Protestant Identity" in T.M. Devine and RJ. Finlay (cds.) Scollcmd 
in the ](j" Century (Edinburgh: EUP, 1996), p. 250; C.G. Brown, Religion and Society in Scotland 
since 1707 (EUP: Edinburgh, 1997) in its entirety. 
6 Brown., Religion and Society in Scotland, p.161. 
7 A. Ramage, 'The Role of Churches in the Peace Movement' in Brian P. Jamison (cd.) St'ol/and and 
the Cold War (Dunfermline: Cualann Press, 2003), p. 32. 
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Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Quakers and Methodists to assemble the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) in 1914, and by 1937 church peace groups in 
Scotland formed the Scottish Council of Christian Pacifists.9 The following year the 
Rev. George Macleod, then a parish minister in Glasgow, founded an ecumenical 
Christian community on lona committed to 'seeking new ways of living the Gospel in 
modem world', and by 1944 all these groups came together to form FOR Scotland in 
1944.10 Though the SCND and Trident Ploughshares were not pacifist groups, both 
the Christian peace movement and the disarmament movement would work together 
for a common cause. 
While it was Macleod who campaigned longest against nuclear weapons, in 1965 
Roger Gray, member of the lona Community from 1963, advocated that the Church of 
Scotland should take a more proactive stance against these arms. By 1976, the 
Church did just that and argued that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons threatened the 
future of humanity. 11 Nevertheless, a correspondence with Rev. Alan D. McDonald, 
Convenor of the Committee on Church and Nation of the General Assembly, revealed 
that the church originally believed Britain's deterrent could someday act as a source 
ofleverage within disarmament negotiations. According to McDonald. the Assembly 
seemed to reflect two opposing views, for they continued to support a need for a 
nuclear force but urged the government not to proceed with Trident. This 
contradiction led to change, and by 1981 there was a reversal in poJicy as the Church 
8 Interview with Alastair Ramage, Curator for the Heatherbank museum of Social Work and ordained 
minister for the Church of Scotland (27/11/03). 
9 Ramage, The Role o/Churches, p. 32 
10 Correspondence with Norman Shanks, Leader of the Iona Community (09/18/02). 
II ADM Church of Scotland, Church and Nation Committee Report (Edinburgh: 2000). 
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and Nation Committee Report opposed central government's decision to replace 
Polaris, going as far as to recommend complete disarmament. 12 
In general terms the Scottish Episcopal Church and the Quakers involvement with 
Trident was noticeably radical compared to that of larger denominations. In February 
1982 members of the Iona Community and the Quakers discussed disarmament issues 
in an unprecedented three-hour interview with Kremlin officials, and by April the 
Rev. Ian Miller of Dumbarton Presbytery accused churches of being as culpable as 
politicians if Trident was not stopped. IJ Though the lona Community was highly 
proactive, reactions from the Quakers and Episcopalians came quickly and clearly 
demonstrated the conviction of these groups. Yet one should note that the Catholic 
Church did make its objection clear. In March 1982 a statement by the Roman 
Catholic Bishops' Conference of Scotland explained that Trident's ability to inflict 
indiscriminate destruction upon whole cities with their inhabitants was 'a crime 
against God and nature' .14 However, while Maver has noted that Catholics became 
'more active in the Scottish political mainstream' after the end of World War One, 
larger denominations were less vocal and more methodical in declaring their views on 
Trident just as they were with Augustine's theory. 
IZ Correspondence with Rev. Alan D. McDonald, Convenor of the Committee on Church and Nation of 
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (01109/02). 
13 Members of the British disarmament movement were also present. re, February 1982, p.l; Gil, 12 
April 1982, p.2 
14 CMO Contributors included Gordon Joseph Cardinal Gray, Archbishop of Sr Andrews and 
Edinburgh, Thomas Joseph Winning, Archbishop of Glasgow Stephen McGill, Bishop of Paisley, 
Francis Thomson, Bishop of Motherwell, Colin MacPherson, Bishop of Argyll and the Isles, Mario 
Joseph Conti, Bishop of Aberdeen, Vincent Logan, Bishop of Dunkeld, Maurice Taylor, Bishop of 
Galloway, James Monaghan, Titular Bishop of Cell Ausaille, Joseph Devine, Titular Bishop ofVoli, 
Charles McDonald Renfrew, Titular Bishop of Abula. Statement by the Roman CadlOlic Bishops 
Conference of Scotland, Disarmament and Peace (Craighead: 16 March 1982). 
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Over the course of three years the Church of Scotland made several attempts to 
persuade central government to reconsider its position on Trident, with the Assembly 
stressing the need for disarmament well into 1983 and this position finally included in 
Deliverances at that time. IS However, for the Catholic Church there were 
considerations that deserved undivided attention. Individual bishops had attempted to 
persuade governments of various hues to appreciate the resources expended in 
maintaining a nuclear arsenal, but evidence provided by Peter Kearney of the Catholic 
Media Office revealed that the church did have misgivings about the methods of civil 
disobedience that were used during protest. 16 For example, the church was careful not 
to condone acts by anti-abortion demonstrators, and it did not believe that people 
chaining themselves to railings or disrupting life for workers going about their lawful 
business was an effective means of changing hearts and minds. 17 Behind this logic, 
Scotland's Catholic community generally resided in the west of Scotland, home to the 
Trident deterrent, with civil disobedience at Faslane having the potential to tum 
Catholics against one another. To some extent this theory also applies to the Scottish 
Episcopal Church. 
According to Christine McIntosh, a fonner Secretary of the Vestry for Dumbarton' s 
Presbytery, the Church 'had not done enough to resist the deterrent' due to the 
Presbytery's location. ls Though in 1983 Rev. Ralph Smith of Dumbarton Presbytery 
likened the moral dilemma of people who took jobs at Coulport to the gas men at Nazi 
concentration camps, many clerics resisted a commitment against Trident because 
15 Correspondence with McDonald (01109/02). 
16 Correspondence with Peter Kearney, Catholic Media Office (19/08/02) 
17 CMO Statement by the Bishops of Scotland on the Faslane nuclear base, 14 February 2001; 
Correspondence with Kearney (19108/02). 
18 Correspondence with Christine McIntosh, former member oCthe Provincial Synod. Lay 
Representative and Secretary of the Vestry (26/08/02), 
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they felt they had to minister to all regardless of politics.19 Other denominations were 
free of such complication. Lacking the structural complexity that hindered both the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scotland. rapid response was a luxury that 
smaller denominations were free to exploit. Nevertheless. it must be recognised that 
each demonstrated considerable foresight when considering the Trident issue. 
Because the public's interest in Trident began to wane before the opening of the 
German border in November 1989, and plummeted still further after the break-up of 
the USSR in December 1991, the importance of the Christian peace movement's 
contributions to disarmament groups cannot be over-stated. By 1989 the Labour 
Party abandoned the disarmament issue altogether, and with the SCND experiencing 
steady numerical decline by 1988 Helen Steven had reminded the Ion a Community 
'to keep up pressure and focus increasingly on Trident over the next few years,.20 
According to Norman Shanks, former leader of the Community, since day one the 
group had consistently voiced its opposition to the US and UK Polaris systems, 
Britain's replacement deterrent, and the UK's participation within the nuclear anns 
race. Furthermore, he, 'travelled to Faslane in protest since 1988' with great 
frequency. 21 Because disarmament groups were struggling to maintain public interest, 
reinforcement from the Christian peace movement proved most beneficial, especially 
in regards to protest actions and public awareness.22 
19 GH, 27 June 1983, p. 2; S. Clark, Just War Theory: A study paper for the Scottish Episcopal Church 
~~cottish Episcopal Church: 1983). p. 6. 
Te, November 1985, p.7; Te, Summer 1988, p. 20. 
ZI Correspondence with Shanks (09/18/02); Te, Summer 1983, p.7. 
Z2 Shanks was convinced that Trident 'is theologically and morally indefensible', and the Community 
was affiliated with Trident Ploughshares and the SCND. Interview with Norman Shanks (09/18/02). 
Shanks was a former employee of the Scottish Office for fifteen years, Shanks had long links with 10na 
and joined the Community due to its commitment to campaigning for nuclear disarmament. Zeiter, A., 
Trident on Trial, p.138. 
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By 1992 a majority of the religious community worked with the disarmament 
movement and therefore increased the volume of protest at Faslane, though 
numerically it still represented a tiny percentage of Scot Jan d's overall population. 
Before the arrival ofHMS Vanguard, the Church of Scotland's Science, Research and 
Technology Project published a comprehensive discussion on Trident between 
academics, theologians and the church, with the discussion focused on topics such as 
Trident's relevance in the post.Cold War era.23 The Moderator of the Church of 
Scotland also led worship at Faslane in 1992, with members of the Committee 
actively participating in demonstrations and meetings.24 Ifnot for the consistent 
participation of Christian activists, the disarmament movement faced complete 
irrelevance during this most challenging period. 
The focus of the Christian peace movement intensified after the 1 996 IC] verdict, and 
again with the restoration of the Scottish Parliament, with each event cultivating a 
noticeable though subdued reaction. In 1995 the Church of Scotland called upon 
central government to take the Trident issue into the Strategic Anns Reduction Treaty 
(START) talks, and in 1997 it urged central government to • abandon , the system. 
Neither of these requests were ever fulfilled but pressure was again asserted after 
1996 when the Quakers, along with other denominations. emphasised the general 
illegality of nuclear weapons upheld by the le]'s Advisory Opinion.2$ The promise of 
greater autonomy served as a further source of inspiration. Before the Scottish 
parliamentary elections in 1999, the Roman Catholic bishops of Scotland published 
their views on a series of issues facing the electorate. including their opinion that 
23 S.R.T. Project, Taking Out Moscow: Talking About Trident (Edinburgh: St Andrew Press, 1991). 
24 Correspondence with McDonald. (01109/02). 
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there could be no justification for stockpiling nuclear weapons in Scotland.26 This was 
not a position reserved to the Catholic Church, and for Labour in Scotland one of civil 
society's three major cornerstones made their message clear as a majority of 
denominations encouraged the party to strive for disarmament regardless of 
Westminster's authority on the issue. At the gateway to the new millennium, 
Christian support for disarmament could not be more apparent. 
Scottish courts and law 
In 1706-7 the Articles of Union declared that 'the Court of Session, or College of 
Justice, do after the Union, and not withstanding thereof, remain in all time coming 
within Scotland'.27 Scots law was not absorbed into a unified legal system, as the 
Union had guaranteed its autonomy. However, if we attempt to construct a history of 
Scottish courts and their experience with anti-Trident activists, a dilemma is 
immediately presented. Conversations with the Ministry of Defence Police unit at 
Faslane, the Greenock Sheriff Court, Helensburgh District Court, the High Council in 
Edinburgh and the Procurator Fiscal's office in Dumbarton revealed that court records 
pertaining to the arrest of activists, fines imposed, or court costs for the period 
between 1979-1999 were only available on a case-by-case basis.28 Data sets, or 
specialised statistics on this particular issue, had not yet been accumulated, and Joe 
Ury of the British and Irish Legal Infonnation Institute was unsure as to 'why they 
25 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. 'Quaker Peace and Social Witness', 
Nuclear Disarmament: Peace and Disarmament Introductory, Briefing "0.5, August 2000, p. t. 
Correspondence with McDonald (01/09/02). 
26 CMO Scottish Roman Catholic Church, Pre-Election Statement (28 April 1999). 
27 The Articles of Union. 
28 The Procurator Fiscal's office in Dumbarton is where all instances of arrest at Faslane were handled. 
The office did reveal that there were individual records of individual cases. but in this instance it was 
impossible for the author to scour over thousands of cases over a twenty-year period. 
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were not broken down'.29 Therefore, to complete an accurate historical account of 
Scottish courts, the legal process and its interaction with the disarmament movement 
proved elusive. Law enforcement's experience with protest at Faslane proved only 
somewhat more enlightening. 
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, protest actions and subsequent arrest had taken 
place at Faslane since the arrival of Polaris, with numerous tactics employed by 
activists to make their dissatisfaction known. When made aware of a particular 
disarmament action that was to take place at Faslane, it was standard procedure for 
Dumbarton Police Office to make a request for 'mutual aid' from Strathclyde Police 
Force L Division. The level of assistance that the Strathclyde force provided 
corresponded with estimations concerning turnout for a particular event. According 
to a Strathclyde constable, larger demonstrations usually required 200 or more 
officers, with this figure including traffic officers, custody officers who dealt with 
arrest, a support unit which served public order duties by detaining those activists who 
chose to be destructive and control room staff co-ordinators for supervision. For 
every ten officers there was to be one sergeant, along with a chief inspector, a 
superintendent and numerous other senior officers for a single event. These 
operations obviously came with considerable cost to the taxpayer. Because a greater 
number of off-duty officers were deployed so as not to restrict law enforcement from 
performing other civic responsibilities, a single police operation would cost 
'minimum, £5,000 to £6,000, at 2004 estimates and that was a highly conservative 
29 Correspondence with Joe Ury. Executive Director of the British and Irish Legallnfomlation Institute 
(17/11/03). 
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figure' (Photograph 4.1,4.2).30 Activists would argue that such expense would be 
unnecessary if Trident was removed from the Clyde, and that this fee was trivial when 
compared to the annual costs of the system's maintenance. Regardless of one's 
opinion, upon arrest a detainee's personal details were retrieved, with this information 
forwarded to the Procurator Fiscal, where the activist's struggle was transferred from 
Faslane to the Scottish courts .. 
When collecting information on the experience of Scottish courts with anti-Trident 
protest, the most basic statistics are currently held by Fas]ane Peace Camp and Trident 
Ploughshares. Activists believed these records demonstrated the tenacity of these 
groups, though advocates of Trident might argue that this only verified unflattering 
stereotypes. In 1982 Faslane Peace Camp, the year in which it was established, was 
subject to thirty-five arrests but these figures were to skyrocket. By December 1983 
the specialist section amassed 178 arrests, and by 1986 it is estimated that it had 
gathered another 200.31 According to the camp's most basic records. the site, on 
average, accumulated anywhere from 100-200 arrests per year up until 1999. As 
should be assumed, some actions accrued more arrests than others. In August 1986 
alone thirty-eight demonstrators were arrested for setting up a temporary site outside 
the Coulport facility with the Dumbarton Sheriff forced to visit the cells of three 
protesters who refused to appear before him.32 Finally, according to Jane Tallents of 
Nukwatch UK and Trident Ploughshares, between August 1998 and November 2003 
Ploughshares had 2,785 appearances in Scottish courts including pleading diets, 
30 Interview with Stratbclyde Constable (12/10/03). 
31 Faslane Peace Camp-list of action, Available: http://dspace.dial.pipex.comlcndscot!camp/arrestslhtm. 
(07107/02) 
32 GH, 12 August 1986, p. 3. 
193 
Photograph 4.1: Strathclyde Police 
Photograph 4.2: Strathclyde Police 
Over the course of this research, the relationship between the police and protesters ha been 
described as amicable and cordial by both side . 
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intennediate hearings, and trials (including adjournments), with Scottish courts 
imposing fines on members totalling, collectively, £60,000 and £52,000 in 1998 and 
1999.33 Between the camp and Ploughshares alone, there is the distinct possibility that 
the total for arrests and court appearances reached well over 5,000 over a sixteen-year 
period, with fines totalling anywhere from £560,000 to £ 1 million over this period. 
This may also be a conservative estimate, but one is only left to imagine the economic 
impact of these actions to policing, courts and prisons. 
Before 1996 the relationship between Scottish law and international Jaw remained 
largely untested, and in the shadow of the Ie} Advisory Opinion, the decision inspired 
protesters to employ both systems of law in their defence. When considering the 
usage of these laws over Trident actions in Scottish courts the historian must be 
careful to avoid the quagmire one is liable to encounter when investigating this topic. 
Individually, international and Scots law are lengthy, vastly complex topics 
vulnerable to the opinion of the court. Therefore, a defendant faced various 
difficulties when questioning Trident's legality. Primary amongst them were 
questions pertaining to the development of armed forces, acts of state doctrine, 
whether the defence of a soldier's duty can tenably be extended to include most acts 
of anned conflict but not Trident, and whether self-defence was available to direct 
activists.34 The historiographical record has shown that not one case considering the 
legality of Trident ever succeeded except for the October 1999 Greenock Sheriff 
33 Correspondence with Tallents (23/11103) 
34 State doctrine is action on behalf of the Crown not questioned in court. J. Komorowski, 'The end of 
the road for action against Trident? Scots law and the Trident Programme'. in Brian P. Jamison (cd.) 
Scotland and the Cold War (Dunfermline: Cualann Press, 2003), p. 146. 
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Court trial involving the 'Trident three' .35 Despite the improbability of acquittal, 
activists continued to utilise this legal strategy well past its usefulness. 
Scottish universities 
Scottish universities date from before the Reformation (St Andrews 1413, Glasgow 
1451) and since the time of the Scottish Enlightenment academic institutions have 
been heavily involved in technological development. This was especially so during 
the two World Wars, and it is without question that they contributed significantly to 
the British defence industry. However, details concerning their contributions to the 
Trident project are presently classified, and this has made the process of assembling a 
precise historical narration an impossible task. Regardless. it should be 
acknowledged that the Ministry of Defence recognised the strong science and 
technology capability of UK. universities as 'a source of innovation and knowledge of 
relevant research'. More recently, it was for this reason that the Ministry encouraged 
universities to participate in the Defence Technology Centre Scheme (DSTL).36 
In order to establish some sort of background on academic involvement with the 
system, comparisons can be made with the participation of American universities and 
their experience with research and development for the US Department of Defense. 
In 1983 Gwyn Prins, a Cambridge historian, stated that: 
35 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. It is probable that this would be the last 
time the disarmament movement would be permitted to en'lploy the intemationallaw defence due to the 
2001 Lord Advocate's Referral. 
36 The Ministry had placed almost all of its research work over the past five years with Defence 
Evaluation and Research Agency and, since July 2001, with DSTL and QinetiQ.ln tum these 
organisations have sub-contracted with academia in a roaMer which ensures that the Department's 
needs are met in an integrated and cost effective roaMer. The Ministry does not hold centrally 
information about the numbers of sub-contracts placed by our contractors with either academia or 
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... as the economic climate for universities has grown more chill, the 
volume of Pentagon-funded research increased more significantly and 
has received a warm welcome from university administration. In the 
period 1978-1981, military research on American campuses has 
increased 70 per cent in dollar volume and has become the most reliable 
and fastest wowing source of external funding for many distinguished 
institutions.3 
Suffering under the weight of a fatigued economy throughout this period, Scottish 
universities could not afford to be averse to this type of arrangement. In 1989 the 
British Society for Social Responsibility in Science (BSSRS), founded in April 1969 
as a pressure group of concerned scientific experts, revealed that the Ministry of 
Defence funded 853 separate research projects worth £55 million at several British 
universities and polytechnics.38 More relevant to this topic, it noted that at least three 
Scottish universities were contracted to perform nuclear weapons research pertaining 
to the development of Polaris and Trident missile systems. Between 1980-1989, the 
BSSRS claimed that the University of Aberdeen was involved in a £69,000 
investigation of materials used by both the Polaris and Trident systems. St. Andrews 
Department of Physics also earned £53,689 between 1985-1987 for a study concerning 
dfplasma physics, and the University of Dundee was allocated £29,536 between 1987-
1988 for the development of laser techniques that simulated extreme temperatures 
generated at the centre of an exploded device.39 However, Scottish universities also 
supported numerous student activist groups and academics that called for 
disarmament, but as one university spokesman put it, 'we carry out pure research on a 
no-nonsense basis' and 'what the Ministry chooses to do with what we are asked to 
industry and this could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Research Projects, Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard), Vol 401 Col 630, 18 March 2003. 
37 G. Prins, Defended to Death: A study o/the nuclear arms ace (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983). 
fa' ~ 7Evans, Universities and the Bomb: the funding 0/ research in universitits during tire 1980s by ,Ire 
Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldennaston (BSSRS, 1989), p .. 5. 
39 df plasma physics was concerned with the split second phase after the detonation of. nuclear 
weapon. Evans, Universities and the Bomb, p . . 5. 
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design is up to them' .40 Though a more informative historical account will have to be 
completed at a later date, in this instance one of Scottish civil society's three major 
cornerstones remained indifferent to Trident. 
Nuclear Free Local Authorities 
While the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities dates back to the sixteenth 
century, according to author George Monies, 'local government has a long history in 
Scotland but it was only in the nineteenth century that a structure was developed,.41 
This framework has been modified on several occasions to meet increasing 
requirements, with the first major rationalisation occurring in the 1890s, minor 
changes made after World War One and considerable restructuring in the 1920s. The 
Local Government Act (Scotland) 1929 was the first comprehensive legislation to 
reconfigure the responsibilities of local authorities, but Monies has explained that 
greater economic and social planning by central government administration created 
alterations in the 'range, nature and scale of local authority functions after 1945',42 
Local authorities were finding it difficult to carry out their assigned responsibilities, 
with the need for reform again recognised in the 1960s. In 1965 the Labour Party 
initiated the Wheatley Commission, and their 1969 report supported radical 
reorganisation. Most ofthese recommendations were later enacted in the local 
Government (Scotland) Act 1973 with further attempts made to fine tune the 
system.43 More to the point, by this time local government was a vital element of 
Scottish civil society because it was responsible for issues such as strategic planing. 
40 GH, 1 June 1989, p .. 3. 
41 0. Monies, Local Government in Scotland. Edition 3 (Edinburgh: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996), p. 1. 
42 Ibid.,p. 3. 
43 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 146. 
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environmental services and industrial development. Because of central government's 
intentions with Trident, local authorities were not given the opportunity to perfonn 
these duties to their satisfaction. Dumbarton District Council provides a revealing 
case-study of the complications that could arise from this responsibility. 
Strategic planning was about infrastructure, and this topic alone included research and 
intelligence, strategic economic planning, industrial and urban development and the 
countryside.44 Dumbarton's attempts to meet these obligations were abruptly 
disregarded by the Ministry of Defence, with several examples revealing the shifting 
lines that accompanied the powers oflocal authorities.4S Because Trident was initially 
at the centre of controversy in Scotland, this encouraged local authorities to band 
together to resist the government's intentions. This partnership was referred to as the 
Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA). 
Its origins were based in 1970s Australia, where the NFLA united local authorities in 
their opposition to nuclear weapons, nuclear waste dumping and the transportation of 
nuclear materials. Of the estimated 150 local councils in Britain that eventually 
joined the NFLA, the first to become affiliated with this international union was 
Manchester City Council. It joined in November 1980, after the Thatcher government 
accepted the basing of the GLCM at Greenham Common. Declaring itselfa Nuclear 
Free Zone (NFZ) Manchester called upon other local authorities to do the same. and 
by July 1982 the Glasgow Herald reported that half of Scotland's sixty-five regional 
and district councils expressed opposition to British possession of Trident.4() With a 
National Steering Committee established to co-ordinate policy thereafter. anti-nuclear 
44 Monies, Local Government in Scotland, p. 23 . 
• 5 See Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde Region. 
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sentiment became so prevalent amongst British local authorities throughout the early 
1980s that at some point the Committee accumulated enough capital to provide legal 
services, policy advice, a member enquiry service and numerous group liaisons.47 
According to Stewart Kemp, NFLA Steering Committee Secretary, at that time this 
concept proved highly popular with Scottish local authorities due in great part to the 
motorway transport of warheads between Coulport and Aldennaston as it was an issue 
that fostered a local safety issue which councils felt able to focus on. ,48 
In exploring the history of Scottish NFLAs during this period problems confront us 
from the beginning. Except at its central office in Manchester the NFLA was not 
concerned with looking after its records, and after their immediate usefulness was past 
they were usually discarded - in this instance it was apparently a common procedure 
amongst local authorities. The interest of historians was not considered, and because 
the records of Scottish NFLAs scarcely exist, to construct an accurate historical 
account oftheir experiences proved most difficult. A conversation with Kemp 
revealed that 'we haven't kept the details ... and the new councils are unlikely to have 
kept the details either' .49 In a correspondence with Councillor Graham Marr of 
Midlothian Council, it was explained that, 'there is no documentation in our 
possession which directly illustrates the local authorities' approach to Trident. .50 
However, according to Kemp, Glasgow was the first Scottish council to join the 
NFLA, carrying a resolution in 1980.S1 Councillor Marr also explained that 
46 OH. 1 July 1982, p.4 
.7 NFLA Nuclear Free Local Authorities Report 200 1, Report for Resolution (26 October 200 I), p.3: 
Nuclear Free Local Authorities web service, Available: http://nfznsc.gn.apc.orglindcx.html. (09/0 (/02) 
48 Interview with Stewart Kemp, NFLA Steering Committee Secretary (26109/02). 
49 Ibid. 
50 This predicament was also confirmed by Councillors at Fife, West Dumbartonshire, Glasgow City 
and Renfrewshire Council. Correspondence with Councillor Graham Marr, Member of Midlothian 
Council (28/10/02) 
51 Interview with Kemp (26109/02). 
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Midlothian District Council and Lothian Regional Council affiliated 'soon after the 
Organisation was fonned in the early 1980s. ,52 Finally, a correspondence with 
Douglas Kerr, member of the City of Edinburgh Council, has revealed that Edinburgh 
District Council became a member in the mid-1980s with the council establishing a 
Peace Advisory Committee that supported the Edinburgh Peace Festival. The 
Festival, in turn, organised events on Trident and other related issues.s3 Despite the 
apparent absence of historical materials, it becomes apparent that Trident, and 
\ 
operations involving the act of nuclear deterrence, were issues of significance during 
this period as the councils of Scotland's two largest population components quickly 
identified with this movement. 
It was initially the issues of civil defence and Trident that established a closer liaison 
between Scottish NFLAs and the SCND. The validity of both official information 
and the system itself became the lynchpin of the conflict between central government 
and Scottish NFZs. While the employed tactic was to obstruct Trident's progress for 
as long as possible, analysis of the political characteristics of membership reveals that 
a majority of Scottish councils in support of the NFLA were those in Labour's 
control. S4 Kemp explained that: 
... from memory I think old Stirling Council might have been Tory in the 
1980s and therefore will not have joined the NFLAs. I only remember 
Stirling joining post local government reoa;sanisation in March 1996 when 
I think Labour held a narrow majority ... ' S 
52 Correspondence with Marr (28/10/02). 
53 Correspondence with Douglas Kerr, Member of the City of Edinburgh Council, (08/08/02). 
54 GH, 10 July 1985, p.8 
55 Interview with Kemp (26/09/02). 
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Kemp's estimations make one point clear. While poor civil defence emergency 
planning was a fundamental concern, the NFLA was utilised by Labour councillors, 
and the party overall, as leverage against central government and its intentions to 
deploy Trident. As noted in Chapter Three, Dumbarton's Labour majority also 
declared its territory a NFZ in May 1984.56 District councils therefore represented a 
microcosm of the broader political picture and the Thatcher government was well 
aware of Labour's collective strategy in both Scotland and throughout the UK. In 
retaliation, local authorities were effectively silenced through the introduction of the 
1986 Local Government Act. Marr explained that the Act, which precluded local 
authority activity critical of government policy, affected the campaigning stance that 
had been previously adopted, with the emphasis for local authorities transfonned and 
energies channelled in the direction of the debate. 57 However, regardless of 
independent political motivations this should not discredit the intentions of the NFLA 
or its efforts to remove nuclear weapons from specific territories. 
It is apparent that throughout the 1980s the nuclear weapons question strained the 
relationship between local authorities and central government, with councillors 
defending the interests of those constituents opposed to Trident but incapable of 
preventing its implementation. Political scientist Ninnala Rao described the nature of 
political representation as a relationship between two persons. the representative and 
the constituent, with the representative 'holding the authority to perform various 
actions that incorporate the agreement of the represented'. 58 Due to the electorate' s 
intense response to the system, many local authorities from regions such as 
56 See Chapter Three: The Scottish political dimension of Trident. LH. 2S May 1984. p. S. 
57 Correspondence with Marr (28/10/02) 
58 N. Rao, The Making and Unmaking of Local Self-Government (AJdershot: Oanmouth Press, 1994). 
p.32. 
202 
Strathclyde felt obligated to challenge Trident and opted to confront the Thatcher 
government. Therefore, local agencies sometimes fell into conflict with central 
government departments, and one should not exaggerate the internal cohesion 
between both levels of government. Local government only enjoyed a very qualified 
and conditional autonomy, and councillors opposed to Trident could only do what 
they were explicitly permitted to do by Parliament. Furthennore, the United Kingdom 
was a unitary state rather than a federal state. In a unitary state, supreme power or 
sovereignty is not divided, as it is in a federal state, but concentrated in the hands of 
the central government. S9 Consequently, local government's ability to stonewall the 
system's progress collapsed because parliamentary law was supreme over other forms 
oflaw, and there were no constitutional restrictions on Parliament's law-making 
capacity.60 It follows that the rights and very existence of local government was 
conditional rather than absolute. But if local authorities employed an extreme fonn of 
defiance, expUlsion was always an alternative. The 1986 sequestration of Liverpool 
councillors opposed to the Thatcher government's rate-capping legislation served as 
an example of this. 
From 1983 the Thatcher government intended to abolish the metropolitan county 
councils, especially the Greater London Council (GLe), and introduced new ratc-
capping legislation that squeezed local authority spending. Councils that behaved as 
if they 'were governments in exile' became a thorn in the side of central government, 
and so rather than run the risk confrontation, Thatcher decided to dissolve thcm.61 The 
rate-capping policy also cut central government's economic support for local 
59 R. Leach. and J. Percy-Smith, Local Governance in Britain (New York: Palgrave. 200 I). pp. 212· 
213. 
60 Furthermore, no Parliament can bind its successors. ibid.,p. 212.213. 
61 Wainwright. Labour: The tale o/two parties, p. 126. 
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authorities, with Liverpool City Council deeply affected after having no reserves to 
finance the maintenance of existing services or expansion that was desperately 
needed.62 In 1984, these cuts resulted in Labour councils collectively adopting a 
policy of non-compliance with this legislation. In practice this defiance remained 
largely verbal. Yet by 1985 the Inner London Education Authority and the GLe led 
the retreat, with only Liverpool and Lambeth councils remaining true to the original 
policy of resistance. Neil Kinnock pushed forward with a policy of capitulation and 
urged Labour councils to try and soften the impact of Thatcher's policy.63 
Nevertheless, Militant Tendency, a Trotskyist faction within the Labour Party. had 
gained considerable influence within Liverpool's council and continued to resist 
Thatcher's plans through a mass movement of the unions and local residents. At that 
year's party conference, Kinnock launched a vitriolic attack on Liverpool City 
Council and by 1986 the chief administrative body of the Labour Party, the National 
Executive Committee, voted to expel those associated with the left wing grouping.64 
With the NFLA working in the midst of this tension, it was seeking recognition while 
placing great emphasis on the protection of civil society. 
According to the Civil Defence Regulation of 1983, regional councils bore the 
primary responsibility for civil defence emergency planning, while district councils 
were responsible for assisting regional councils in carrying out their civil defence 
tasks.65 Because local authorities were concerned with the inadequacy and ambiguity 
62 ibid., p. 127. 
63 P. Carmichael. Central-Local Government Relations in the 1980 's: Gltlsgow and Llv('rpool 
Compared (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), p. 154. 
~ Derek Hatton was a member of the Labour Party and deputy leader of Liverpool City Council in the 
1980s. He was expelled in 1986 for belonging to the Militant Tendency, an entryist faction in the 
Labour Party promoting Trotskyism. The National Executive Committee of the party voted to expel 
him by 12 votes to 6, the move being a policy aim of Neil Kinnock. Many believed Militant could have 
ruined Labour's chances of electoral success under Kinnock. ibid., p. 155. 
65 NFLA Nuclear Free Local Authorities, Target Scotland (October 1989). 
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of the guidance issued by central government for the preparation of plans with any 
war situation, including nuclear war, Scottish councils launched a civil defence study 
in September 1987. That year the NFLA feared that the future shortfall in plutonium 
for the proposed Trident system were reasons to suspect that plutonium from 
Dounreay might end up in French or British warheads.66 Nevertheless, by October 
1989 the East Central Scotland Planning Assumption Study, carried out by two 
scientists from the Department of Physics at Edinburgh University, and the 
Strathclyde Region Planning Assumption Study, undertaken by officers from the 
Emergency Planning Unit at Strathclyde Regional Headquarters, were brought 
together to create the document Civil Defence Planning Assumptions in Central 
Scotland (Photograph 4.3). Though less publicised than Strathclyde's 1983 Coulport 
Inquiry. due to the lack of public interest in Trident at that time, the report provided 
insight into matters such as government planning assumptions on conventional war 
and civilian protection but it also criticised conflicting plans for conventional and 
nuclear attack. Furthermore, it also discussed topics such as methods of protection 
from the short-term effects of nuclear attack, self-evacuation and unpleasant matters 
such as disposal of the dead.67 While attempts to quantify the impact ofnuc1ear war 
were only possible for certain areas, the study was believed to be as accurate as was 
possible and in some respects was more informative than the document released by 
Strathclyde Regional Council some six years earlier.68 
66 GCUA Nuclear Free Zones Scotland, Dounreay Expansion: The Cast Against (July 1987). 
61 NFLA Nuclear Free Local Authorities, Civil Defence Planning Assumptions in Cl'nf"'/ Scot/and 
~NFLA: October 1989). 
8 See Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde Region. 
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By 1989 the Labour Party abandoned disannament altogether and while the NFLA 
prepared for the arrival of Trident only a minor proportion of Scottish civil society 
actively opposed the system. Timed to correspond with the arrival of the first SSBN, 
in 1992 the National Steering Committee conference, sponsored by Glasgow City 
Council and Strathc1yde Regional Council, allowed Kemp to declare that 'Trident was 
a legitimate matter for public debate' and as such. local authorities had a clear role to 
fulfi1.69 This task had been complicated by the 19861egislation, yet the National 
Steering Committee responded by producing detailed legal guidance that instructed 
how authorities could justifiably publish material on relevant nuclear issues.70 
However, because Vanguard's arrival inspired only limited protest in Strathclyde. 
with interest plummeting yet further upon the amval of Victorious and Vigilant, 
Douglas Kerr noted that Edinburgh District Council's Peace Forum ran until the 
middle to late 1990s but was stopped due to 'lack of participation '. 71 
Combined with Labour's transformation in policy and overwhelming public 
disinterest, local government reorganisation and the arrival of the Blair government in 
1997 served only to undermine further the potency of the NFLA. Earlier on, the 
Major government had fortuitously established yet another legislative barrier for the 
NFLA. Though this bill was not inspired by NFLA action, the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1994 put in place the reorganisation of local government in Scotland 
from a two-tier framework into a unitary system with all former councils abolished 
along with the policy positions they employed.72 These factors ultimately left the 
69 GCUA Stewart Kemp, The Cost o!Trident: Local Authority Implications on Policy Prop()sals, NSC 
Briefing Paper (Glasgow: June 1992). p.3. 
70 Ibid., p.S. 
71 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. Interview with Kerr (08/08/02). 
72 The drive to institutional reorganisation formed part of the restructuring of local government which 
was initiated under the Central Government through the increased scope of compulsory tendering of 
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NFLA incapacitated. Kemp explained that, 'since Labour came to power criticism of 
nuclear weapons and Trident has become more muted from Labour politicians at a 
local level ' .73 With the silent majority largely unconcerned and Labour councillors 
following party guidelines, the NFLA lost a majority of its support after 1996 with 
only fifteen Scottish councils remaining thereafter.74 
The Scottish media 
According to journalist Ian Bell, most of Scotland's major newspapers have long 
histories, with the Glasgow Herald founded in 1783, the Courier and Advertiser in 
1801 and the Scotsman established in 1817. More importantly, Bell has noted that the 
media of communications are 'politically or culturally' unstable, though their 
representations 'are crucial to the formation and preservation of national identity' ,75 
When considering the Scottish media's depiction of Trident, Bell's assertion becomes 
increasingly unquestionable. The Scotsman lurched to the right in the 1990s when it 
was taken over by the Barclay Brothers, and the Glasgow Herald became more Jeft-
of-centre during the 1980s.76 Yet when attempting to gauge the influence that media 
has held over Scots' views on the SSBN, it is first necessary to appreciate the not so 
subtle differences between local and national media. 
local authority services, tighter fmancial stringency and changes to key functions such as community 
care and education. Black, 1996/97 Audits of Local Authorities. 
73 Interview with Kemp (26109/02). 
74 These councils included Aberdeen City, Edinburgh. Glasgow, Clackmannashire, Dundee City, East 
Lothian, Fife, Midlothian, North Ayrshire, North Lanarkshire, Renftewshire, Shetland Islands, Stirling, 
West Dumbartonshire and West Lothian Council. Interview with Kemp (26109/02). 
75 I. Bell, 'Publishing, Journalism and Broadcasting' in Paul H. Scott (cd.) Scot/and: A Concise 
Cultural History (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1993). p. 385. 
76 Information provided by Dr. Irene Maver (217104). 
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A correspondence with Brian Taylor has revealed that local papers 'are entirely driven 
by local perceptions,.77 When considering Trident, their motivation was inspired by 
whether they believed their readers were generally motivated by either employment or 
concerns with the system. If there was uncertainty, in many instances these 
publications attempted to reflect both. Providing an example, Taylor explained that a 
local paper in Peterhead would defend the fishing industry 'to the hilt' while a local 
paper in Caithness would tend to support employment at the Dounreay test 
establishment because that was the predominant issue. Yet that same publication 
would also acknowledge the environmental question of Dounreay.78 When 
considering the local media's position on Trident, the Helensburgh Advertiser, the 
Lennox Herald and the Dunfermline Press made clear Taylor's assertion. 
Arguably, strategic headlines had been utilised to relay the particular message a paper 
chose to deliver, regardless of agenda. In the period between 1979-1999 local 
newspapers for those communities heavily reliant on the employment Trident was 
thought to provide clearly demonstrated a push to the right. In the west of Scotland, 
the Helensburgh Advertiser proposed sustained employment, necessity and safety 
through titles which read 'Future of the Bases is Secure' in July 1980, 'Our defence is 
at stake' in September 1981, and 'Technical safety award for Faslane' in May 1996.79 
Much the same in the east of Scotland, before relocation the Dunfermline Press 
headlines frequently declared 'Base fit for the task in March 1984', 'Trident task for 
Rosyth' in July 1984 and 'Yard expansion talks: Council seek fair deal on Trident 
plan' in January 1986.80 Local papers serving communities less accessible to Trident, 
77 Correspondence with Taylor (12/02/03). 
78 Correspondence with Taylor. (12102103). 
79 HA, 18 July 1980, p. 1; HA, 18 September 1981, p. 2; HA, 30 May 1996, p. 9. 
ao DP, 2S March 1983, p. 1; DP, 12 July 1984, p. 1; DP, 7 January 1986, p. 7. 
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especially in tenns of economic advantage, tended to lean to the left and often 
brandished criticism. The Lennox Herald, also in the west of Scotland, was a prime 
example of this. Headlines such as 'Trident missiles a necessary evil?' in August 
1980, 'Fury over Trident II Purchase' in March 1982 and 'Ministry faces flak' in 
February 1985 all presumed Dumbarton's dissatisfaction with the decision to replace 
Polaris with Trident. 81 However, there is the danger of historical inaccuracy if it is not 
recognised that local papers incorporated the arguments of both sides within 
individual stories and published articles, though with noticeably less frequency. In 
February 1981 the Dunfermline Press offered 'eND unfurl their banner' while the 
Helensburgh Advertiser explained that 'Defence Secretary urged to go public on 
problems at Faslane' in May 1989.82 It was sporadic, obligatory entries such as these 
that only rarely acknowledged the Trident controversy in Dunfennline or 
Helensburgh. Taylor explained that the agendas of publishers can be highly 
influential over reporting. and apparently this assumption proves correct. but what of 
the national media? 
National broadcast and print media favours either committed or partisan journalism, 
with patrons of this style arguing that it makes clear where the author stands; or it 
tends toward neutral or detached journalism, with proponents arguing that it provides 
a more accurate and unbiased service to the public.B3 Furthennore, this fonn of media 
is more generalised as it tends to focus more on issues of national, rather than local, 
importance. Though the Glasgow University Media Group has asserted that 
television often disregards protest and focuses more on personalities, Taylor 
explained that, 'in Britain I know of no broadcasting networks which have agendas 
81 LH, 15 August 1980, p. 4.; LH, 12 March 1982, p.l; HA. IS February 1985, p. 2. 
82 DP, 27 February 1981, p. 15: HA. 20 May 1989, p. S. 
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beyond the search for an audience and their wish to serve that audience' .84 A verdict 
on this has yet to be established, but it is irrefutable that viewers have at least some 
influence over a network's particular message. 
While researching the print media that served Scotland's major population centres, a 
particularly interesting factor has been discovered. According to Bell, in 1940 there 
were nineteen titles in Scotland, eight of which were English-owned. By 1980, the 
year of Trident's procurement, there were only fifteen papers with four in Scottish 
hands, two were English-owned and no fewer than nine were the property of 
multinationals' .85 Given that modem communications tend invariably to gtobalisation. 
Bell argued that: 
The problem of the Scottish media is easily put down; how do you 
represent, report or foster a national identity - even if you are sure what it 
is - when everywhere communications are falling into the hands of 
multinationals who, by definition. have no country? ... Assimilation has 
long been a problem for the Scottish media confronted with the demands 
of a larger neighbour ... To that extent, the Scottishness of the Scottish 
press is merely superficial, if by Scottishness it is meant a willingness to 
reflect the views of the majority. ,86 
More recently the Herald came back into Scottish ownership, but for some time the 
Scotsman was owned by a subsidiary of the International Thomson Organisation, 
Thomson Regional Newspapers. These papers, again according to Bell, 'have for 
decades, perhaps for centuries, acted as a distorting mirror',s7 Therefore, if we focus 
our attention on these two newspapers and disregard the Daily Record, which 
continued to serve the Labour Party, devolution and the largest block of voters 'with 
83 See Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movement. Correspondence with Taylor (12/02/03). 
84 Correspondence with Taylor (12/02/03). 
8S Bell, Publishing, Journalism and BroQcicasting. p. 387. 
86 Ibid, p. 388. 
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unwavering journalistic selectivity', it becomes an effort to deny Bell's relentless 
criticisms.88 
A swift overview of these two papers bears the unmistakable mark of ambiguity, 
which ultimately solidifies Bell's theory. In March 1982 a Glasgow headline declared 
'Trident system is off target' , insinuating futility, yet by May 1986 the Herald 
apparently rejoiced when it announced a '£220 m project for Trident fleet refits,.89 
Furthennore, that same paper expressed frustration when it stated 'Clyde jobs blow as 
work is given to the US' in September 1982, but adopted a more defiant stance in 
October 1992 when it claimed 'Anti-Trident protesters brushed aside at Faslane,.90 
The same degree of confusion applies to the newspaper that regarded itself as 
Scotland's national paper. In May 1995 the Scotsman s headline announced 'Hopes 
raised for Trident work at Rosyth', suggesting support for the Polaris replacement. 
while it chastised the 'Deadly war machine [that] sweeps aside Faslane peace 
protesters' in March 1996.91 A consistent perspective on Trident is never established 
at any point, and while these papers simultaneously commend and condemn the 
system throughout the 1980s, this journalistic imbalance is again employed 
throughout the 1990s. Bell acknowledged that neither paper had been found guilty of 
disloyalty at any point in their histories, yet 'both have lived the contradiction: 
Scotland's national newspapers refused to seriously question the political settlement 
fundamental to the United Kingdom,.92 This same indictment could be applied to their 
handling of the Trident issue. 
87 Ibid, p. 388. 
88 Ibid, p.388. 
89 GH, 12 March 1982, p. 1; GH,2 May 1986, p. 1. 
90 GH, 10 September 1982, p. 4; GH, 26 October 1992, p. 2 
91 TS, 18 May 1995, p. 1; 15,20 March 1996, p. 1; 15,27 September 1997, p. I 
92 Bell, Publishing. Journalism and Broadcasting, p. 399. 
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Various media techniques had also been applied to the subject of Trident in Scotland. 
Symbolism is contained within traditional myths, with weapon systems purposely 
given classical names to set them in the structure of traditional culture. 'Trident'is 
not only the god Poseidon's weapon, but also Britannia'S, and this symbolism may 
not be without impact on some British minds.93 Comparisons with accepted primitive 
weapons was a way in which nuclear weapons were classified as part of human 
culture, and thus, these weapons were subconsciously regarded as less dangerous than 
they actually were. This was a strategy employed by the defence industry, but a 
strategic vocabulary, or symbolism, had also been consistently applied to media 
presentations. According to linguist Paul Chilton, one British newspaper believed the 
neutron bomb 'will give Europe a shield'. Simply stated, Chilton's argument was, 
'who would object to a purely defensive shield?,94 In terms of word association, the 
Scottish media has more often than not associated the system with terms of defence 
(protection), employment (financial security) and safety (invulnerability), while 
activists had been typically linked to radicalism (social irresponsibility), 
unemployment (personal irresponsibility) and defectiveness (the term, 'the great 
unwashed', springs to mind). Depending on one's opinion of Trident, either side of 
this argument could be rationally construed as a misconception. 
The Scottish Trades Union Congress 
The founding congress of the STUC occurred in 1897 with W.W. Knox, Scottish 
historian, making it clear that it was primarily established due to the feeling amongst 
Scottish delegates that 'not enough attention was being paid to matters concerning 
93 P. Chilton, 'Nukespeak: nuclear language, culture and propaganda' in Crispin Aubrey (cd) 
Nukespeak: the media and the bomb (London: Comedia Publishing Group, 1982). p. lOS 
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Scotland in the British Trades Union Congress' .95 Commonly linked with the 1919 
Forty Hours strike and attempts to 'paint Clydeside revolutionary red' after the First 
World War, for some the STUC did nothing to discourage its association with 
communism. This becomes readily apparent as George Middleton, STVe General 
Secretary until 1963, believed that what 'people wanted ... was an alliance with the 
Soviet Union' .96 It therefore came as little surprise that the STVe rejected the 
usefulness of the SSBN and played an important role in the anti-Polaris movement, 
often joining forces with folk singers, the SCND and party protesters in their 
opposition. In November 1960 the STUe's liaison committee attempted to persuade 
the Scottish Council of the Labour Party to Conn a joint coalition against VS 
intentions for the Holy Loch, but the Labour leadership declined this offer until party 
authorities in London were able to manage a clear policy steer. Despite this setback 
the STUe co-organised one of the first major anti-Polaris demonstrations in Glasgow 
the following month, and at the 1961 congress in Rothesay it also approved a 
'stringently-worded' general council repudiating the purpose of the American 
presence.97 
According to author and journalist Keith Aitken, rather than focusing its initial 
objections on nuclear weapons or Scotland's vulnerability as a target for Soviet 
military planners, the STVC's principal objection was to the aggressive stance that the 
Americans' forward operating base represented. Straightforward disannament 
therefore became official in 1963 when Michael McGahey, miners' activist and 
94 Chilton, Nukespeak. p. 105. 
95 W.W. Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland. 1800-pl'f!.tent (Edinburgh: 
EUP, 1999), p. 158. 
96 Ibid.,p. 220; K. Aitken, The Bairns of Adam: the story of the STUC (Edinburgh: Polygon Press, 
1997), p. 148. 
97 Aitken, The Bairns of Adam, pp. 120, 202. 
214 
unequivocal communist, rejected a British nuclear capability and its construction of 
the Resolution class.98 Though a general council motion at the 1964 STUe conference 
at Perth demanded the removal of all nuclear weapons from Scotland, American and 
British systems remained in place. 
After analysis of the Scottish political dimension of Trident it has been revealed that 
the government advertised the system as a source of employment in the midst of 
economic crisis. However, the STUe also rejected the deterrent on economic grounds 
but it initially failed adequately to emphasise this most significant point. The 
disarmament movement would adopt this outlook in time, but, like his predecessors, 
Aberdeen's Jimmy Milne, member of the CPGB and STUC General Secretary from 
1976-1986, generally focused on strategic imperatives and opposed the sea-borne 
deterrent on the basis of threat. So much so that in 1981 the STUe, under his 
leadership, condemned the course being pursued by a government which 'fai Is to 
recognise the futility' of nuclear weapons because Scots had 'no intention of being 
sacrificed' . 99 Maintaining a strategy that required drastic adaptation, it was for this 
reason that the STUe rejected Thatcher's reasoning at that time. 
Campbell Christie, General Secretary from 1986-1998, also supported this view. 
Born in 1937 and raised in Glasgow, by the early 1960s Christie, then secretary of the 
National Assistance Board section in the Civil Service Clerical Association, helped to 
transform the Society for Civil and Public Servants. 100 Following in the footsteps of 
98 Ibid. 
99 GCUA Nuclear Disarmament Sub.Committee, Peace and Detente, Trade Councils Annual Report: 
STUe Council Minutes, (Rothesay 1981), p. 254. 
100 Aitken, The Bairns of Adam, p. 253. 
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McGahey and Milne, Christie made his position on Trident clear during a speech for 
the Campaign for a Nuclear Free Scotland when he stated: 
We live in one world and whatever social system we live in, whatever 
stage of economic development our country has reached. we are 
increasingly interdependent. Since the trade union movement represents 
the best ideals of internationalism. the trade union movement can and 
should playa leading role in the stru~le for a new international economic 
order and for peace and disarmament. 01 
With the Scottish economy in a state ofparaJysis throughout the 1980s the STUe 
understood that monies invested in Trident held serious implications for housing. job 
creation and social services. Yet a well-devised economic strategy that undermined 
Trident's utility was not fully implemented up until the early 1990s. Because Scots 
had learned to live with Polaris and were under the threat of nuclear war since 1945, a 
new plan was in order. It was an economic strategy that was later accentuated by 
Christie's successor, Dr. Bill Speirs. 
Speirs initially joined the STUe as an Assistant Secretary in 1979. and towards the 
end of the Cold War he went on to emphasise the economic burden of a system that 
was, according to the STUe and numerous others, destined to have no true value in 
the post-Cold War era. 102 During a NFZ conference speech in Glasgow in June 1992, 
Speirs emphasised that reallocated funds acquired from the decommissioning of the 
system could have funded the: 
... whole Scottish Health Service for almost five years, or - more 
helpfully, fund District General Hospitals at a cost of £32.5 million; a 
CAT scanner at £500,000; optical lasers at £50,000; kidney dialysis 
101 GCUA Speech by Campbell Christie. General Secretary of the STUC. Campaign for a nuclear free 
Scotland, 29 October 1989. 
102 GCUA Background on Bill Speirs. General Secretary. Scottish Trades Union Congress. 
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machines at $13,000; a staff nurse at £ 14,648 per annum; a ward sister at 
£19,334 per annum; a domestic worker at £7,648 per annum; or a 
physiotherapist at £15,970 per annum. t03 
Corresponding with the arrival of the first boat roughly 239,000 Scots were claiming 
unemployment-related benefits as the Trident Works Programme approached 
completion. 104 According to STUe calculations, Trident's cancellation could have 
saved an estimated £17 billion at 1991192 prices over its projected lifetime, and thus 
offered serious benefits for issues such as railways, budgets for Scottish local 
authorities, housing and employment. Speirs provided numerous examples of 
alternative funding, and he also estimated that £1.6 billion, or 9.S per cent of Trident 
cancellation-based savings, could have enabled the number of local authority nursery 
places in the Strathclyde Region to be trebled for two decades if decommissioning 
occurred that summer. lOS Regardless, with Trident's completion on the foreseeable 
horizon such observations failed to invigorate an interest with decommissioning. 
The STUe's arguments against Trident largely fell upon deaf ears as the disarmament 
movement in Scotland experienced a downward spiral in public support. The silent 
majority focused its attentions elsewhere. Furthermore, the STUC, like the 
disarmament movement, generally failed to incorporate the tragic experience of 
Rosyth into their campaigns after June 1993, which potentially underlined their 
current economic strategy. At a 1994 Glasgow conference designed to revive the 
Scottish Labour Movement's campaigning against the deterrent, Assistant Secretary 
Richard Leonard was careful in his acknowledgement of Trident expenditure and its 
ability to generate employment and capital investment within a number of local 
103 GCUA Statement by Bill Speirs. STUC Deputy General Secretary 10 Nu,~/eor Free 1om's 
Conference, 10 June 1992. 
104 Scottish Economic Statistics 2000, Available: www.scotland.gov.uklstatslses2000/secs-47.aspb8. 
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economies in Scotland. These investments included the production of submarine 
periscopes in Glasgow, hulls in Renfrew, steel plates from Ravenscraig in 
Motherwell, navigation systems in Edinburgh and the production of tritium for 
warheads at Chapelcross. He further cited capital expenditure of £120 miIJion that 
was made for RD57 at Rosyth Royal Dockyard, and the £1,700 million on the 
development of infrastructure at Coulport, but little was made of the relocation of 
Trident refits to Devonport.106 Leonard's reasons for this dismissal remain unclear. 
However, perhaps taking from AESG statistics Leonard clearly accentuated the 
temporary nature of work generated through Trident, and argued that the STUC's 
Emergency Jobs Package could have created over 55.000 direct and 19.000 indirect 
jobs, offsetting the loss of civilian jobs at Faslane, for an investment of £ 1.350 
million.t07 This was a figure paltry in comparison to that spent on Trident over its 
operational cycle, but similar to the SNP's studies on employment alternatives, these 
projections failed to inspire a noticeable reaction. 
By the mid-1990s the STUC's efforts were further undennined by the inevitability of 
Trident and unavoidable political circumstances. After losing three consecutive 
general elections Labour had rejected disarmament altogether. and after millions of 
trade unionists deserted the party and voted Conservative in the 1983 general election. 
it was evident that its policy reversal on Trident was to be handled with caution. 108 
With the core argument of Britain's trade unions centred on alternative employment 
and the system's expense to the taxpayer, Labour took the view that with boats under 
10$ Statement by Bill Speirs. Nuclear Free Zones Conference. 
106 GCUA Speech by Richard Leonard, The Economic Consequences of Trident (March 1994), p. 2; 
GH, 3 December 1985, p.l. 
107 Leonard, The Economic Consequences, pp. 3.8. See Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde 
Region. 
108 Knox, Industrial Nation, p. 2. 
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construction and the Tridents Work Programme virtually complete, it was time to face 
the fact that Trident was coming whether unions liked it or not. After three attempts, 
reality set in. 
During the October 1993 Labour conference in Brighton, party leader John Smith 
failed to convince trade unionists to reconsider, and during the October 1994 
conference Kinnock stressed to Blair the need to 'keep the trust' of the electorate 
through Labour's dedication to national security. After Smith's unexpected death 
Blair served as Smith's replacement, but he also left the 1994 event empty-handed. 
That year the STUC greeted the future Prime Minister with Trident in Scotland: Not 
Safe, Not Economic, Not Wanted, a booklet which included contributions from 
General Secretary Christie, Scottish Labour CND's Tony Southall and the SCND's 
John Ainslie (Photograph 4.4). Bringing together trade unionists, politicians and 
protesters, the document questioned Trident's applicability in the post-Cold War era. 
it argued that both unions and Labour in Scotland rejected the system and it 
considered various radiological hazards. 109 However, by 1995 Trident was set to 
assume responsibility as the national deterrent, and, according to Frank Purdie, 
Labour reminded trade unionists that within one year HMS Vigilant would make its 
first appearance at Faslane. 11o Because the future of the replacement system was 
guaranteed, a narrow majority of unions understood the futility of their objections at 
that year's conference and voted in favour ofTrident.111 Blair also convinced unions 
that opposition to Trident served only to damage Labour's credibility, and to do so 
109 Trident in Scotland: Not Safe. Not Economic. Not Wanted, p.l; STUC sruc, General Council 
Report, R.13 Conference. 'Scotland Withoul Trident', 1994, p.I72.173. 
110 Vigilant was the second Trident SSBN to arrive at Faslane. Interview with Purdie (02106/03). 
11155.8 per cent of unions voted to retain Trident. TO, 6 October 1994, p. I: IT, S October 1995, p. 1. 
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potentially granted the Major government yet another term in power. Nevertheless, 
the STUe refused to abandon its conscientious stance. I 12 
A correspondence with Dr. Bill Speirs revealed that Blair's lobbying of individual 
unions did not affect the STUC, there was no infighting and that policy remained 
straightforward in its opposition to Trident. Speirs went as far as emphasising that 
during the 1994-1999 period, the STUC's affiliated unions gave support to the SCND, 
to 'anti-Trident activity' and that it 'continued to issue press releases' with the 
Scottish Trade Union Review frequently publishing pro-disarmament articles. III Of 
greater significance, he also explained that 'it would probably be fair to say that 
during 1994-1999, STUe focus was more on the securing ora Scottish Parliament 
than on campaigning against Trident. but that did not affect the policy position' ,114 
This statement verifies points embedded throughout the contents of this thesis. As has 
already been noted in Chapter Three, this assertion demonstrated both Trident's 
absence as a part of the push for greater autonomy. and its status as an issue of 
dwindling importance. Similar to Labour's view in Scotland, it was apparent that 
Trident had also become a symbolic issue for the STUC, 
In 1996 the STUe reiterated that the operating costs of Trident could be more usefully 
deployed in rejuvenating the Scottish economy. Furthennore, by December 1999 
Speirs, now General Secretary, released a holiday message which stated that 'our gift 
112 The STUC observed the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 
recognised that Trident had come into full operation BS I. Goudie, 'Diversifyins for Defence', SC'ottM, 
Trade Union Review (November-December 1995: Number 73), p.12. BS B. Quail, 
'Hiroshima ... Nagasaki ... Never Again!', Scottish Trade Union Review (May-June 1995, Number 70), 
p. 6. The STUC also called for the immediate scrapping of the programme and for the £22 billion in 
running and decommissioning costs to be redirected to the generation of 'aood quality, long-term' 
employment oppOrtunities aimed at meeting social needs. STUC STUC. Composite C: TJI~ Pt>a('~ 
Dividend (Covering Motions Nos. 20 and amendment, and 21). 1995. 
113 Corresponence with Bill Speirs, General Secretary of the STUC (15/09/02). 
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to the children of the new Millennium' should be 'the removal of Trident' ,I" 
However, despite honourable intentions, this sentiment served as nothing more than 
an open appeal. 
Public Opinion 
Understanding the public's experience with the Trident represents a fonnidable 
challenge, and because civil society'S perspective on the nuclear deterrent, and its 
experiences during the Cold War, are still unfamiliar subjects to the Scottish historian 
there remains a need for analysis in both quantitative and qualitative tenns. This has 
already been noted in the Introduction of this study, yet a quote from the Scottish 
historian, Michael Lynch, may be of assistance. Lynch stated that: 
The major events of themes in Scottish history - such as the coming to 
power of Kenneth mac Alpin in 843, the Wars for Independence which 
afflicted Scotland for almost a hundred years from 1296 onwards. the 
Reformation of 1556-60, the Union of 1707 and the Enlightenment of the 
mid-eighteenth century - are easy to list, even if historians lists' would 
vary a little. The impact of such landmarks on Scotland's cultural identity 
is less easy to evaluate. Each of those listed above, it is possible to argue 
and it was argued at or near the time, was a turning point, at which the 
concern of contemporaries was less the past then the present 116 
Scotland's role in the nuclear defence of the United Kingdom has yet to earn a place 
amongst these monumental events, but lack of association should not be pennitted to 
undermine its importance to Scottish history. Nevertheless, because the British 
114 Correspondence with Speirs (15109/02). 
liS STUC STUC General Council Report, Resolution No. 1/8 - Trident, (1996); STUC Bill Speirs. 
STUC General Secretary's Message/or the New Year and New Millennium· ',4 dynClmic SCOlli.\'" 
Parliament. equality and social justice throughout the worM, and on enelto nuclear Wt'apons. starting 
with Trident', (28 December 1999). 
116 M. Lynch, 'Scottish Culture in its Historical Perspective' in Paul H. Scott (cd.) Scm/and: ,4 Concis~ 
Cultural History (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1993), p. IS. 
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deterrent inspired intense reaction in Scotland during two separate periods, it requires 
little effort to differentiate between those who supported procurement, and those who 
did not. I 17 
Through various media outlets, the responses of those concerned with Trident were 
made unequivocal. However, when attempting to establish an historical perspective 
on this subject a conundrum is fostered through the inaction of the silent majority. 
While views on the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq were amplified through nation-
wide protests in 2003, the same could not be said for Trident. These views were also 
susceptible to modification as concerns with the Cold War and the post-Cold War 
Trident were two very different issues altogether. Therefore, it is insufficient to 
theorise that a majority of Scots generally rejected these weapons simply because the 
media or the disarmament movement exhibited concerns when Polaris submarines 
suffered cracks in their secondary cooling systems or when ballistic missiles were 
dropped during transport at the Holy Loch. I IS It is equally inaccurate to suggest that a 
majority of Scots generally supported procurement of these systems just because 
livelihoods were derived from Trident's shore facilities, especially when a significant 
number of employees preferred another line of work. There is little doubt that a 
majority of citizens held an opinion on Polaris or Trident, but an official forum was 
not made available and most chose not to advertise their beliefs for one reason or 
another. For these reasons alone it is reasonable to suggest that Trident was received 
in Scotland with a fluctuating degree of ambivalence, though a verifiable 
117 Scottish response to the British government's procurement of Polaris, on the surface, appears to be 
contained. The introduction of Polaris to the Holy Loch may have taken much of the wind from this 
arf.!ment. 
II W.M. Arkin and J. Handler, Neptune Papers No.3: Naval Accidents 1945·1988 (London: 
Greenpeace Institute for Policy Studies, 1989), p.58.61 
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determination on this particular subject might only be completed sometime after the 
system is decommissioned. 
Hesitance with Trident nurtured divisions within Scottish civil society but it did not 
inspire so powerful a split that it encouraged most Scots to re-evaluate their country's 
status as a quasi-autonomous state. James Mitchell can bare quotation at length: 
Cultural nationalists stressed the distinctive cultural characteristics of 
Scotland and placed less emphasis on economic arguments. Political or 
economic nationalists must, by defining themselves as nationalists at all, 
have a conception of Scotland as a distinct entity but stress the socio-
economic advantages of self-government. This applies equally to those 
who campaign for any limited measure of home rule ... Efforts to 
stimulate a sense of Scottish identity were only one part of the battle: 
another was to convince Scots that this identity had a positive and 
political meaning. 1 19 
When considering Trident's repercussions on both cultural or political identity 
towards the end of the Cold War (1979-1989), the system was naturaIJy understood as 
a deterrent to foreign aggression. Notwithstanding this, the efforts of Scottish 
separatists to remove Trident from Scotland were ultimately hampered by simple lack 
of interest, security concerns and a struggling economy that needed jobs enough to 
accept the system's necessity. The fact that procurement placed further financial 
strains upon the national economy was not highlighted. Furthennore, it is certainly 
possible that, at that time, a majority in Scotland recognised that reorganisation of the 
UK's military framework only served to compromise national security. So why did 
the post-Cold War era not prove to be more advantageous for separatists when 
considering Trident's impact on these identities? The answer lies with three, possibly 
four, justifications. From 1989-1999 Trident still employed thousands of civilians in 
119 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, pp. 24-25. 
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Strathc1yde, and many believed there was little point in discarding a source of 
employment after the threat ofnuc1ear exchange had begun to subside and interest in 
these weapons, in both societal and political tenns, plunged. Amongst a number of 
problematic issues, the SNP had also not devised proposals for a military capability 
that was at least as credible as that which was already available. The economic 
implications of a Scottish Defence Force were, and still are, somewhat daunting. 120 In 
this instance Trident presented few complications for those seeking only a limited 
measure of home rule, as defence was a matter reserved to Westminster. However. 
the SNP's arguments for self-government unravelled under the weight of economic 
and military considerations alone, and for a majority of Scots, independence did not 
constitute a sound personal or political purpose. Examples of how Trident influenced 
Scottish civil society remain. 
Though Trident no longer resonated with the Scottish electorate in the post-Cold War 
era, it remained a lingering though diminutive issue. Chalmers and Walker have 
stated that the military is still a source of political unity to the UK. but 'this does not 
discourage significant numbers of their members voting for the SNP.' 121 It could 
therefore be argued that some in Scottish Regiments supported the relocation of 
Trident. Yet an interview with Major (retired) Alastair Campbell of the Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders may best describe the outlook of those serving who did not 
share this sentiment. Campbell stated that: 
... the considerable majority of those in the forces have no sympathy with 
the peace movement, or any of its tenets such as unilateral disannament. In 
the forces, generally, we like to think of a strong deterrent to ensure that 
we do not have to fight, especially the nuclear battle which is too horrible 
120 Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an Independent Scottish Defence Force. 
121 Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 35. 
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to contemplate. There are some who believe in the ~licy of the SNP - but 
not very many, certainly not a 'significant number'. 22 
At time of writing (2004) British troops are fighting in Iraq regardless of Britain's 
possession of Trldent, but in alilikelihood, Campbell's view was the opinion of the 
majority. Furthermore, Chalmers and Walker have also noted that many Scots, 
including those with no affiliation with the nationalists, have taken a principled stance 
against nuclear weapons.123 This was made evident by Labour's questionable policy in 
Scotland, which consistently maintained a non-nuclear defence strategy despite the 
determinations of the London leadership. Finally, in 1999 the Scottish Parliament's 
public petitions committee was obligated to consider Trident. though the Scotland Act 
reinforced central government's monopoly on defence. In December of that year, one 
petition called for Parliament to conduct a review of its obligations under both Scots 
and intemationallaw in relation to Trident's presence. Another requested that it 
reviewed the relevance of the IC] verdict on the legality of Trident in Scotland, and a 
third hoped to establish that Faslane contravened the IeJ finding regarding the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons. 124 These petitions were ultimately rejected, but they served 
as a reminder that Trident was still a matter for some concern in Scotland. If these 
examples still failed to bolster our understanding of civil society'S perspective on 
Trident, public surveys were also of limited assistance. 
Opinion polls were not subject to verifiable proof and were commonly represented as 
value judgements, preferences, or estimates of the outcome of future events. Most 
122 Interview with Major (retired) Alastair Campbell of the Argyll and Sutherland Highland Regiment 
(12/08/03) 
123 Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 5. 
124 BBC News, Petition challenge to Trident legality, 11 December, 1999; Public Petitions Committee. 
6th Meeting, Session 1,14 December 1999 Available: 
www.scottish.parIiament.uklofficiatreportlctteelpetit99-00/pumop1214.htm. (03/09/02). 
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politicians regarded attitudes as more fundamental generalised predispositions, 
opinions as specific manifestations of underlying attitudes and values as people's 
ideals and the commitments they make to pursue them. Sociologist David McCrone 
explained that, 'opinion polls are not precision instruments, although they are 
frequently taken by newspapers and their readers to be such. Polls are, however, 
fairly crude devices for charting the general trends in public opinion as it fonns and 
shifts around the major issues of the day.,12S Though the opinions of Scots on nucJear 
weapons have been charted over a twenty-year period, it provided for only mixed 
results. 
In 1980, fifty-two percent of those surveyed were against Trident in a MarpJan poll 
for the BBC's Panorama programme, and fifty-nine percent against the system in a 
Marplan/Weekend World poll nearly a fortnight after. 126 In October 1982 a Glasgow 
Herald survey suggested that fifty-five percent of all surveyed were 'not in favour' of 
Britain acquiring Trident, though that same survey revealed that fifty-six percent of 
those polled believed Britain 'should have' a nuclear deterrent. 127 In 1984 a Gallup 
poll for CND suggested that sixty-three percent were against Trident, and by 1987 a 
System 3 poll commissioned by the SCND assumed that only twenty-three percent of 
Scots were in favour of the British continuing with Trident if the US and the Soviet 
Union agreed to withdraw medium-range missiles from Europe. 128 In the post-Cold 
War era the picture becomes even less transparent. In 1991 a Gallup poll for Bradford 
University's Department of Peace Studies found that just previous to the 1987 general 
election, sixty-seven per cent of those polled would have been unhappy with only the 
125 D. McCrone, 'Opinion Polls In Scotland: July 1998-June 1999', Scolli.rh Ajfilirs ( no.2S. Summer 
1999), p.38. 
126 SRT, Taking Out Moscow, p. 9. 
127 GH, 18 October 1982, p. 1. 
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two superpowers possessing nuclear weapons, while fifty-five per cent supported a 
British deterrent. However. sixty-nine per cent of those polled were also opposed to 
the launching of missiles against a Soviet attack on the UK. Therefore, while a 
majority believed in retaining a British deterrent in this instance, an even greater 
proportion was not prepared to use these weapons. 129 Finally, previous to the May 
elections for the Scottish Parliament a Teletext poll carried out in April 1999 asked 
whether Scotland should have nuclear weapons, with eighty-five per cent responding 
in the negative. 130 
Ifwe adopt McCrone's definition of surveys at this time and apply it to the seven 
polls provided above, it becomes clear as to why these studies playa limited role in 
the government's decision-making process. While it appears that Trident was 
unpopular both in Scotland and throughout the rest of the UK, two surveys revealed 
that the British electorate believed it necessary to maintain a deterrent though one 
argued that the system should be maintained but not used. Firstly, if central 
government was not prepared to use its deterrent under the most extreme 
circumstances it ultimately undermined the very act of deterrence. Secondly, for 
those who suggested that Polaris should be retained while discarding the Trident 
option, it becomes obvious to central government that those surveyed appreciated the 
need for deterrence yet failed to grasp the repercussions of technical advancements 
with Russian capabilities at that time. Disregarding the matter of usage, it was 
nonsensical to maintain a system that did not serve as an effective deterrent and 
central government believed that only Trident could provide the crucial advantage at 
that time. If we placed these results into a hypothetical situation where politicians 
128 SRT, Taking Out Moscow, p. 9. 
129 Ib'd 9 1 ,.p, . 
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actually executed policy under the guidance of public opinion, arguments against 
Trident were severely incapacitated. For politicians these polls implied that it was 
nuclear war that was highly unpopular amongst civil society, and central government 
would argue that Trident was the reason this did not occur. Therefore, when 
considering the people of Scotland and their collective attitudes towards Trident one 
is forced to acknowledge that the poor evidence currently available provides no 
definitive conclusions. 
Conclusion 
Scotland's status as a quasi-autonomous state provided for certain advantages and 
improved security throughout the Cold War was one of these benefits. Yet there is 
little doubt that the SSBN provided for internalised complication within the three 
traditional cornerstones of Scottish civil society. The prosecution of thousands of 
activists represented an administrative nightmare for Scottish courts, economic 
uncertainty encouraged Scottish universities to pursue research that had the potential 
for public criticism, and the larger denominations amongst Scotland's religious 
community were pressured to take preventative measures so as not to alienate 
adherents. Other components were just as susceptible to the various pitfa))s of 
Trident. Local authorities affiliated with the NFLA had to be mindful of the much 
needed employment opportunities the SSBN was thought to provide, and the STUC, 
heavily influenced by CPGB ideologues and concerns for the proletariat, conceivably 
estranged thousands of civilian employees at Coulport, Faslane and Rosyth. 
Furthennore, a plague of contradiction spread throughout the Scottish print media 
130 SCND Magazine, Available: www.cndscot.dial.pipex.comlmagazine/nfs997c.htm. (02/07/02) 
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which, at a local level. often put forth the message it believed its public wanted to 
hear while delivering nothing less than obscurity at a national level. It is clear that a 
sophisticated combination of economics and ethics inevitably shaped the 
determinations of these components, and Scots themselves were no less susceptible to 
these conditions. 
Against this background, there were an incalculable number of citizens who chose not 
to crash Faslane's gates yet maintained a principled stance against nuclear weapons. 
But while some of these citizens might have argued lye cannae spend a dollar when 
ye're deid' there were Trident's advocates who believed that without a dolJar 'ye're 
deid' nonetheless. With the situation as such, Scottish civil society was left diffused 
and incapable of establishing a dominant rallying force that worked against Trident. 
The world's most powerful submarine weapons platform had effectively penetrated 
society's malleable foundations. 
It is immediately recognised that the system also highlighted obligations that were 
linked with the role of the welfare state. This, of course, was relevant to a number of 
subjects, including matters of economy and foreign affairs. However, the benefits of 
Union definitely came with a price and accommodation of the Trident system 
represented one such fee. Yet it should be noted that Trident's placement north of the 
Border did nothing to convince a majority of the Scottish electorate that separation 
was a reasonable alternative.131 Because Scots had become familiar with Polaris, both 
the Conservative and Labour governments were granted the luxury of only 
131 Scotland as an independent state would need to assemble a credible Scottish Defence force from the 
ground up with the new establishment at least considering the need for a national deterrent. This, in 
itself, presented a daunting task. Hawthorn, Some Thoughts on an Intlepenclen, Scotti,flt ~fi'nc~ FQrc:~. 
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occasionally having to address the Trident issue from time to time. One must also 
recognise that a significant number of people appreciated the opportunities and 
security the national deterrent provided, and an even greater amount took pride from 
the contributions Scotland made to the British military establishment. The situation 
could therefore be described as such: a minority either challenged or championed the 
deterrent but the overall reaction to Trident was characterised through disinterest and 
fluctuating degrees of ambivalence. It is this situation which the disarmament 
movement was left to contend with. 
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Chapter Five: Scotland and the disarmament movemegt 
In the midst of the Cold War Trident inspired both the British and international 
disarmament movements to make clear their intentions to have the system 
decommissioned and promptly towed from the river Clyde. Yet with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union came a decline in public urgency, and the safe, successful peacetime 
operation of the system also caused the movement to lose support in Scotland. 
Employment provided by the system fed families, regardless of the state of 
international relations, and it was this factor which served to weaken further the 
movement's popUlarity. To this day their efforts continue. After numerous 
conversations with leaders from both defunct and currently existing protest 
organisations, including groups such as the SeND and the Scottish Campaign to 
Resist the Atomic Menace (SCRAM), it has been revealed that the movement 
confronted a number of obstacles and employed several strategies during their years of 
protest. As will be seen, they ultimately enjoyed only limited success in the 1979-99 
time frame. Therefore, the intention of this chapter is to break down their collective 
experience and the vast quantities of materials these organisations have produced has 
been of immeasurable assistance in constructing a more precise understanding of their 
struggle to maintain opposition to Trident. However, while it was the intention of 
these groups to convince the Scottish electorate. and its political leadership, that 
Trident was the wrong way forward, it is first necessary to retrace the events that led 
to the creation of the British disarmament movement. 
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The anti-Polaris movement 
Without the formation of Britain's CND, a political pressure group, both the Scottish 
and world-wide debate with such weaponry would have been far Jess developed by 
the time the Thatcher government opted to acquire the Trident system. Thirteen years 
before to the formation of Greenpeace and four decades before the first series of non-
violent direct-actions by Trident Ploughshares, articles written by Bertrand Russell 
and J.B. Priestley questioning the validity of the nuclear bomb inspired concerned 
citizens to establish CND in London in 1958. I According to the former Labour Party 
leader Michael Foot, the creation ofCND 'made our country the most active and 
vocal in the world in attempting to rouse mankind to an awareness of the nuclear 
horror,.2 Consequently, the London-based movement provided the spark that inspired 
the creation of the Scottish campaign that same year. The autonomous SeND was 
formed in Glasgow with its own unique objections initially focused on the testing of 
nuclear weapons and the increasing threat of nuclear warfare.3 Unlike much of the 
Christian peace movement, the group was not a pacifist organisation though it was 
opposed to the possession of these weapons. It was concerns with the influence of 
nuclear weapons over local issues that ultimately characterised the distinctly Scottish 
aspect ofSCND.4 With the arrival of the US Navy's own Polaris fleet in the Holy 
Loch after 1961, the SeND set aside its concerns with testing and refocused its 
energies. It was robust support from the likes of the CPGB, the STVe, local 
1 Articles written by Russell were concerned with the abolition of the bomb while Priestly wrote that 
reople should 'lead the way to nuclear sanity'. Foot. Dr. Strange/ove, p. 68. 
Ibid., pp. 68-72. 
3 National CND branches also included Welsh and Irish CND, which also staned in 1958·1959. 
Interview with John Goodwillie, Irish CND (03/31/03). 
4 A. Carter, Campaigns for Peace: British peace movements in 'he 1(J· Cc>nlUl')l sine'ff 194$ 
(Manchester: MVP, 1992), p. 153. 
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authorities, Scotland's Labour Party and thousands of ordinary citizens that fuelled 
the movement at its earliest stages. 
It was the physical presence of the American Polaris fleet that initially bolstered the 
SCND's determination to have nuclear weapons removed from Scottish waterways. 
After CND marches to Aldermaston in April 1958 Harold Macmillan purchased 
Skybolt in exchange for the US Navy's use of the Holy Loch in March 1960, and it 
was this decision that initially thrust Scotland into the 'centre of superpower and 
military block rivalries'. S Thereafter, the arrival of Fleet BaJlistic Missile Refit Site 
One, USS Proteus, and the first American boats incited intense responses both in 
Scotland and throughout the wider UK. Despite the then maturing state of the Anglo-
American special relationship, it is unquestionable that a foreign nuclear presence 
provoked previously inactive supporters of the disarmament movement to respond, as 
marches soon attracted considerable attention throughout the British press 
(Photograph 5.1). On 4 March 1961 the SCND, working in conjunction with the 
Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear Weapons (DAC), assembled roughly) ,000 
fellow activists who marched from the loch-side community of Dunoon to the Holy 
Loch in opposition to its American defender.6 Several demonstrations were also held 
on 14 May, and on 20-21 May, with the latter representing an escalation of the 
movement's efforts.' However, in the midst of the Cold War the deterrence value of 
the Polaris, regardless of its foreign status, soothed much of Britain's post-194S 
security concerns and thus remained firmly in place.· Though many people would 
5 Spaven, Fortress Scot/and, p. 1. 
6 The DAC was committed to non~violent methods of resistance (Satyogralto) devei()pcd by Gandhi 
during India's struggle for freedom. 
7 The 14 May march attracted roughly 2,000, with a rally addressed by Michael Foot. While the 20 
May demonstration executed a 'sea action' by attempting to board US boars. the 21 May profest 
featured a 'land action' to occupy two piers used by submarine crews. R.K.S. Taylor and C. Pritchard, 
234 
Photograph 5.1: SeND march from th 1960. 
The protest makers: the British nucl or disormom lit 11/0 1' 11/ ' III 
(London: Permagon Press, 1980), p. 138. 
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come to accept the SSBN. these four demonstrations established a precedent and 
served as a useful model for future demonstrations in both Scotland and the 
international community. 
Polaris was received in Scotland with a greater degree of ambivalence than that which 
was later produced through Thatcher's decision to procure the Vanguard class. With 
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a not-so-distant memory, Scottish reactions 
to the US presence generally proved predictable ifnot monumental. After the 
explosions over Japan, world-wide hysteria with nucJear weaponry was reinforced by 
anxieties brought about by the Cold War and its Cuban Missile Crisis, fears which 
were dictated by the state of relations between the US and USSR. Author Robert H. 
Patterson went as far as stating that the UK's 'reduced status in the international 
community' post-1945 had 'manifested itself in a fear of nuclear war'. 8 Therefore, the 
introduction of Polaris to the Holy Loch highJighted improvements in nuclear weapon 
technologies, with the system becoming a rallying force and the now immortalised 
protest song Ding Dong Dollar becoming the anthem of the movement in Scotland 
(Appendix D).9 
Despite the implications of these marches, the influence of the movement was 
compromised through the economic advantages of Polaris and, eventually, the 
opportunity for greater Scottish autonomy. A former US serviceman stationed at the 
Holy Loch in 1961 described the reception of Proteus as 'cordial' and the Provost, 
8 R.H. Patterson, Britain's Strategic Nue/ear Deterrent: From Before the JI·B()mber 10 Bc~wJlul Tritlt!nl 
~London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1997), p. 123. 
Ding Dong Dollar was written when Glaswegian John Mack beard Georae Macleod of the lona 
Community say 'You cannot spend a dollar when you are dead'. John Smith aot the basic chorus idea, 
then it was refmed and Jim McLean joined in the working up of the verses. Interview with John 
Powles, Glasgow Caledonian University Centre for Political Song (08/03/03) 
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C. S. McPhail, said she hoped that the Americans would be treated not as visitors but 
as 'part of the fabric of the town' .10 The US Navy was indeed at the centre of 
controversy at that time, but commercial factors frequently countered objections from 
the movement as American sailors on shore leave broUght with them their hard-earned 
monies to surrounding communities. It appears that the arrival of the British system 
near Helensburgh in 1968 also brought forth a similar degree of dependency. Because 
ofthis, the intensity of the Polaris debate in Scotland subsided. By 1969 Polaris 
accounted for nearly 1,800 civilian employees and throughout the 19705 economic 
depression solidified the relationship between both the deterrent and the community. 
If the movement hoped to inspire the decommissioning of Trident it would therefore 
need to consider the potential for substantial unemployment and overcome a history 
of familiarity with Polaris, improved security and safe operation. 
The anti-Trident movement 
At a time when the BBC's award-wining drama documentary, Threads, illustrated the 
horrendous impact of a nuclear exchange upon British society. Trident encouraged the 
SCND to establish numerous connections and explore new strategies. This 
established a superior degree of complexity, in tenns of organisation, to that ofthe 
anti-Polaris campaign.11 Though the SeND often spearheaded anti-Trident activities 
in Scotland, it further utilised a two-tier system of interdependency that allowed the 
organisation to network with the international disarmament movement, recognise and 
10 SubRon J 4 and Scotland, Available: http://thistlegroup.netlholylochlhistory.htm ( 13/03.03). 
II In 1984 Threads depicted the holocaust through the eyes of two people from two months before to 
thirteen years after the holocaust. Viewers are treated to a graphicaJly disturbina portrayal of the 
medieval conditions that would prevail after such a conflict. including starvation. nuclear winter, 
disease, psychological trauma, illiteracy and both mental and physical mutation. After discussions with 
the CND, Greenpeace UK, Ploughshares, and SCND it was discovered that records pertaining fo the 
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support local groups and work in unison with specialist sections that either disrupted 
the operation of the SSBN, applied political pressure or challenged the intrinsic worth 
of nuclear deterrence. Furthennore, this loosely knit pattern of cooperation allowed 
the movement rigorously to monitor military activities while the SeND often acted as 
collection point for intelligence. Infonnation for the SeND was then dispersed 
amongst other independent organisations, as well as local groups and specialist 
sections, and used either to disrupt the operation of the SSBN through planned actions 
or assist in organised demonstrations. Therefore, the circulation of information 
between individual bodies served to empower protest organisations as a whole. 
While the SeND's efforts were consistently reinforced by eND and the Christian 
peace movement, over the years it maintained cooperation with other independent 
organisations such as Greenpeace UK, SCRAM, the NFLA and Trident Ploughshares 
while also creating the alternative Scottish Campaign Against Trident (SeA T) 
campaign. 12 Both Greenpeace UK and SCRAM viewed nuclear weapons as an 
environmental issue yet from 1987 the fonner demonstrated against nuclear-armed 
and powered warships while SCRAM temporarily addressed the Trident issue in 
Scotland as the SCND's popularity peaked during the early 1980s.13 These groups 
served a supportive role while the NFLA, Ploughshares and SeAT were considerably 
more aggressive in their approach. Both the CND and the NFLA attempted to 
publicise the effects of nuclear war and the false sense of security that civil defence 
disarmament movement were not adequately maintained. Interviews brought some clarity to (he issue. 
Furthermore, the disarmament movement used the Internet extensively to document irs activities. 
12 For examples of groups within the international movement and their work in Scotland scc A. l.clrcr. 
Trident on Trial: The Case lor People's Disarmament (Edinburab: Lualb Press. 200 I). 
13 Greenpeace was formed in 1971 and worked with Greenpeace UK. formed in 1977. Both viewed 
nuclear weapons as an environment issue. See M. Brown and J. May. The Greenpt'(JC't Sit),), (London: 
Dorling Kindersley, 1989). Formed in November 1975 as an umbrella group of Friend4 uflbe Earth. 
the Conservation Society and the Edinburgh University Ecological Society, SCRAM ended when it 
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plans provided. 14 Furthermore, like the DAC of the 1960s, Ploughshares believed 
there was a distinct need for non-violent direct action and did not operate from 
Scotland exclusively because Trident sites were scattered throughout Britain, with 
each considered to be legitimate targets for actions. ls However, according to lain 
Leitch SCAT was simply an attempt by the SCND to widen its own appeal. Though 
dates are unclear it was formed when the SCND considered that a broader based 
campaign against Trident was necessary to take account of the extent of opposition to 
Trident even among supporters of the Polaris deterrent. SCAT was a successful 
campaign in that it reached and was supported by a wide spectrum of Scottish society, 
though the campaign was merged with SeND when Trident was initially deployed in 
the early 1990s.16 The creation ofa vast network allowed the movement in Scotland 
to establish credible links with both domestic and foreign disarmament groups, 
making the government's objectives all the more difficult. 
Local groups were the primary unit of organisation for SCND while specialist 
sections functioned as the movement's eyes and ears. Though the SCND promoted 
and facilitated their own activities, over a twenty-year period an undetermined 
number of local groups were established from Aberdeen to Dumbarton and 
Dunfermline. Unquestionably, the permanence of these groups varied as their 
numbers experienced steady decline following a spike in membership during the early 
1980s, and further deterioration after the collapse of the Soviet Union, presenting 
figures that often fluctuated according to international and or local developments. 
merged with Friends of the Earth in the early 1990s. Interview with Peter Roche, co-founder of 
SCRAM (27/03/03). 
14 Half of Scotland's sixty-five regional and district councils opposed the nuclear anns race. Gil, t July 
1982, p. 4; Byrne, The Campaign/or Nuclear Disarmament, p. 167. 
15 Based in Norfolk, it was launched in Hiroshima, Gothenburg. Gent. Edinburgh and London in May 
1998. Interview with David McKenzie, media officer for Trident Ploughshares ( 12/03/03). 
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The key function of the specialist section was to further the cause of the movement as 
sections like Christian, Student and Trade Union CND spread the message of 
unilateral disannament throughout Scotland's religious communities, universities and 
unionsY Faslane Peace Camp, Nukewatch UK. and Rosyth Watch were indispensable 
specialist sections diligent in monitoring and blocking the transport of nuclear 
warheads to and from the CoulportlFaslane area, observing and sometimes attempting 
to obstruct submarine patrols entering and exiting the Clyde or surveying refitting and 
refuelling operations ofSSBNs at Rosyth Dockyard.1S Of these, Faslane Peace Camp 
had established itself as the most recognisable specialist section in Scotland ifnot all 
of Britain. Inspired by Greenham Common woman's camp and their struggle against 
the GLCM, in June 1982 members of the SCND, the anti-nuclear group Parents for 
Survival and the Ecology Party (later the Green Party) established the camp with the 
assistance of Strathc1yde Regional Council.19 Furthermore, the SeND also 
concentrated on applying political pressure to Trident through specialist sections like 
Green, Labour, Liberal and SNP CND, which encouraged their respective MPs to 
campaign against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.20 However, Sociologist Paul 
Byrne has noted that certain sections had been accused ofbcing more 'concerned with 
importing political disagreements into the movement rather than exporting the 
unilateralist message' from time to time.2J 
16 SCAT was chaired by Ian Leitch of Dum barton District Council. Interview with Leitch (07/0)/03). 
17 Christian CND was composed of many denominations, questioning the morality of Tridenl. Orisins 
and related statistics for these groups were unavailable. 
18 Inspired by Nukewatch US, peace activists concerned with the 'elimination' of nuclear weapons 
organised Polaris Watch in the summer of 1985, which later became Nukewatch UK. It conducted a 
programme to monitor and expose the transportation of nuclear weapons in unmarked trucks. Interview 
with Jane Tallents of Nukewatch UK (006/03/03). Information on Rosyth Watch was unavailable. 
Interview with Ainslie (25/03/03) 
19 In September 1981 a women's march from Cardiff arrived at Greenham Common US Air Force balle 
in Berkshire, where the first Cruise missiles were to be based. What was al first a temporary camp soon 
became permanent. Interview with Graham X ofFaslane Peace Camp (12103/03). Interview with 
Taggart (28/02/03); OH, 16 June 1982, p. 4. 
20 Interview with Taggart (28/02/03). 
21 Byrne, The Campaign/or Nuclear Disarmament, p. 123. 
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As a whole, general statistics pertaining to the movement in Scotland, and records of 
the seND's local groups, specialist sections, executive committees and chairpersons, 
were unclear. Scouring the SeND's Annual General Meeting notes revealed that 
executive committees and selected chairpersons were established during the early 
1980s and came together on a yearly basis to discuss campaign priorities.22 Records 
pertaining to membership were just slightly more informative. According to Byrne, 
British eND offered two types of membership; national members who paid an annual 
SUbscription to national eND and local members who subscribed to their local group. 
He further acknowledged that the eND's total membership at the end of 1986 was 
roughly 86,000, based largely in England rather than the rest of the UK. and by 1988 
89 per cent ofCND members lived in England, 6 per cent in Scotland, 5 per cent in 
Wales and less than 1 per cent in Ireland.23 For the SeND this figure represented a 
clear disadvantage as they represented a distinct minority to that of overall Scottish 
population percentages. Finally, Burn described the social composition of eND's 
membership in the 1980s as comparable to that of the 1960s with membership 
remaining predominantly middles-class, 'overwhelmingly' potential Labour voters, 
evenly balanced between the sexes and concentrated in the 25-40 age_group.24 With 
limited financial and human resources the SeND would have to make do. 
22 By the 1980s SCND shifted from a democratic structure and was broken down to an executive 
committee. 'People simply worked together'. Interview with TaUent! (06103103). An accurale 
chronology was not available for SCND Chairpersons and executive committees; however, mentioned 
names included Billy Wolfe, Neil Crookshank, Keith Bovey, and lain Davison. Interview with Brian 
Quail, joint secretary SCND (01103/03). 
23 Similar to local groups and its apparent lack of information in either quantitative or chronological 
terms, membership statistics for organisations remained blurred due to enlistment inconsistencies or 
because certain members preferred to retain their anonymity. New memberships often rose after 
significant events. The arrival of Trident to Faslane in October 1992 lathered 100 new memberships 
for SCND, though many never renewed. Anonymity was an issue best exemplified by members of the 
Faslane Peace Camp who often referred to themselves on a rltst name basis onl),. Interview with 
Ainslie (25/03/03) Roche (27/03/03) and Leitch (07/03/03). Byrne, Campaign for NUc/fUlr 
Disarmament, p. 55. 
24 One-third of CND 's members also belonged to a trade union, one-quarter 10. political party, one 
fifth to a church and two-thirds of CND also members of other peace organisations. Furthermorf. 
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Strategies of the movement 
In March 1986 Margaret Morton, in the left-nationalist magazine, Radical Scotland. 
explained that, 'it was essential to build up opposition to Trident in the early stages, 
before it gained political credibility and before investment decisions were made' ,25 In 
its drive to discourage Trident's implementation in Scotland the disarmament 
movement conducted numerous campaigns which included Greenpeace UK's 1987 
'Nuclear Free Seas' strategy, the CND's early 1990s 'Scrap Trident' campaign and 
Ploughshares 1998 'Tri-denting It' action. However, the CND's 1985 'Basic Case' 
strategy proved most controversial. In the aftermath of the 1983 general election the 
Thatcher government's consideration of both the GLCM and Trident encouraged the 
eND to integrate their policies against these specific systems and focus public 
opinion more on the basic fundamentals of disarmament. Yet it was argued that 
progress with the Trident campaign at a national level 'writhed' because the strategy 
detracted considerably from a well understood purpose, opposition to two distinct 
systems, with a concept 'so vague as to make it meaningless .. 26 Helen Steven of the 
Iona Community further agreed that CND's emphasis on the GLCM ultimately 
weakened the anti-Trident movement in Scotland, though Brian Quail, joint secretary 
for SCND, believed that campaigns before the 'Basic Case' strategy assisted the 
public in understanding individual systems and their unique capabilities. 27 
women activists were often arrested during protests. Byrne, The Campaign for Nucltur Di.~/lrm(lm,·nt, 
fs' ~'MortOn, 'The Politics of Trident', Radical Scotland (February/March 1986), p. 9. Rmiic'al 
Scotland was a one-off edition intended to assume the role of Crann Tara magazine. Kevin Dunion 
took over and it was relaunched in 1982. It was created because of the loss of national sclfconfidence 
in the devolution project following the referendum in 1978. It represented the strand orleft nationalist; 
maxi devolutionist approach to self-government. The magazine was also an important forum for anti 
nuclear politics. The last issue was in 1991. Interview with Kevin Dunion. fOl'lTler editor for Racfical 
Scotland (23/04/03) 
26 Byrne, The Campaign/or Nuclear Disarmament, p. ISO. 
27 Interview with Helen Steven, Iona Community (04/03/03) and Brian Quail (03/06103). 
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Whether or not Thatcher's brief period of contemplation between two systems was 
some premeditated move to disorganise the movement remains to be seen, but the 
'Basic Case' strategy became strained as it was ultimately balanced between either 
being too academic or desperately generalised. Had this been Thatcher's intention, it 
proved highly effective. However, it might also be the case that the inadequacy of the 
strategy and any complications it produced were over-exaggerated as Michael Foot 
emphasised that 'campaigns for nuclear disarmament show a familiar pattern; they 
may rise suddenly to the highest pitch of excitement, but then relapse into a seeming 
slothfulness' ,28 Furthermore, with the 80viet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979, the assignment of900 88-20s to Eastern Europe and the installation of the 
GLCM and Pershing missiles in Western Europe it was highly improbable that any 
campaign, regardless of the extent of public support, was capable of preventing the 
government's replacement of Polaris. 
The disarmament movement was comprised of several pressure groups, a term 
normally used to denote a type of informal political organisation whose activities 
sometimes had a great influence on national decision-making processes. A pressure 
group must include the bulk of the people, organisations and companies in the sphere 
of its concern in order to be acceptable to governments as a representative for that 
interest. Furthermore, pressure groups tried to achieve change they saw as desirable 
by political action, and to prevent changes regarded as undesirable.29 Because the 
disarmament movement was an agency of political representation, communication 
and participation, the movement had close organisational links with political parties. 
Both Labour CND and 8NP CND were two examples. The disarmament movement 
28 F oot, Dr. Strangelove, p. 187. 
29 W.N. Coxall, Parties and Pressure Groups (London: Longman, 1986), pp. 16·19. 
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was also composed of what could be described as promotional groups. These groups 
were held together by a shared attitude, and they sought to promote a particular 
cause.30 Consequently, it sought influence at all levels simultaneously and generaJJy 
focused its efforts on public opinion, the media, various ministries, central 
government and local authorities. 31 Yet the British disannament movement never 
achieved the level of success that other groups experienced. 
In the last days of the 1983-87 Parliament, the Thatcher government abolished 
domestic rates and introduced a flat-rate charge, or 'community charge'. The fact that 
the legislation applied to Scotland alone at that time led to accusations that the 
country was being singled out. Under these circumstances. an early symbolic victory 
was scored when the 'poll tax' label replaced the term 'community charge,.l2 
Opposition became overwhelming, and in 1987 a labour movement campaign was 
launched in Edinburgh, with steps taken in the west of Scotland, particularly in 
Pollok, to organise anti-poll tax unions. The anti-poll tax movement deliberately 
linked the struggle in Scotland with the battle that was likely to develop on an all-
British scale, and in March 1988 at the Labour Party Scottish conference, delegates 
argued the case for defiance.33 On the day the conference had opened. a poll showed 
forty-two per cent in Scotland favoured an illegal non-payment campaign against the 
poll tax. The charges gradually began to rise and millions refused to pay, with 
enforcement measures becoming increasingly draconian. Unrest mounted and 
culminated in a number of riots, including a brawl in Trafalgar Square where more 
30 W.N. Coxall, Parties and Pressure Groups (London: Longman. 1986). pp. 16·19. 
31 Pressure groups rarely stand for office, they have no aspirations to form a government, they do not 
f:ut forward candidates at elections and they do not seek to exercise power directly. ibid., pp. 16-19. 
2 The poll tax proked the Peasant's Revolt after it was first levied in 1380 to finance I war alainst 
France. The 'community charge' was a fixed tax per adult resident. hence a poll tax, although there was 
to be a reduction for low-income people. Mitchell, Strategies/or Self-Government, p. 274. 
244 
than 200,000 marched in London on 31 March 1990. The Conservative Party was 
forced to abandon the poll tax after it came to the conclusion that their party was 
doomed to electoral defeat if the tax remained.34 The disarmament movement 
struggled to establish a comparable level of public concern. 
Because the first delivery to Scotland of Trident's warheads would not arrive until the 
mid-1990s, the movement attempted to sustain public awareness in the interim by 
maintaining its resistance to Polaris while producing publications that addressed 
controversial topics such as economic, environmental or safety-related characteristics 
of Trident. Greenpeace UK produced several pUblications such as The UK s 
Involvement in the Naval Nuclear Arms Race in 1987 and The Problems of the Trident 
Programme in July 1991, both of which considered the economic burden of the 
system to the British taxpayer or the probability and effects of a serious nuclear 
accident on the Clyde.35 Numerous CND publications similar to Malcolm Dando and 
Paul Rodgers's The Death of Deterrence also offered infonnation pertaining to 
Trident's offensive capabilities while the SCND established monthly instalments of 
Scottish eND News in May 1983, which later went on to become Nuclear Free 
Scotland sometime in 1988.36 Articles such as 'US Trident in Scotland: New 
Evidence' and 'Trash Trident: Bin the Bomb' made for common literature within this 
Scottish periodical, and addressed the modernisation of the US deterrent in the Holy 
33 Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 274. 
34 Michael Heseltine successfully challenged Thatcher's leadership and eventually replaced the 
community charge with the council tax at the start of the 1993/1994 financial year. See D. Butler. A. 
Adonis and T. Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: OUP. 
1994). Mitchell, Strategies for Self-Government, p. 278. 
35 The UK's Involvement in the Naval Nuclear Arms Race (London: Greenpeacc UK, 1987); Naval 
Nuclear Bases: The Costs to the Clyde (London: Greenpeace UK. July 1988); GP Problt!ms (}II"~ 
Trident Programme (London: Greenpeace UK., 1991). 
36 Dando and Rodgers discussed Trident's capabilities, and revealed that the system made it possible 
for one country to destroy an opponents command and control systems and arsenal in a first-strike. M. 
Dando and P. Rodgers, The Death of Deterrence; Interview with Ainslie (25103/03). 
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Loch or questioned the utility of the system.37 In order to address the concerns of 
civilian employees of Trident shore facilities the SeND, in collaboration with the 
STVC, also released Trident in Scotland: Not Safe. Not Economic. Not Wanted in 
1994, arguing that resources freed by 'axing' Trident could be applied to rebuilding 
infrastructure.38 Finally, published by the SeND comprehensive documents such as 
February 1994's The Safety of Trident: An Assessment of the Radiation Risks 
Associated with the UK Trident Programme addressed a number of environmental 
issues while March 1999's Trident: Britain's Weapon of Mass Destruction discussed 
the threat of Trident in the post-Cold War era.39 Though this was mereJy a reasonable 
sample of the materials produced, several of these documents were strategically 
placed to coincide with the arrival and/or operation of Trident SSBNs.40 
Over the years the disarmament movement established a respectable understanding of 
the system, and after the 1990 Drell Commission and the 1992 Oxburgh Report 
highlighted complications Trident was experiencing in various stages, British and 
Scottish eNDs were diligent in processing this information for public consumption. 
In mid-1990, the Drell Report raised serious concerns about the design of the missile 
and argued that Trident featured an explosive propellant that could misfire in the 
37 'US Trident in Scotland: New Evidence', Scottish eND News (August-September J987), p. 6; 'Trash 
Trident: Bin the Bomb', Nuclear Free Scotland (April 1996), p. 3. 
38 Trident in Scotland: No Safe, Not Economic, Not Wanted (Glasiow: STUC and SeND. 1994). p. 23. 
39 The Safety of Trident discussed in detail issues like environmental hazards associated with the 
nuclear reactors and warheads and the reliability of computer systems while Britain 's W(,ilPO"'~ 0/ MClss 
Destruction argued that the theory of nuclear deterrence was fatally undermined. The first was released 
to MPs on the Defence Select Committee as HMS Victorious was set to arrive in Scotland. Britain's 
Weapon of Mass Destruction was strategically issued previous to the elections for Scottish Parliament 
and the arrival ofHMS Vengeance. See SCND, The Safety of Trident: An Assessm('nt o/tllt Radimjem 
Risks Associated with the UK Trident Programme (Glasgow: Scottish CND, 1994) and J. Ainslie, 
Trident: Britain's Weapon of Mass Destruction (Glasgow: SCND, March 1999). 
40 Ploughshares also produced the Trident Ploughshares: Tri-denting II Handbook 'The Pledge to 
Prevent Nuclear Crime' said it was the duty of every citizen to uphold the law relatina to nuclear 
weapons and that all should work to carefully, safely and peacefully disarm any weapon that breaches 
humanitarian law. Tri-denting it (Norfolk: Trident Ploughshares, 1999), p. 9.1. 
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earliest stages of flight.41 When the Defence Committee questioned the Ministry of 
Defence concerning the implications for the British systemt it stated that it was 
prevented from releasing any information relating to the design of the American 
warhead.42 NaturallYt the disarmament movement considered this to be an 
unsatisfactory development. Furthermoret in July 1992 the government also agreed to 
appoint a new nuclear weapons safety watchdog after the chief scientific adviser to 
the Ministry believed that budget and manpower cuts could affect safety. 
Consequently, the Oxburgh Report recommended that the nuclear weapon safety 
champion had the ability to discharge a large number ofresponsibilities.43 Though 
detailed information on this matter remains classified, several improvements were 
made according to the Defence Committee and revisions in safety guidelines did take 
place. Both actions ultimately provided little comfort for groups like the SCND. 
However, it must be acknowledged that consistent pressure from external groups like 
the SCND provided an extra incentive for the Ministry of Defence to perform its 
operations scrupulously. 
Full-blown demonstrations were vital in rallying public opinion against Trident, but 
stringent economic guidelines and geographic location certainly encouraged the 
movement to be selective in its use of such activities in Scotland. Based on previous 
experiences mass demonstrations outside of London were unlikely to 'draw more than 
30,000 people' despite the fact that there was considerable agitation by activists to 
mount more events outside of the capita1.44 Though demonstrations held in Hyde Park 
41 IT. 
, 20 December 1990, p. 2. 
42 Eighth Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of the Trident Programme. He 286 of 
Session 1990-91, p. 9. 
43 Second Report from the Defence Committee, The Progress of Ihe Trident Programm~. HC 297 
of Session 1993-94, p. 19. 
44 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, p. 167. 
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from 1981-1983 attracted roughly 250,000 to 400,000 per event, the suggested figure 
for events in Scotland was upheld when in April 1982 SCAT organised rallies in 
Glasgow and Dundee. Police estimates at that time placed the turnout at roughly 
10,000 while conflicting reports suggested 30,000 (Pbotograpb 5.1,5.3).45 The 
SCND further organised events to correspond with the October 1992 arrival ofHMS 
Vanguard.46 However, The Glasgow Herald described the event in Helensburgh as 
'an uneventful passage to Faslane' for the boat as several 'hundred' people gathered 
at the shoreline. A majority of this figure was not affiliated with the movement.47 
Media attention such as this only served to incapacitate the movement. With limited 
access to the necessary economic and human resources, and serious implications 
unavoidably linked to the public's reduced participation, the SCND recognised that 
smaller demonstrations in Scotland were detrimental to the cause. Consequently these 
efforts were reinterpreted as either actions or blockades to compensate for their lower 
attendance figures. 
Though actions and blockades relied heavily on an activist's willingness to participate 
in some form of non-violent direct action, and thus be at greater risk of arrest, the 
decision to conduct flurries of these activities after the arrival ofHMS Vanguard 
often provided the necessary media exposure in which the movement could broadcast 
its disarmament message. Since the arrival of Polaris these operations encompassed 
an assortment of tactics that included spontaneous presentations, bonfires. 
premeditated interruption of submarines while navigating through Scottish lochs and 
45 Events were supported by the Tory Reform Group, the Quakers, CND local groups and members 
from the Labour movement. GH, 12 April 1982, p. 4; Byrne, Nue/ear Disarmament, p. 167 
46 The arrival of the ftrst boat was expected to draw considerable support for the movement but failed 
to generate the same figures as Polaris in 1961. Interview with Ainslie (25103/03) 
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the blockading of Faslane itself or warhead transports. While the act of spray painting 
slogans like 'Ban Trident' upon the Palace of Westminster or a bonfire action at 
Faslane hardly amused law enforcers or many of Scotland's Christian activists, these 
exercises effectively demonstrated the intensity of deep-seated emotions that many 
protesters associated with the system. Attempts physically to disrupt the patrols of 
massive boats while they traversed the Clyde also became a featured item for the 
movement as countless numbers of activists, with little regard for their own personal 
safety, attempted to swim into the path of these boats after their systematic arrival to 
the Gareloch. Furthermore, the blockading of Faslane had been accompanied by a 
multitude of operations that included activists chaining themselves to rails, damaging 
fences that surrounded shore facilities and frequent incidents of illegal trespass. 
While these actions were predominantly conducted in the west of Scotland, the 
movement's interference of warhead convoys occurred throughout the wider UK.4R 
After 1992 the motorway transport of warheads and the deliberate interruption of such 
convoys were topics of discussion that deserved special attention. Over the course of 
its journey, two Trident warheads were placed into special containers and transported 
to Coulport within a specially articulated Truck Cargo Heavy-Duty Mark 2 (TCHD 
Mk2) vehicle. Under civilian and Ministry of Defence police escort, convoys of three 
to five TCHD Mk2s moved warheads from Aldermaston on a monthly basis and 
normally passed London on the M25, took the MIA! to Newcastle, then travelled 
either west to the A74 or north around Edinburgh with all warheads escorted through 
48 In the US almost 600 arrest citations were also issued at a transmitter site for the American Trident 
system in Wisconsin since 1991, and people who have refused to co-operate with sentencina have 
served a combined total of more than 5 years in county jail. Interview with John laForge, Nukewatch 
US (13/03/03) 
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the centre of Glasgow on the M8.49 Such convoys were not infallible, and. 
controversially, there are several incidents where they experienced mechanical 
failures. To limit 'unscheduled stops', in mid-March 1994 the Ministry spent an 
estimated £60,000 modifying its fleet of transports to end a series of embarrassing 
series of roadside breakdowns. so As might be expected, these modifications were 
considered unsatisfactory by groups like Nukewatch UK. 
This group, which monitored convoy movements throughout the country, worked 
with the likes ofFaslane Peace Camp and Ploughshares on numerous occasions to 
disrupt the transport of these weapons.51 Of the numerous Polaris or Trident 
transports, in September 1996 one convoy was interrupted five times by activists ncar 
a housing estate in Balloch while two activists cut security fencing and disabled a 
transport vehicle held at Cambridgeshire's RAP Wittering in November 1999 
(Pbotograpb 5.4).52 Despite the fact that the Health and Safety Executive emphasised 
that such weapons must be transported in a way that complies with IAEA guidelines. 
the transportation of explosives alongside radioactive material was contrary to British 
49 In July 1999 Doug Henderson, Armed Forces Minister. announced that mponaibility for d~ f\lUlinc 
movement of nuclear weapons within the UK was transferred tfom the RAF to the Ministry of llcofefk'c 
Police. SCND Ministry of Defence, Press Release: Transfer 0/ nuel,. COIIvoy mpolUlbilitif's. J' July 
1999; SCND, The Safety of Trident, p. 18. 
so The first Trident convoy to suffer mechanical failure was on the M62 in July 1992. and by MIlY 19t)) 
another convoy was halted for four hours near the Erskine Bridle outside OlulOw.lntOmlidon i, 
freely available from the SCND website. These incidents also concerned SCND duo to th4: f\'Cft" of 11 
September 2001. TG. 17 March 1994. p. 6; Ainslie. The Sol'ty of ~t. p. 18. 
SI Nukewatch UK was concerned with the complete elimination oftbete tnnlipofU II wt'll II the: 
deCOmmissioning of Trident. Interview with Jane Tallents (06103103). In 1982 FulaM PCII.~ ('amp 
accumulated just thirty-five arrests. By February 1997 the camp amaaed wen O\'ft' 1.200 amtt. 
ranging from offences involving the destruction of Ministry of Defence property to the dilrupcion (If 
warhead transports. Faslane Peace Camp -list of actions. 
http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/cndscotJcamp/arrcsts.htm.(02J03103). 
52 ZeIter, Trident on Trial, p. 52. Interruptions were numerous. In October 1996 Ictlvh, .. wcon: amlllt'd 
in Balloch as they stopped a convoy that experienced mechanicil failure. In November 1998 • c:on\'\l)' 
was stopped twice by activists as it passed through Rbu and at Whistletleld roundabout Milf ('oulpon. 
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k pl. 
regulations due to an exemption clause for 'instruments of war'. 53 However, though 
the movement was unable to prevent the transport of these devices, it was successful 
in bringing international law to the forefront of the Trident debate. 
Moral principles arguing against the act of deterrence were incorporated into the 
policies of the disarmament movement since the early 1960s, but in 1983 SCRAM 
also cited the standards of the Nuremberg Tribunal that ruled under international law 
against the 'planning, preparing, initiating, or waging a war of aggression' .54 By 1984 
the CND Annual Conference endorsed a motion that committed it to place greater 
emphasis on the legality question of nuclear weapons in the future. 55 This legal 
strategy, a tactic not exploited by the anti-Polaris campaign, reaped unexpected 
rewards for the anti-Trident movement. In July 1996 the ICJ declared that it could 
find no circumstances in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not violate 
humanitarian law.56 Though this ruling was ultimately regarded as a symbolic gesture 
by the governments of nuclear-weapon states, the movement's interpretation of this 
verdict was in no way dismissive. 
From 1996 the IC] decision held incalculable leverage over the strategies of both the 
Christian peace movement and the disarmament movement, with Scottish law, 
somewhat inadvertently, inflicting manifest discomfort upon the Blair government. It 
Nuclear Convoy stopped, Available: www.banthebomb.orglnews961010.htm. (01/07102). 
53 SCND, The Safety of Trident, p. 23. 
54 During a discussion with lain Leitch it was argued that lawful ownership of nuclear weapons was 
partially based on racially motivated guidelines. While nuclear-weapon states like the US. UK and 
Israel were free to possess such weapons free of harassment; India. North Korea and Pakistan were 
chastised for such development and consistently reminded of their futility. Furthermore. following Gulf 
War II activists argued that while UN inspectors could not find Jraqi weapons of mass destruction they 
could easily locate such items in the west of Scotland. Interview with Leitch (07/03/03): GH. 27 June 
1983, p. 3. 
55 Byrne, The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, p. 145. 
56 Zeiter, Trident on Trial, p. 41 
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is well documented that during a Ploughshares action in early June 1999 activists 
Angela ZeIter, Anne Moxley and UUa Roder boarded a Ministry of Defence barge, a 
floating laboratory that monitored various signals that active Trident submarines 
emitted, and destroyed property worth an estimated £80,000.57 As activists sometimes 
do, they were arrested. However, taking some comfort from guidelines provided by 
international law, they remained incarcerated because they would only accept bail on 
the understanding that disarmament activity would not be considered to be a crime by 
the Scottish court. When the Greenock Sheriff Court trial commenced on 27 
September 1999 a defence of necessity was pushed forward and argued that although 
the women had been wilful, they had not been malicious. 58 After a trial of twenty-four 
days the Defence managed to convince Sheriff Margaret Gimblett on 20 October 1999 
that: 
The three accused took the view that if it was illegal. and given the 
horrendous nature of nuclear weapons, that they had an obligation in 
terms of international law, never mind morally to do the little they could 
do to stop ... the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in a situation 
which could be construed as a threat. 59 
For the first time in Britain's history the SSBN's legitimacy was officialty questioned 
as Gimblett instructed the jury to acquit. thus validating the thirty-eight years of 
" This included magnetic, acoustic, thermal, radar and visual signals. Zeiter. TrMvltlon Trial, p. 54. 
'8 The Procurator Fiscal charged that they (1) maliciously and wilfully damaged the vessel M"Ylim,.; 
(2) attempted to steal two inflatable life rafts; (3) maliciously and wilfully damaged equipment on 
board May time; and (4) maliciously and wilfully damaged equipment by depositing it 'in lht waters of 
Loch Goil, whereby said items became waterlogged. useless and inoperable', The Defence further 
offered five expert witnesses, including Professor Francis Boyle, University of Illinois, who testified 
that Trident could not be used in a lawful manner; Judge UlfPanzer fro m Germany. who lave 
evidence of the legitimacy of non-violent action to uphold the law; Professor Paul Roaen. Bradftlfd 
University, who discussed the capabilities of Trident; Professor Jack Boaa. who lave evidence about 
the associated dangers of nuclear weapons; and Rebecca Johnston of ACRONYM. Gentva. wbo 
explained the consequences of the failure of successive UK governments to fultll its obliaarions to the 
Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NNPT). Each submitted that inlernationallaw applied in Scotland. 
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was found to be generally contrary to international law by the 
Ie] and that Trident was clearly interpreted as a threat. 
'9 Zeiter, Trident on Trial, p.69. 
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protest in both Scotland and throughout the international community. The British 
media, which became journalistically lethargic over disarmament actions at this point. 
suddenly exploded. Official responses from either NATO or the US government 
remained unclear. However, the verdict rattled the British political establishment as 
former Conservative minister, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish. proclaimed 'that pretty 
well anyone can walk into a nuclear installation related to Trident and do more or less 
what they want. ,60 One can only surmise as to the intensity of chatter that bounced 
between Downing Street and the White House. Foreed to react, the Blair government 
set into motion a rare legal process in Scotland referred to as a Lord Advocate's 
Reference, which would later prevent other judges from providing similar acquittals.fll 
Despite the obvious humiliation this verdict exacted, Labour's embarrassment also 
stemmed from the bygone relationship it established with the movement in years past. 
According to naval historian Jim Ring, the CND had established a long running 
relationship with Labour as the party was 'well stocked with members ofCND' who 
had from the beginning publicly 'opposed the Nassau agreement,.6l While 
relationships between the disarmament movement and parties like the SNP. the 
Scottish Socialist Party and the Green Party were relatively straightforward, over the 
course of two decades the same could not be said for the rapport between Labour and 
eND. In 1987 Hillary Wainwright, freelance writer and researcher, explained that: 
... one independent movement which has upset the Labour Party's 
equilibrium is the peace movement. .. The Labourist left, as well as right, 
have assumed Britain's role as a 'world leader' in all their international 
60 Nuclear Safeguards Bill, Lords Hansard, Col. 779 Vol. 45, 30 November 1999. 
61 ZeIter, Trident on Trial, p. 79. 
62 Labour CND, composed of party members and an organising executive that WlS Britain-wide, aillt.) 
had beginnings that dated back to the earliest days ofPolaris.ln~rview with Tasaan (08102/03). RillS. 
We Come Unseen, p. 55. 
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campaigns. In the early years ofCND (1957·63) they [Labour] presumed 
that this greatness could be deployed 'by example' to bring about world 
peace. 63 
In light of this commentary, by the early 1980s only a handful of Cabinet members 
had been former members of the CND with its influence on the party significant yet 
intermittent.64 Chapter three has already explored the various reasons for Labour's 
transformation of policy and the slight complication that accompanied this. 
Nonetheless, in an attempt to influence Labour's Strategic Defence Review the SCND 
submitted a list of five points to central government in June 1997 which argued that 
Scots rejected the utility of Trident. Labour's White Paper inevitably failed to meet 
the disarmament movement's expectations.65 The movement was successful in 
pressurising the party in Scotland, but perhaps the Labour MP for Dundee East best 
explained their situation. John McAllion stated that, 'only British aClion can further 
the cause for scrapping Trident. .. unilateralist Scottish action could merely move it 
along the coast, never get rid of it' .66 Labour's pragmatism did little to discourage the 
efforts of the movement. 
Obstacles for the movement 
Besides overcoming the erratic nature of public support, the: movement in Scotland 
was inevitably forced to confront substantial political opposition, media bias and a 
sagging economy ifit hoped to incite the decommissioning of Trident. To its 
63 Wainwright, Labour: The Tale o/Two Parties, p. 81,274. 
64 Foot, Dr Strange/ove, p. 72; Byrne, The Campaign/or Nuclear DLtarmamvnt, p. 147. 6' SCND Ainslie, Submission to the Strategic Defence Review from tit#! Sccmlf/, O""I'<,lgn for Nudml' 
Disarmament, 27 June 1997. The Labour government began its Stratcaic Defence Review (S()R) in 
May of 1997 and was published on 8 July 1998. As dedared in the Labour election manifesto it 
affirmed the Government's commitment to maintainins a nuclear deterrent but made a number of 
changes to it. Dodd and Oakes, The Strategic Defence Rev;f!W While Papt'r, pp. 31·36. 
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detriment, it was also bound to compete with the anti-cruise movement. Thatcher has 
stated in her memoirs that the CND had begun to lose support from the 'high point' it 
reached in 1981, but that it remained 'dangerously strong,.67 Therefore, because her 
government inherited its relationship with the movement it 'adopted the same strategy 
as its predecessors', ignored it when possible, and, 'when pressed, to dismiss its 
arguments as unrealistic and to concentrate on presenting the case for replacing 
Polaris with Trident' .68 The behaviour of activists and local authorities from 198()" 
1985 encouraged the latter. In January 1983 central government employed its most 
extreme tactics when it appointed Michael Heseltine as Minister of Defence with a 
'mission to counter CND influence', allowing for 'a well-funded anti-eND 
propaganda unit' to monitor its activities.69 At that time the GLCM was drawing 
massive attention in England, with the government employing a well-funded national 
advertising campaign and establishing DS 19, a special unit which methodically 
depicted the CND as left-wing extremists prepared to jeopardise national security. 70 
Due to Heseltine's aggressive initiatives, the CND cited incidents of mail tampering 
and telephone-tapping operations, which the Home Secretary would neither 'continn 
nor deny'. 71 It soon pressed for a full inquiry, which never transpired, as the issue was 
overshadowed by Clive Ponting's supposed breaching of the Official Secrets Act, 
leaving CND vulnerable to further operations and allowing the government greater 
freedom in its attempts to influence public opinion.71 Heseltine later claimed that the 
66 John McAlIion: Nationalism and Identity. Available: bttp:/lwww.$OI.eo.uklj/jmcallionlcl.htn\. 
~OJl07/02) 
7 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years. p. 267. 
68 Byrne, The Campaign/or Nuclear Disarmament. p. 147. 
69 Campaign/or Nuclear Disarmament. Available: www.cnduk.ol'l. (02/07/02) 
70 Much of this was achieved through the media. Public Records Otl1cc. Diwrtllitllfal Sc>1«li(JIf PCllie,' 
aSPI I: Nuclear Weapons Policy /967-1998, Available: 
http://www.pro.gov.uklrecordsmanagementlacquisitionlosp II nuclear. hen" (04/03/03). 
71 Byrne, The Campagn/or Nuclear Disarmament. p. 149. 
72 Ponting was eventually acquitted. He had responsibility for 'the policy and political .. peets of the 
operational activities of the Royal Navy' during tbe 1982 Falklands war. Puntln" had the job of 
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defeat of CND was 'the proudest achievement of his political career'. 7J With the 
British public's attention generally focused on Greenham Common at that time, the 
anti-Trident movement was weakened considerably. 
Although the true extent of surveillance by the Ministry of Defence before 1983 is 
unclear, it is certain that the movement's stationary sites in proximity to shore 
facilities were consistently monitored. Due to a history of concerns with the IRA and 
the later threat of radical Islam, the intensified monitoring ofCoulport and Faslane 
was highly desirable. Yet in 1984 protest groups were considered a relatively new 
threat to the physical security of military establishments, with control of 
demonstrations outside these establishments deemed a matter for the civil police and 
the Ministry naturally alert to 'deliberate trespass'. 74 In April of that year Commodore 
David Morse reported to the Defence Committee at Faslane that activists were under a 
certain degree of surveillance and that, 'we do know who the regulars are but there are 
many regulars who come for two days and some stay for a week then the numbers 
build up and it is then for us at that time to build up our identification,.7$ Activities 
surrounding Rosyth Dockyard were also under regular observation. On 1 May 1984 
the Defence Committee heard evidence from Chief Constable W. Moodie, Fife 
Constabulary, who explained that authorities 'maintained a low profile approach to 
drafting replies and answers on the sinking of the Argentinian warship Bclgrano by the Royal Nav)' un 
2nd May 1982. Because he believed that the Government misled the Commons, he sent d(~umcnt.ttl 
Tam Dalyell MP. The documents got to the Chairman of the select comminee on Foreign Affairs, who, 
in turn. gave them back to the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence. Ponlina was then 
prosecuted for breach of sec, 2( 1 )(a> of the Official Secrets Act. See C, Ponlina. TIt .. Rig'" to Kltt,w. 
The inside story 0/ the Belgrano affair (London: Sphere Books) 1985, 
73 F oot, Dr Strange/ove. p. 76. 
74 In 1984 the Defence Committee explained that 'protest groups currently account for the area' 
majority of unauthorised incursions' and that 'authorities have had to meet the nuiSllt(c cawed by their 
activities by a variety ofcountenneasures', Second Report from the Defence ("on'lminee. Tltt PIt'\'$Jtal 
Security o/Military Installations in the Un/ltll Kingdom, HC 397-U of Scllion 1983-198", p. vii, 
75 Physical security feU into five broad categories that included 'innocent trespau. criminal entry, 
espionage, protest groups, terrorist attack/sabotage'. Second Report from the Defence ("omntiltee, Tlrt 
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this particular matter and ... the activities of those people whilst they were located in 
the area were monitored,.76 Though incomparable to the methods of OS 19, after 
Trident assumed the principal burden of providing deterrence, actions were 
augmented and the Ministry sustained its surveillance.77 In the midst oCmaintaining 
itself from day to day, observations made by the Ministry were of little concern to the 
movement. 
Throughout the economic depression of the 1980s employment opportunities afforded 
by the Trident, regardless of its inability to promote serious job growth, did nothing 
whatsoever to assist the disarmament movement.78 Furthennore. a significant 
proportion of civilian employees at Trident facilities also interpreted the movement's 
position on the system as a clear threat to thousands of jobs in Scotland.79 From 1980-
1985, protest groups generally failed to address the financial implications of the 
system and there is little evidence to suggest that such a strategy was reasonably 
employed until sometime in the early 1990s. During the early 19805, moral principles 
handed down from the Polaris era were eventually combined with the legality issue. 
but what of the £5,000 million question? The creation of a global network also 
provided for a complex though loosely co-ordinated Conn of activism in Scotland, but 
with overall unemployment standing at 14.8 per cent by 1987 its dialogue on Trident 
hardly inspired public sympathies. If protest organisations hoped to capitalise from 
Physical Security o/Military Installations in the Uniled Kingdom, He 397·1 ofSc$$ion 1983·1984, p. 
43. 
76 Ibid.,p. 71. 
77 Faslane was the centre of controversy in 1984 when the words, 'Vermin, Vemlin, Vermin' were 
supposedly used to signal the suspected intrusion of the base by Faslane Peace Clmpel1.IfA. 2 Man;h 
1984, p. 1; Statement on Defence Estimates 1996, Prescnted to Parliament by the Secretary of State f{lr 
Defence by Command of Her Majesty, Chapter Four: The Dc>/enct Equipm"", Progrm .. m~ (1.ondon: 
HMSO, May 1996). 
78 See Chapter One: Trident and the Strathclyde Rgion. 
79 Interview with Purdie (02106/03). 
260 
Scottish uneasiness with Trident, it first needed to present solid, workable 
employment alternatives. 
According to lain O. MacDonald, in 1981 two of Faslane's civilian employees 
expressed that 'a lot of men' wished that jobs offered near Helensburgh were 'other 
than for a nuclear military base,.8o More recently Robert Purdie concurred with this 
assertion and explained that while many employees were comfortable with Trident, 
there were also a significant number who would have preferred another line ofwork.BI 
In an attempt to meet the challenge of providing alternatives, the CND did choose 
Barrow-in-Furness, the construction site of the Vanguard class. as the location for its 
annual demonstration in 1984. By declaring itself as an advocate for conversion. both 
the eND and its Scottish equivalent emphasised that utilising skills and resources in 
nuclear weapons production should be geared towards new, socially useful 
production.82 However, a credible list of alternative employment sources, including 
verifiable statistics and a rational time seale were not provided. and civilian 
employees gave little credence to a movement that potentiaJly underestimated the 
Herculean task of formulating such a complex economic strategy. Should the Trident 
system be completely decommissioned or should it be relocated. and what type of 
comparable employment could take its place? Furthermore. in the event of relocation 
what would the cost be to British taxpayers in order to establish both new shore 
facilities and refurbished industrial complexes for prospective employers? 
Nevertheless, relocation was both a logistical nightmare and a matter for Westminster, 
and in the midst of the Cold War Scottish apprehensions would not be pcrnlitted to 
compromise national security. The questions pertaining to alternative employment 
80 MacDonald, Faslane Facts and Feelings. p. 13. 
81 Interview with Purdie (02/06/03). 
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were boundless, and, at that time, the answers to these questions remained largely 
undetennined.83 As late as 1994 the SCND still believed that decommissioning was 
capable of creating 55,000 direct and 19,000 indirect jobs through the STUC's 
Emergency Jobs Package, but because many Scots were aware of the Fife Region's 
experience, the movement's economic rationale largely failed to capture the 
imaginations of civilian employees. 84 
Throughout its history the disarmament movement also sought to utilise broadcast and 
print media to spread its message, but this convoluted relationship brought with it 
certain disadvantages. The Glasgow University Media Group examined television 
news coverage of CND demonstrations in 1985 and commented that opponents 
frequently depicted it 'as an emotional movement rather than a reasoned opposition 
containing people who are at best well meaning but nal've, and at worst subversives 
playing on the fears of the population',8s In many instances television appeared to 
disregard the principal reasons for protest and focused more on specific personalities. 
This attentiveness adopted a vicious tenor within the print media at times, 
occasionally propagating the harmful stereotypes of peace activists as social 
undesirables. In January 1998 Graham Stewart of The Independent reported that the 
son of a submariner 'was drawn into the eND in his mid-teens and indoctrinated by 
campaigners who used to give him cannabis', The piece concluded by stating that 'he 
felt he was used then discarded by political protesters who were trying to target his 
82 Byrne, The Campaign/or Nuclear Disarmament, p. 147. 
83 Some of these questions have been answered yet so many remain. See Chalmers and Walker. 
Uncharted Waters. 
84 Trident in Scotland: Not Safe, Not Economic, Not Wanted, p. 24. By this time Rosyth Royal 
Dockyard would be forced to seek an alternative source of employment. ~ Chapter Two: Trident and 
the Fife Region. 
8S Glasgow University Media Group, War and Peace News (Milton Keynes Philadelphia: OUP, 198~). 
p.217. 
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father,.86 This most unfavourable representation contradicted Byrne's portrayal of the 
eND's social composition, and John Ainslie, head administrator ofSCND, funher 
challenged this depiction as he was both a fonner member of the Intelligence Corps in 
Northern Ireland and a minister for the Church of Scotland.87 Though numerous, 
positive examples of the movement's membership were readily available to the 
media, interests were often focused elsewhere and the damage caused by such 
portrayals proved immeasurable. 
By this time Faslane Peace Camp lost Strathclyde Regional Council's backing, due to 
local government reorganisation, and this exposed the camp to increasing hostilities 
from Argyll and Bute Council.88 According to one peace camper, 'when borders 
changed', the relationship with an 'anti-nuclear council' was replaced by 'the 
animosities of a pro-nuclear council' .89 These comments proved accurate as 
Conservative councillor Billy Petrie argued that local residents wanted authorities to 
reclaim the property in Apri11997, with the council intending to bulldoze the area 
(Photograph 5.5, 5.6).90 Eviction papers were therefore delivered. However, the 
specialist section challenged the validity of this order as the lease in question. which 
gave activists and the previous council the right to exercise a one month termination 
clause, contained an unwritten agreement which dictated that activists could remain so 
long as nuclear weapons existed at Faslane. Campers also lived in mobile homes. a 
factor that ultimately granted them security of tenure under the Housing Scotland Act 
86 TI, 5 January 1998, p. S. 
87 Interview with Ainslie (25/03/03) 
88 As a result of the reorganisation of local governments in Scotland I stnale tier structure of thirty-two 
councils carne into existence on 1 April 1996. NFLA Roben W. Black. 'Overview Repon on the 
1996/97 Audits of Local Authorities', Accounts Commissionfor St'Olltlnd(S.R. 99/3. 13 July 19(9). 
89 Interview with Graham X, Faslane Peace Camp, (12103/03). 
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Photograph 5.5: Faslane Peace Camp 2000 
Photograph 5.6: Artist unknown 
90 TS, 25 April 1997, p. 3 
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1987.91 It was these simple conditions that secured the future of the site as the eviction 
writ was ruled incompetent in April 1998, with the council's attempts to evict ending 
only in humiliation.92 The implications of this case were infinitesimal to that of the 
October 1999 'Trident three' verdict, yet it serves to highlight the swarming legal 
challenges so many activists faced. 93 
Finally, while protest organisations experienced a noticeable resurgence in Scotland 
during the early 19805, it lost considerable support in the south and was incapable of 
maintaining the public's interest due to the de-escalation of tensions brought about by 
the Cold War's thaw. As mentioned previously, the Thatcher government's decision 
of Trident over cruise quelled opposition to nuclear weapons in England. However. 
by 1985 England's relaxed state undermined Scottish opposition to Trident, and 
despite a revived presence north of the Border the movement experienced a massive 
reduction in terms of support from the wider UK. International developments also did 
nothing to assist. At the end of 1987 the final signing of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (JNF) removed the GLCM, Pershing missiles and Russian SS-
208 from Eastern and Western Europe. 'with many in Scotland under the impression 
that Trident was included in this agreement,.94 However. even ifconfusion was a 
credible factor it was the fall of communism in the early 19905, along with the 
withdrawal of the US Polaris fleet from the Holy Loch in late 1991, that served as a 
dagger to the movement's heart. Lack of response to these historic events 
demonstrated the indifference most Scots held towards the Trident issue at this time. 
Such dramatic events allowed for public support to deteriorate within the confines of 
91 TS, 2 Apri11998, p. 4. 
92 TS, 7 Apri11998, p. 2. 
93 Sere Chapter Four: Civil Society aned Public Opinion. 
94 Isaacs and Downing, The Cold War, p. 368; Interview with Steven (04/03/03). 
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a more relaxed global community, leaving the movement, both foreign and domestic, 
stripped to its bare essentials. Though the physical presence of the Trident assisted 
the movement in refocusing its efforts in 1992, by 1999 neither the IC] ruling, the 
Greenock trial or the late arrival of the fourth and final boat was capable of restoring 
the movement's former glory. Therefore, those who formed the backbone of protest 
groups in Scotland were forced to sustain themselves on a diet of sheer determination. 
Conclusion 
Because all fixtures of the Trident system were firmly in place nearly a decade after 
the Cold War's completion it requires little effort to discount the achievements of the 
disarmament movement in Scotland. Both the government's decision to acquire the 
system, and the arrival ofHMS Vanguard, failed to inspire mass raUies or 
monumental demonstrations as Polaris had some three decades earlier. However, one 
must note that the arrival of the US Polaris fleet met considerable opposition in 
Scotland because it was the first time many Scots experienced first-hand the extreme 
temperatures of the Cold War's world. Yet over the course of some forty years this 
sense of urgency was left to expire, with Scottish civil society generally disregarding 
the Trident as the public had grown accustomed to the presence of such weapons. In 
terms of protest the loss of British support after the cancellation of the GLCM can not 
be exaggerated as Scottish opposition to Trident, weakened by the loss of UK wide 
support, willingly subsided. This lack of resistance was also due in no small part to 
the rhetoric of Conservative MPs and local media which so frequently emphasised the 
promise of sustained employment. Therefore, because of Scotland' s fami I iarisation 
with the SSBN the movement's ability to draw public support, despite countless 
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actions and blockades, greatly diminished. A barrage of information on the system, 
made through numerous disarmament publications, also fell short of achieving the 
movement's objectives. Ultimately, national security during a period of tension, safe 
operation of the system without incident, the Cold War's thaw and economic 
necessity only further eroded the potency of the movement. At this point, one must 
then question what the disarmament movement did in fact accomplish during this 
period. 
For those of a sceptical nature the achievements of protest groups were generally 
overshadowed by their inadequacies and therefore much less obvious. However, the 
movement did not allow for Home Office pUblications, such as Protecl and Sun';ve 
and Domestic Nuclear Shelters, to convince ordinary civilians that nuclear war was a 
survivable option.95 In 1982 Michael Dando, former lecturer in Peace Studies at the 
University of Bradford, described British civil defence policy as 'a disaster from the 
start ... and will be of quite minimal value' ,96 Arguably, the government's publications 
attempted to provide a false sense of security and were possibly designed to 
undermine the efforts of these groups. Over the next fifteen years nothing changed in 
Britain's status as a nuclear-weapons state, but disarmament efforts continued. 
Though it could not convince Labour to decommission the system following the 
party's return to power in 1997, an immeasurable degree of pressure was exerted by 
the movement as it added an extra incentive for the Ministry of Defence to manage 
Trident's operations under the most stringent of safety guidelines. Because the SeND 
consistently monitored the system's activities, it served as self-appointed watchdog. 
9S Protect and Survive: an archive of civil defence materials. Available: 
http://www.cybertm.demon.co.uklatomic/ (10/10/03) 
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While it worked closely with the Christian peace movement, the disarmament 
movement's sustained presence in Scotland also prevented the issue from completely 
falling off the political map, both at home and abroad. Over a forty-year period 
numerous multinational groups like Ploughshares were inspired by the actions of their 
predecessors, thus, undertakings in Scotland served both as an inspiration and world-
wide model for resistance. However, perhaps the most remarkable accomplishment 
of groups like SeND was far less ostentatious. With restricted access to economic 
and human resources, determination was the disarmament movement's greatest asset 
as it survived extended periods of decline. Their efforts continue to this day. 
96 M. Dando, What would be the value of our civil defence in a nuclear war?, in M.R. Dando and 
B.R.Newman (eds), Nuclear Deterrence: Implications and policy options/or tht I 980s (Kent: Castle: 
House Publications Ltd, 1982), p. 154. 
268 
Chapter Six: CODclusioD 
To this point we have uncovered the Scottish historical experience with Trident but 
there still remains the necessity of drawing together and analysing the various 
questions that have been explored. Three broad themes have been assembled to 
untangle the core arguments of this study from previous chapters, and each has been 
systematically categorised. We begin our analysis with an explanation of people's 
willingness to accept the view that Trident was required to ensure national security. 
Next, we examine the economic implications of Trident and acknowledge that central 
government potentially distorted the facts about its ability to strengthen the Scottish 
economy. Lastly, this chapter highlights other inconspicuous factors that assisted 
residents in disregarding the system's presence, a symptom largely sustained by 
exaggerated economics and enigmatic safety precautions. Ultimately, this conclusion 
defines the relationship between Scots and the national deterrent over the 1979-1999 
period. 
National security 
Whether it be a conventional or nuclear conflict, the mechanics of going to war 
required communication, appropriate response and time to bring individual member 
states of NATO on to a war footing; the importance of Scotland's collaboration in 
these matters was nothing less than imperative. 1 During the Cold War Scots generally 
understood that their homeland was riddled with immediate and major targets for 
Russian warheads, with the country committing itseJfto American, British and NATO 
I Miller, The Cold War, p. 319. 
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security planning. Though Scotland's dependency on the British state still inspired 
questions of sovereignty, Russian targeting of Scottish territory validated Trident and 
the issue did not, by itself, hold the potential to support an agenda that boJstered the 
need for Scottish Home Rule. However, advocates for disarmament continued to 
question the appropriateness of Scotland's contribution to the nuclear arms race. 
Because Scots were familiar with Polaris. and lodged firmly between the vice of 
economic depression and tensions with the USSR up until the early 1990s, the UK's 
adoption of the Trident system alarmed relatively few north of the Border. ArguabJy, 
concerns with Polaris were allowed to dissipate sometime after the Americans 
occupied the Holy Loch, and before the installation of its British equivalent. There is 
no evidence of mass protest in Scotland associated with the Resolution class. Most in 
Scotland viewed the Polaris replacement as just that, with civil society generaJly 
unaware of the Vanguard's improved capabilities. Chapter Five has shown that those 
opposed to Trident remained focused on the results this system would have provided 
in the event of a nuclear exchange or some unforeseen accident. However, this was a 
distinct minority. Trident's advocates in Scotland also represented a lesser percentage 
of the population, but they asserted that the system was crucial for both employment 
and the defence of the West. Nevertheless, that which was not seen nor heard sparked 
little interest. Trident, like Polaris, was a stealthy system tucked away in the Clyde 
Estuary, and with Scots preoccupied by their economic situation this allowed a 
majority to disregard its presence. 
From a political perspective, this thesis has argued that opposition to Trident in the 
1980s was problematic, and after the Cold War it was viewed as irrelevant. Further 
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explanation is in order. For the British electorate economics generally take 
precedence over defence issues. At a British level, in the 19805 voters may have 
construed emphasis on the national deterrent by Trident's political opposition as an 
attempt to avoid the economic issue. Yet within a Scottish context, many regarded 
Thatcher and her economic policies 'with dislike, occasionally with loathing', but a 
credible number were receptive to the enhanced security or jobs that they believed 
Trident could provide.2 For voters opposed to Trident and unwilling to accept 
Scotland's dependency on the unitary state, separation was an alternative. However, if 
an elector rejected Britain's nuclear defence strategy this did not imply that 
sovereignty was the preferred option, as rational thought, more often than not, dictated 
that it was preferable to retain Scotland's semi-autonomous status despite the SSBN's 
presence. It was this alternative that gathered the greatest level of support from the 
Scottish electorate. Finally, after 1991 Scottish demands for Trident's 
decommissioning, from a financial standpoint, would have been considered by some 
as nothing less than self-destructive given that Scots had already endured the worst of 
the Cold War. 
After the 1991 fall of communism in Eastern Europe, issues like 'first strike' and 'hard 
target' were considered irrelevant, and the Trident issue was no longer important to the 
Scottish electorate. Yet, in terms of security, it was assumed that Trident still served a 
purpose. In January of that year hostilities in the Persian GuJfled to the invasion, and 
liberation, of Kuwait; the Americans left the Holy Loch in November and within 
weeks the lowering of the Soviet flag over the Kremlin symbolised a second Russian 
revolution as the Soviet Union fell. But with the passing of the communist 
2 Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, p. 165 
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superpower, it was Saddam Hussein's aggression towards its neighbour, including the 
use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988, which tested the UK's defence 
posture against 'reality rather than hypothesis,.3 The system's continuity was therefore 
seen as a reflection of the international community. Nevertheless, issues like 
devolution, the Poll Tax or the economy were of the highest priority in Scotland, and 
if Trident was decommissioned after the Cold War the British electorate would have 
considered this to be both a threat to national security and a monumental waste of the 
taxpayer's money. Britain's Trident would remain in Scotland. 
Lastly, there was no experience of a nuclear accident with Trident, and the political 
potency of the SSBN in Scotland only continued with its downward spiral. Both the 
STue's and NFLA's experiences verify this. In the future some unfortunate mishap 
on the Clyde could reverse this trend, but from 1979-1999 this assertion stands. With 
the promise of greater autonomy in Scotland fulfilled after 1997 and Trident left to 
roam in relative peace, the issue was effectively overpowered (Pbotograpb 6.1)." In 
terms of security, each region had an obligation to the state. For Scotland. Trident was 
part of this responsibility but further analysis of the economic dimension reveals that 
the system left much to be desired 
Economic necessity and employment 
This thesis has shown that Trident's contribution to the Scottish economy was over· 
rated by both central government and the Scottish electorate. The First World War 
3 See S.K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: the politics o/revenge (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2000). See 
chapter three. R. Mottram, 'Options for Change: Process and Prospects" RUSI Journal. Spring 1991, 
pp 22-24; Third Report, Options/or Change: The Royal Navy, paras 40 and 41, He 266 of Session 
1991-92. 
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Photograph 6.1: HMS Vengeance arrives to Coulport, 1999 
4 This was according to Labour 's Strategic Defence Review. 
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had brought with it a dependence on arms production, as global conflict provided for 
full employment in Scottish factories re-designed for war work. Yet despite the 'Red 
Clyde' phenomenon and the enhancement of 'workplace power and collective 
organisation', political scientist John Foster described Scottish civil society at that 
time as a culture of survival. S At the start of the Second World War the Scottish 
economy was not dissimilar from that which evolved during the previous years of 
conflict or post-war reconstruction. In the early 1940s the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Tom Johnston, pressured the Churchill government into shifting significant 
war production back into Scotland.6 Again the country's economy was bolstered 
through anns production. However, after 1945 Scottish dependency on defence took 
on the nuclear dimension and continued amidst tensions with the Soviet Union, but 
this transition implied little for heavy industry as Polaris and Trident SSBNs were 
built south of the Border. Though some conventional class boats were assembled in 
Scotland, submarine production brought little reJiefto the country as heavy industries 
were permitted to suffer a slow and painful death. 
The drive to establish a means of support is not uniquely a Scottish characteristic in 
that there are countless examples of this throughout history. Yet in western society 
what is distinctly Scottish about this situation is the degree to which the Scottish 
economy relied on defence over the course of four decades. Spaven has argued that a 
majority of studies on the economic impact of bases suggested that ffor every 100 
jobs (service personnel and directly-employed civilians) created at a base there are 
between twenty and sixty jobs indirectly generated in the local economy'. However, 
5 For more on the 'Red Clyde' see J. Foster, The Twentieth Century, 1914·1979 in R.A. Houston and 
W.W.J. Knox (eds.) The New Penguin History ofScotlantl: From the Earliest Times to the fusent I)(IY 
1London: Penguin Press, 2001), p. 426. 
Ibid, p. 453. 
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he has noted that a private export industry created twice as many jobs. 7 Nevertheless, 
at the end of the millennium the Scottish economy did not establish a reputation for 
adaptability. Despite the discovery of the first 'Scottish' oil field in 1970, the 'cruel 
accountancy of market forces' failed to either transfonn or prepare Scottish industry 
for oil production.8 In 1913 some 100,000 were employed in the metal manufacturing 
sector but by 1980 the steel industry in Scotland began to contract, with the 
Ravenscraig plant extinguished in 1992 due to the rationalisation programme of a 
privatised British steel. In 1913 there were 400 collieries but by 1990 the Scottish 
miner was left with two. Between 1951-1991 the shipbuilding industry was purged of 
some 63,000 jobs.9 In comparison, Trident's effect on the Scottish economy was 
marginal. In 1981 Polaris facilities in Scotland employed 8,400, and by 1999 Trident 
provided a meagre 3,300 jobs. Scottish historians have written extensively on 
Scotland's transition from heavy industry to the electronics and financial services 
sectors in the 1990s, but, serving as testimony to the SSBNs impact on the Scottish 
economy, none have incorporated either Polaris or Trident into their economic 
analysis. Their silence over the national deterrent speaks volumes. 
There is a clear possibility that central government deliberately exaggerated Trident's 
economic potential in order to overwhelm its controversy in Scotland. In the midst of 
the Cold War and a struggling economy it was this ingenious strategy that nurtured 
tolerance, rather than hostility, between the thousands of civilian employees and 
Trident's adversaries. This arrangement ultimately served to pressurise Scottish civil 
society, but it was skilfully employed so as not to divide communities. ultimately 
7 Spaven, Fortress Scotland, p. 32. 
8 Payne, The Economy, pp. 29-31. 
9 In 1913 twenty of those collieries were large producers. Harvie, No Gods and PrC!C'/OIIS Few lI~rot!.''I. 
p.4. 
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contributing to a loose form of social cohesiveness. However, in its attempts to 
convince Scots of Trident's economic significance central government and 
Conservative Members of Parliament consistently failed to mention the system's 
higher standard of efficiency to that of Polaris. They were therefore culpable of 
overemphasising the system's true economic impact. So effective was this technique 
that, for many, Trident was idealised; prompting few to question the system's capacity 
for future job reductions. 10 
It was the Scots time-tested propensity for acclimatisation that allowed for their rather 
relaxed degree of familiarisation with Polaris and Trident. Whether their ability to 
'buckle on one's armour' has always served them favourably over the centuries is 
open to conjecture, and Scotland's imperial past, inevitably tied to economic interests, 
was likely to be an influential factor over Scotland's relationship with the deterrent. If 
we consider nuclear weapons against this background, the analysis of historian Linda 
Colley may be of assistance. 
When discussing Scottish participation in the empire Colley stated that investment in 
the British imperium enabled Scots to feel themselves 'peers of the English in a way 
still denied them in an island kingdom' .11 There has long been a tradition in Scotland 
of providing recruits for the UK's armed forces with Spaven describing this as 
'predominantly lower ranks of the "poor bloody infantry".12 Due to the consistent 
level of high unemployment in Scotland and concentrated recruiting drives in specific 
areas, the Scottish contribution of military personnel per head of population was, 
10 In terms of technological advancement, submarine reactor refuelling had taken mammoth steps 
forward. The Astute class, to be stationed at Faslane, would not require refuelling throughout their 
anticipated lifetime of up to thirty years. Van Der Vat, Standard of Power, p. 418. 
II ibid.,p. 136. 
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again according to Spaven, 'likely to be higher than the UK average' .13 However, 
Scots have also gone on to establish themselves as important figures within the 
military establishment, particularly the Royal Navy. When Highlander Hugh 
Mackenzie was appointed Chief Executive for the Polaris Programme it made him 
one of the most important submariners in British history.14 Therefore, in an age 
without empire, could maintaining the SSBN in Scotland, coinciding with other 
military and political contributions, be but one way of bringing that sentiment home? 
Though a distinct possibility, this question remains to be answered. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union it is certain that lasting economic interests were 
still key in Trident's ability to remain in Scotland undisturbed. IS Puerto Rico's 
experience with the US Navy is a useful comparison that might best demonstrate the 
veracity of this statement. For years there had been intense opposition to the 
American bombing range at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station on Vieques, and when the 
US Navy closed the facility in July 2003 the island lost the $250 million injected 
annually into its economy and the civilian jobs it provided. The opposition was 
successful, but whether residents ofVieques lived to appreciate their victory over 
their fonner American employer remains to be seen. When questioned about the 
impact of the US Navy's decision to the Puerto Rican economy, Senator James M. 
Inhofe, Oklahoma Republican and member of the Senate Anned Services Committee, 
coldly stated, 'that's their problem, the time for them to be concerned about that was 
when they were kicking us off our range .• 16 Rosyth's fonner employees have already 
undergone what the Puerto Ricans are currently experiencing, but one can only 
12 Spaven, Fortress Scotland, p. 3. 
13 Spaven, Fortress Scotland, p. 3. 
14 Van Oer Vat, Standard of Power, p. 359. 
IS Chemical and biological weapons were still a concern after the Cold War. 
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imagine as to whether Fife residents long for the days of refitting British SSBNs or 
prefer its absence. 
Health researcher Maggie Mort has described civilian employees opposed to nuclear 
weapons as 'economic conscripts' in the Trident project, and because the defence 
industry was vulnerable to a number of external influences Scottish workers were 
inevitably forced to accept that which was dealt to them. I? In September 2003 the 
Public Accounts Committee announced that Trident's relocation from Rosyth to 
Devonport cost £300 million more than originally projected, ultimately discrediting 
Rifkind's 1993 analysis. 18 Poor management was but one possibility that underlined 
the hazards of such dependency, with the Dockyard smothered under the weight of 
faulty judgement. Preferring to maintain an optimistic view, the Blair government 
continued to argue that hosting Trident still had its benefits 
Public indifference to Trident 
Without question, less obvious factors bolstered Scottish cooperation with the 
national deterrent. During the Cold War British possession of a credible system eased 
public concerns with American strategic objectives. Yet when we attempt to 
delineate the Scottish historical experience with Trident from within the context of the 
Union, it is also increasingly apparent that, along with operational suitability, interests 
in self-preservation held implications for where the system should be situated. Those 
in England, Northern Ireland and Wales were all too prepared to accept the services of 
16 The Washington Times, 20 July 2003, p. 3. 
17 Mort, Building the Trident Network, p. 114. 
18 Thirty seventh Report from the Committee of Public Account, Ministry of Defence: The construction 
of nuclear submarine facilities at Devonport, HC636 of Session 2002-2003. 
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a replacement system for the outdated Resolution class Polaris fleet, so long as it took 
residence outside their own geographical boundaries. Following Thatcher's decision 
to acquire Trident, this assertion becomes evident as mass protest over the GLCM at 
Greenham Common did not represent a commitment by the British public to the 
removal of Trident from Faslane. While the abandonment of cruise missiles brought a 
collective sigh of relief for those in England, protest in Scotland was subdued as the 
system was to be established in what many may have considered to be a remote 
location. Furthennore, this perception appears to have been shared amongst a 
considerable number in Scotland. To this day the Ministry of Defence has done little 
to dispel this false perception as idealised photography still presents the SSBN against 
a background devoid of Scottish communities.19 This study has served to discourage 
any understandable misconceptions. 
Sporadic emphasis on public safety and the environment by both the Ministry of 
Defence and the Royal Navy was successful in containing opposition to Trident, thus 
easing tensions in Scotland. Since its arrival there is little room for doubt that the safe 
operation of the SSBN has been, at considerable cost to the taxpayer, held to the 
highest of standards. Nevertheless, Chalmers and Walker have suggested that, 
'Whether public antagonism to nuclear weapons in Scotland is as great as activists 
claim is open to question. ,20 This statement in itself verified the uncertainty 
surrounding the state of opposition. Mort has also stated that Trident 'does not seem 
to have been a major issue' for the US public, with the UK, and Scotland in particular, 
apparently following the American trend.21 Accidents involving submarines were 
inevitable, but because there were no incidents with Trident in Scotland, controversy 
19 The cover photo is but one of numerous examples of idealised photography. 
20 Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 42. 
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remained contained. However, considering that a handful of activists have 
successfully boarded parked submarines at Faslane, after September 11 2001 it is no 
longer inconceivable that a car bomb or modified speedboat could damage either a 
nuclear convoy en route to Coulport or a nuclear vessel moored on the Gareloch 
(Photograph 6.2). 
The notion that Trident was a remarkable technological achievement is indisputable, 
but both the applicability and utility of nuclear weapons has been subject to fervent 
criticism since the first usage of radiation bombs on Japan. Despite concerns with 
WMD at the time of writing this thesis, and the attempts of 'rogue nations' to 
establish nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, it remains uncertain as to 
whether this will assist Trident's opponents in Scotland. When some who assisted in 
designing the US Trident system's re-entry body described it as 'a symptom ofa 
deeper sickness in our society', the project's value is called into question.22 
Nonetheless, when considering the Scottish historical experience with Trident it is 
apparent that the majority made no public declarations whatsoever. This study has 
clearly demonstrated that over a relatively short period, Scots came to disregard the 
issue in return for significant employment, and that Trident sustained little political 
value so long as it was maintained safely. With the system left to frequent Scottish 
waters and its warheads free to travel various motorways, it appears that the efforts of 
those who once marched to the Holy Loch in defiance had been long forgotten. That 
being said, in 1999 there was little question that the probability of ridding Scotland of 
Trident, and future versions of the SSBN, was anything but likely. 
21 Mort, Building the Trident Network, p. 4. 
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Photograph 6.2: Activist welcomes HMS Vengeance to Scotland, 1999 
22 Thjs was a comment from Bob Aldridge, who worked on the Polari , P idon and Trid nl 
and has since criticised his work. 'Focus on Trident', Red Pepper (2004), p. 6. 
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March - May 1961 
October 1962 
April 1963 
May 1963 
September 1966 
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March 1976 
January 1979 
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May 1979 
July 1980 
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March 1981 
June 1981 
March 1982 
June 1982 
September 1982 
January 1983 
May 1983 
June 1983 
May 1984 
Chronology: The SSBN in Scotland 
Macmillan allows the US Navy's use of the Holy Loch 
as a forward-operating base for the Polaris deterrent. 
SeND assembles action against US presence at the 
Holy Loch. 
Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Polaris Sales Agreement concluded between US and 
UK governments. The Admiralty Polaris Committee 
also agrees that Rosyth should refit the new sea-based 
deterrent as well as other SSNs. 
Work to accommodate the UK's Polaris programme at 
Faslane begins, government places orders for Polaris 
boats. 
The first of the Resolution class Polaris boats, HMS 
Resolution, is launched. 
HMS Resolution undergoes first patrol from Faslane 
HMS Repulse commissioned. 
HMS Renown commissioned. 
HMS Revenge commissioned. 
Nixon and Brezhnev sign the first Strategic Anns 
Limitation Treaty. 
Ford and Brezhnev sign the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe between the US 
and USSR. 
Soviets deploy SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe 
Callaghan and Carter reach agreement over Trident 
Scottish devolution referendum fails to pass with 40 per 
cent approval. 
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher replace Labour 
government with forty-three seat majority. 
The GLCM is considered but decision to procure 
Trident I announced by Thatcher government. 
Manchester City Council joins NFLA, Glasgow and 
Edinburgh follow soon after. 
Labour splits, 'Gang of four' set to establish the SOP. 
First NOPD for Trident Works Programme released. 
Decision to procure Trident II announced by Thatcher 
government; Catholic Church condemns Trident; 
Argentineans invade the Falklands. 
Faslane Peace Camp established outside submarine base 
Missile fitting and servicing for Trident transferred to 
US facility. 
OS 19 established to counter eND influence. 
Strathclyde Regional Council's Coulport Inquiry 
released. 
Conservatives win general election with 144 seat 
majority. 
Dumbarton District Council joins NFLA; revised 
NOPD released. 
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March 1985 
May 1985 
May 1986 
June 1987 
March 1988 
May 1989 
October 1989 
November 1989 
January 1990 
November 1990 
December 1990 
November 1991 
December 1991 
April 1992 
September 1992 
October 1992 
June 1993 
August 1993 
May 1994 
January 1995 
October 1995 
March 1996 
July 1996 
December 1996 
May 1997 
September 1997 
November 1997 
May 1998 
July 1998 
May 1999 
September 1999 
October 1999 
Chronology: The SSBN in Scotland 
Secretary of State for Scotland, George Younger, 
approves Trident Works Programme. 
Asbestos discovered at Faslane; AESG releases first 
study on Trident. 
NOPD released for Rosyth Royal Dockyard. 
Conservatives win general election with 101 seat 
majority, but their Scottish seats plummet from twenty-
one to ten. 
Liberal Democrat Party established; AESG release 
second study on Trident. 
Kinnock and Labour reject disarmament 
NFLA release Civil Defence Planning Assumptions in 
Central Scotland. 
Border between East and West Germany opened. 
Widening ofRhu Narrows begins. 
Thatcher ejected after poll tax riots; John Major is PM. 
Major confirms dedication to project when he states 
states, 'We must have Trident'; Drell Commission 
warns of accidental explosion with Trident SLBM 
during flight. 
US Polaris fleet withdrawn from the Holy Loch. 
Soviet Union collapses. 
Conservatives win general election with twenty-one seat 
majority. 
Major government announces competition for refits 
HMS Vanguard arrives at Faslane. 
Rosyth stripped of Trident refits. 
Faslane opened for Trident; HMS Vanguard 
commissioned. 
HMS Victorious arrives at Faslane. 
HMS Victorious commissioned. 
Blair convinces trade unions to reject disarmament. 
HMS Vigilant arrives at Faslane. 
ICJ Advisory Opinion rules the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons violated humanitarian law. 
HMS Vigilant commissioned. 
Labour government returns under Blair with 177 seat 
majority. 
Scottish devolution referendum passed. 
Royal Assent given to Scotland Act 1997. 
Declaration of Faslane released. 
Strategic Defence Review confirms Labour's dedication 
to Trident. 
HMS Vengeance arrives at Faslane; Labour secures 
majority in Scottish Parliament. Scottish Parliament 
reconvened. 
HMS Vengeance commissioned. 
'Trident three' acquitted. 
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Appendix A: Scottish local government 
It is necessary to provide clarification over the arrangement of Scotland's local 
government as references to the Strathclyde and Fife Regions are likely to confuse the 
uninitiated reader. Prior to 1974 Scotland was divided into thirty-three county 
councils and 201 town councils, including the four cities of Aberdeen, Dundee, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow. City Corporations governed larger cities. However,local 
government underwent reorganisation under Labour in 1974-75, and there was a 
move to establish three unitary Island Councils and nine Regional Councils, broken 
down into fifty-three District Councils. Regional Councils controlled larger 
populations and involved extensive geographical boundaries. These changes created a 
more cohesive identity for the various regions but it also empowered local authorities 
in that it allowed them to be more confrontational on various issues. During the 
procurement stage of Trident this allowed for greater tension between the two levels 
of government. After the completion of shore facilities both Strathclyde and Fife 
ceased to exist following the reorganisation ofl996. Post-l 996 a single-tier structure 
allowed for twenty-nine unitary authorities with the three island councils remaining. I 
See maps on the following page. 
ISee Central Office ofInformation. Scotland, (London: HMSO,1974) p. 13; lain G.C. Hutchison, 
'Government' in T.M. Devine and R.I. Finlay (eds.) Scotland in the 2(jh Century, (Edinburgh: EUP, 
1996), p. 60; I. Maver, Glasgow, (Edinburgh: EUP, 2000), p. 216-217; and Whitaker's Scottish 
Almanac (London: A&C Black, 2003), p. 79. 
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Appendix B: Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) 
SEP A was established by the Major government under the Environment Act 1995 as 
Trident was to assume responsibility for the national deterrent the following year. 
After the government's unfortunate handling ofRosyth Dockyard in 1993 and the 
arrival of Vanguard class SSBNs to Faslane it probably supported any efforts to repair 
its tarnished image in Scotland. Though the Agency's primary function was to ensure 
the protection of the Scottish environment, it may have also been the case where 
central government realised that an additional safety champion might have 
demonstrated its appreciation for Scottish apprehensions with Trident. This is purely 
speCUlative. Nevertheless, after 1997 the Labour government's delivery of greater 
Scottish autonomy held few implications for the Agency. SEP A was sponsored by the 
Environment Protection Unit in the Scottish Executive's Environment and Rural 
Affairs Department, and was responsible for issues such as the keeping and use of 
radioactive substances; protection of the public and environment by minimalising 
production of radioactive waste; and ensuring that doses of all man-made sources of 
radioactivity in food and the environment remained below one millisievert per year. 2 
Amongst a number of responsibilities, the Environmental Monitoring Programme 
specifically focused on discharges from Dounreay nuclear research and fuel 
reprocessing facility, Chapelcross, Faslane and Rosyth Dockyard.3 However, 
according to Chalmers and Walker, the Ministry of Defence was exempt under the 
Radioactive Substances Act of 1993, and this implied that there was no statutory 
requirement to honour SEPA's procedures; with discharge agreements subjected to 
full public consultation as if there were no Crown exemption. Chalmers and Walker 
also noted that complex safety and environmental regulations were to be handled by 
'the Ministry of Defence in conjunction with safety and regulatory bodies located 
South of the Border where the main competences reside; and that 'the London-based 
Secretary of State for Scotland, rather than the Edinburgh-based First Minister', was 
responsible for protecting Scottish interests with safety.4 
2 The sievert relates to the absorbed dose in human tissue to the effective biological damage of the 
radiation. See Radiation Reassessed. Available: http://whyfiles.org/020radiationlfact_sheet.html. 
(09/03/02). 
3 Scottish Environment Protection Agency. Environmental Radioactivity in Scotland (200 I). p.2. 
4 'Civilianising' of regulatory activity also involved work carried out by the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NIl) as well as SEPA. See Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker. Uncharted Walers., 
p.S7. 
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Appendix C: The Clyde Off site Safety Plan 
Dumbarton District Council participated in the pre-planning of the Scheme and would 
have supervised its execution should it have ever became necessary. From 1999 
Argyll and Bute Council had responsibility for co-ordinating the preparations of the 
Clyde Offsite Safety Plan and for managing consultations with the public. These 
preparations replaced the fonner Clyde Area Public Safety Scheme. A Local Liaison 
Committee was to co-ordinate, manage and liaise with local emergency services.s A 
correspondence with Eleanor Steel of Argyll and Bute Council revealed that after 
1999, 'in order to look at the plan afresh, a multi-agency group was brought together 
to ensure that the plan fulfilled all the requirements of civilian agencies'. However, it 
should be acknowledged that this plan was designed to response to accidents 
involving submarine reactor but there were no proposals for a weapon accident.6 
Neither the Safety Scheme nor the Off site Plan were ever enacted. 
5 Report of Inquiry into the proposed extension of the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport. 9 
September 1983, p. 40; The Local Liaison Committee was established during the Polaris era. Chalmers 
and Walker, Uncharted Water, p. 169. 
6 Correspondence with Eleanor Steel, Argyll and Bute Council. (06/07/02). 
287 
Appendix D: Ding Dong Dollar' 
Chorus: 
Oh ye cannae spend a dollar when ye're deid 
No ye cannae spend a dollar when ye're deid 
Singing, Ding Dong Dollar, everybody holler 
Ye cannae spend a dollar when ye're deid 
o the Yanks have just drapped anchor affDunoon 
And they've had a civic welcome frae the toon 
As they came up the measured mile 
Bonnie Mary 0' Argyle 
Was wearing spangled drawers ablow her goon 
And the publicans will a' be daein' swell 
For it's jist the thing that's sure tae ring the bell 
Aye the dollars they will jingle 
There'll be no a lassie single 
Even though they'll maybe blow us a' tae hell 
And the Clyde is sure tae prosper now they're here 
Because they're chargin' one and tenpence for the beer 
Ay, an' if you want a taxi 
They stick it up your - jersey 
An' they charge you thirty bob tae Sandbank Pier 
But the Glesca Moderator disnae mind 
In fact he thinks the Yanks are awfy kind 
'Cause if it's Heaven that ye're goin' 
It's a quicker way than rowin' 
And there's sure tae be naebody left behind 
7 Words by Trad, Thurso Berwick, J. Mack and Jim Mclean. Also visit the Scottish Centre for Political 
Song at Glasgow Caledonian University. 
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